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CHAPTER I 
THE POLITICS OF DEPOLITICIZATION 
Motion pictures do more than just reflect our political life. If we take seriously the 
cultural construction of human identity—how social life forges the performative features 
of gender and sex, race and ethnicity—then American movies of the 20th century were 
more than a mirror onto a culture. They were dreams that made that culture. They were 
mass produced dreams for the most part, commercial products of a factory-based system 
in Hollywood. As much a reflection of the political, the cinema has always been 
productive of political identity, a medium of images that travel along our relations of 
power. These images are the products of an industry that shaped ideologies and 
institutions central to American political development. The specific ideologies produced 
are less central to the following study than the frames of ideological production—the 
politics of free speech for motion pictures, on the one hand, and the democracy of movie 
propaganda, on the other. But if the movies were economic products of social 
performance they were also, for much of the classic Hollywood era, a field of delimited 
political power. The story of the early American movie industry is the story of the 
triumph of commercialism over the social power of the cinema. What are the politics that 
lay behind the de-politicization of American movies? 
Film free speech and movie propaganda were two ideological frames of American 
cinema in the 1910s. Both were to be cast aside in the creation of the classic Hollywood 
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system. Film free speech was legally defeated by the Supreme Court Case Mutual Film 
Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (1915) and somewhat ironically limited by 
Hollywood’s first blockbuster and early symbol of film free speech, The Birth of a Nation 
(1915). The defeat of an explicitly propagandistic cinema came later, in the spasmodic 
paranoia of wartime America from 1917–18, in which propaganda itself was put on trial. 
Both film free speech and movie propaganda were severely limited by a commercial 
industry forced to navigate the demands of moral regulation. But in a sense, both of these 
limitations proved incomplete, hollow to the realities of an artistic medium with unique 
and pervasive social power. Commercialism may have triumphed in America’s most 
powerful entertainment industry, but it could never fully eliminate the social power of 
movies.  
As America entered the 1920s, one part of the American film industry—big 
producers in Southern California—set about mastering an industry denatured of political 
meaning, casting aside the free speech argument for film and eliminating the 
propagandistic power of the screen. The process of denaturing the political from the 
American movie industry coincided with other processes: the decline of exhibitor power 
and the rise of producer power in the industry; the decline of progressive era moralism; 
and the destruction of legal liquor. These three developments reinforced the 
depoliticization of American movies, creating opportunities for the future moguls of the 
industry to define the economic arrangements of entertainment and to shape the 
foundations of consumer capitalism. There were a series of strategies, alignments, and 
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conflicts that shaped what we know today as the classic Hollywood system, all of which 
threaded through the main institutional threat—regulation of the industry and 
censorship of the screen. 
Far from the end of politics in the industry, the de-politicization of the movie 
screen necessitated thick political negotiation, beginning with an industry centered on 
the site of consumption—the moving picture theater—and its battles with a powerful 
economic competitor, liquor and the saloon. The movie industry relied on the 
propagandistic spirit of the screen in the progressive era, intimately binding together the 
value of deliberative democracy and the commercial imperative of motion pictures. This 
industry-sanctioned political power of propaganda helped defeat liquor interests and the 
ubiquitous saloon. Attacking the saloon through movies could conveniently make 
movies respectable by cutting against liquor’s immoral and deleterious social effects. As 
war raged between these two industries, both were developing unique conceptions of 
personal liberty that tied consumption to individual freedom. For the liquor interests, 
particularly the brewers, this discursive formulation of modern liberty often centered on 
the notion of liberal identity and liberal action, attenuating the negative conceptions of 
liberal consumption (as excessive and immoderate) by infusing it with temperate 
freedom and the distinction between liberty and license. These discursive formations 
were failures in the immediate term, but they fertilized the cultural ground in which 
modern liberty becomes more than political and propertied freedom. 
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For the movie exhibitors of early American film, liberty was formulated through 
the democratic value of free speech welded to the realities of influence and persuasion. 
This meant propaganda, but not simply as an inevitable feature of politics and power, 
rather propaganda as a desirable instrument of democratic will. The motion picture 
theater could embody the democratic arena of deliberation, in this conception, 
revitalizing the machinery of self-government so central to the anxieties and hopes of 
progressivism. Along these lines, American cinema was developing a robust capacity for 
an explicitly political, if still commercial, medium. Legal conceptions of the cinema 
curtailed this political function. In the Mutual case, lawyers for the film distributors 
argued that film was entitled to First Amendment protection on grounds that it was both 
speech and publications, protection that would render state and municipal film 
censorship boards unconstitutional. The Court answered by denying this conception of 
the cinema, ruling instead that film was not speech nor a publication of the press, but 
simply an economic product subject to interstate commerce regulation.  
The relationship between the commercial industry and political cinema were 
further troubled by the release and exhibition of D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation 
(1915). Sold out shows, protests, and censorship agitation followed the film’s exhibition 
at nearly every stop. Legal challenges were raised in Chicago, Boston, and New York, and 
while lawyers for the film argued for free speech protection, these arguments failed to 
advance the cause of film free speech. Defenders of the film did win in these legal 
challenges for the most part, but only by advancing the argument of property protection 
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under the 14th Amendment Due Process clause. Although Griffith and his producers 
denied that the film was explicit propaganda, it was viewed by many at the time as an 
incitement toward racial demagoguery and white terror. Defenders of the film attempted 
to parse the conceptions of cinema as propaganda and speech, arguing that Birth hardly 
constituted the former but demanded legal protection as the latter. More broadly 
speaking, Birth mobilized conflicting social movements that defined the early 
configurations of modern liberalism at the progressive turn—a political call for free 
speech articulated through the propagandistic powers of cinema on the one hand, and a 
liberalism grounded in civil rights and racial justice on the other. Such a distinction rests 
along traditional legal lines of civil liberty (in this case, to engage in the free speech of 
racist demagoguery) and civil right (to suppress such exhibitions of racist propaganda as 
harmful to the public). The Birth of a Nation so often appears at the nexus of this complex 
cultural formation, determining not just what American cinema becomes, but what it 
does not become, and limiting the development not just of an industry but of a political 
culture in the throes of a crisis over the modernization of democracy. As a powerful 
symbol of film speech, Birth was the well spring of modern liberalism’s civil libertarian 
form, but it also provided conditions for the fruitful generation of social justice in 
twentieth century American culture, a conception of justice that cut powerfully against 
the film’s racist paranoia.  
Griffith’s epic was not the birth of an industry indelibly tied to propaganda, but 
precisely the opposite—it was the first articulation of a crisis in the propagandistic power 
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of the medium, the beginning of the end for explicitly political cinema. Here it is 
important to note that most of the men who would eventually become moguls of classic 
Hollywood started out in exhibition. For the first era of American silent film, power 
shifted in varying degrees from the owners of raw production material and industry 
patents to the point of purchase and site of consumption: the motion picture theater. 
Exhibitors were motivated by economic interests, of course, but often understood this 
interest through the theater’s social binds to the community. Exhibitors had an 
economic interest in democracy, or, at least, the revolution in democracy the motion 
picture theater promised to be. Such a spirited conception of political cinema was fully 
amplified in World War One, when the American motion picture theater fashioned itself 
a civic institution capable of mobilizing wartime will and patriotism, both through 
propaganda movies and the Four Minute Men, who articulated the war’s progressive 
cause in the time it took to change a movie reel. The war was the apotheosis of 
progressivism, exhibitor power in the movie industry, and propagandistic power in 
American cinema. 
Propaganda as a functional part of democracy necessitates the doctrine of free 
speech. The competition of persuasion and influence relies on conditions fostered 
through open and fair opportunity for communication. But the art of persuasion is often 
most effective when closing off the potential for persuasive speech among competing 
and alternate options. Propaganda necessitates free speech, but one of the imminent 
challenges to free speech is the social power of propaganda itself. The tension between 
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a principle and form of communication was rarely more manifest than in World War I. 
The Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, sought to harness the 
powers of propaganda to sell America and the world on progressivism, but they also 
sought to stifle, and at times prosecute, speech they felt harmful to the war effort. The 
ideological force of propaganda severely undermined the ideological principle of free 
speech, a conflict often articulated through the movies.  
For the movie men consolidating the industry around the power center of 
Hollywood, propaganda and film free speech were both threats to the system they were 
trying to create. Propaganda threatened the inevitability of state regulation and political 
contestation over the method and content of the cinema. If the movies were to become 
the arena of democracy, politics would have to be its spectacle and story—the wood, 
brick, and mortar of its visual expression. The process undertaken to ward off this threat 
of propaganda was the depoliticization of the movie screen, a process most visible in the 
entanglements, and later disentanglements, between liquor and the movies. As the 
movies harnessed the social power of propaganda to defeat legal liquor in the 1910s, it 
sought in remarkable degrees to denature this very power when the federal authorities 
pressured Hollywood to aid prohibition enforcement in the 1920s. Liquor wasn’t the only 
cultural force that made visible this process of American cinema shedding its explicitly 
political function: the rise and fall of the second wave Klan, party politics, and educative 
cinema had to be negotiated by the commercial interests of Hollywood. The process was 
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the depoliticization of American movies. The outcome of this process was the dream 
factory of Hollywood’s narrative-based cinema.  
The big producers in Hollywood also had little use for film free speech. The 
principled call of speech protection that animated the defense of The Birth of a Nation 
was an idealistic and utopian vision that, in this case, was grounded in images of white 
supremacy and racial demagoguery. Despite its huge financial success, Birth’s 
controversies revealed the perils of the industry’s future, not its promise. Coordinating 
acceptable and unacceptable guidelines for Hollywood movies required a more limited 
ground. Film free speech, in principle, created a more open field of film expression, in 
which independents and proponents of non-commercial cinema could present 
alternatives to Hollywood’s consolidated vision for the industry. With film free speech 
more a danger than a principle with which to defend their interests, the big producers 
embarked on a process of internal self-regulation of movie content. To condition 
regulatory principles and build the capacity of an institutionalized self-regulatory 
regime required greater horizontal coordination among producers and control over the 
political environment surrounding the movie industry. Thus, when Will Hays and the 
MPPDA closed off film products that were used as recruitment materials by the 
burgeoning Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, despite also working with Klan mobilizations to 
scuttle film censorship bills, the big producers sought to suppress the social power of 
movies to influence the public, limiting speech through coordinated business practices. 
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Internalizing movie regulation was, foremost, a psychological and pragmatic 
process for the big producers, Hays, and the MPPDA office. Unlike the arguments for 
propaganda and film free speech in the 1910s, they were not ideologically motivated. It 
was psychological in its accommodation to moral forces. Hays and MPPDA officers 
consistently talked about the right “psychological time” to engage the censorship issue, 
and that the work of the Association was “principally psychological.” “The people of this 
country must have their amusement or the country will go red,” Hays would warn. The 
movies could provide “a mood of relaxation, of reception—in precisely that state of mind 
and emotion in which a master psychologist would want them to come.” This public 
condition, of a “plastic state for the receiving and holding of impressions,” acknowledged 
the great fear of reformers—that the movies had tremendous influence over society—in 
order to make the case that a consolidated industry could limit film expressions to the 
morally safe and culturally acceptable.1  
Developing the capacity for self-censorship was also pragmatic in its economic 
strategy and deployment. There was a trial-and-error process that slowly shaped 
acceptable and unacceptable parameters for movie content. The code developed through 
a series of applications, objections, revisions, and reapplications of social and political 
meaning in movie content throughout the 1920s. Broadly speaking, the self-regulation 
of the American movie industry required four overlapping and reinforcing steps: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Will H. Hays, speech at the Carnegie Institute, May 26, 1922. In: WHH Papers, vol. 1, reel 5. 
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horizontal coordination of business practices by big producers in Hollywood; moral 
control over the site of production by defining acceptable and unacceptable movie 
content; fully coordinated vertical integration of the industry in which big producers 
control the industry chain down to the movie theater; and, finally, moral mastery over 
screen content through the institutionalization of moral regulation. This four step 
process aided in the depoliticization of American film necessary to ward off external 
regulation without having to resort to a defense of film free speech, a defense that 
threatened to undue the industry’s consolidated plutocracy. Self-regulation would not 
be fully institutionalized until 1933–34 with the establishment of the Production Code 
Administration. By then, educative and religious film interests were cast aside, the 
screen had been white-washed of explicit political meaning, exhibitor’s power had been 
dismantled and scattered, and power in the industry had become synonymous with the 
power of Hollywood.  
The depoliticization of the American movie screen was not motivated by 
ideational or cultural factors, but rather a more crudely political and economic 
negotiation that served the interests of the big producers in shaping the features of the 
classic Hollywood system. Along these lines, The Birth of a Nation became a template of 
what to avoid—propaganda, political controversy, psychological disruption, not 
psychological pacification. These limitations were already manifest in World War One, 
where Robert Goldstein’s The Spirit of ’76 and Robert Cochrane’s The Yellow Dog marked 
the incendiary limitations of propagandistic cinema. Spirit and Yellow Dog were both 
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propaganda films and failures—the persuasive war fever of progressivism and democracy 
created the conditions of its own demise. In the early 1920s, as Hays begins insisting that 
the American film industry never did propaganda, movies such as Thomas Ince’s Those 
Who Dance and Louis B. Mayer’s One Clear Call were important if subtler political 
limitations of the Hollywood screen. Casting aside film free speech and movie 
propaganda for a depoliticized and self-regulated movie industry necessitated economic 
coordination and consolidation. But for the blue nose reformers of the progressive era, 
consolidation invited the peril of a “movie trust” and its harmful effects on the social 
body. 
 
Economic Consolidation and Moral Regulation 
The trust problem was viewed by many reformers as the source of the moral 
problem in movies, but no reformer so consistently attacked the movie trust as Canon 
William Sheafe Chase, leader of the Christ Episcopal Church in Brooklyn, New York. 
Chase assailed the movie trust as a “school of crime” that violated the personal liberty 
of the community to protect itself against the ideological forces of violence, decadence, 
desire, and excess. Chase spoke at a congressional hearing on federal film censorship in 
1914, arguing that Congress had a duty not only to censor, but to smash the consolidated 
forces of the industry in order to restore competition. Competition, argued Chase, would 
better foster the conditions for a more righteous and Godly cinema: 
Think of the money and governmental machinery which Congress and the 
States are using to conserve forests, to enrich the land, to improve rivers 
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and channels, protect harbors, and promote the welfare of cattle. 
Congress has found it necessary to control freight rates and restrain trusts 
in order to protect the small businesses of this country. Is not the mental 
and moral welfare of children worth more than all the property, lands, and 
animals of our Republic? The children are the lifeblood of the nation.2  
  
Chase was still at it in 1927, leading the call for censorship and trust busting with 
scathing letters to federal officials and Hays. He was by this time the General Secretary 
of the Federal Motion Picture Council of America, a reform organization that lobbied for 
federal government regulation, both moral and economic, over the American movie 
industry. But was the “movie trust” a real monopoly? And could the restoration of 
competition protect the public from immoral movies?  
As in the uproar over the “liquor trust,” there’s substantial evidence that the 
American film industry was not the insidious monopoly harmful to the public interest 
that reformers like Chase claimed. By the late 1920s, arbitration boards functioned 
relatively smoothly, adjudicating conflicts between exhibitors and distributors 
successfully enough that few cases required an impartial tiebreaker.3 There were 11,197 
disputes between exhibitors and distributors in 1924, for example. 5,697 of these 
disputes were settled before coming to arbitration. 4,875 went to arbitration, 332 were 
withdrawn by the complainants, and 293 were dismissed by the board. Only 15 cases out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Canon William Sheafe Chase, Motion Picture Commission Hearings Before the Committee on Education. 
House of Representatives, 63rd Congress, second session, March 20, 1914. In: National Board of Review 
Archive, New York Public Library, box 142. 
3 This tiebreaker was a seventh arbiter of the board who was chosen by the 6 original arbiters. Exhibitors 
and distributors had equal representation on the board—3 arbiters for the former and 3 for the latter. 
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of 11,197 went to the impartial tiebreaker.4 Block booking, the practice of forcing upon 
exhibitors a slate of movies without much choice over what they could show on their 
screens, appeared to be less common in the 1920s than later historians would claim. Of 
the 47,000 contracts investigated in the 1927 Federal Trade Commission, US vs. Famous 
Players Lasky case, for instance, only 1,741 were block contracts. While the claim from 
big producers that block booking was “merely a case of quantity discount” is hardly 
accurate, it was not a widespread practice, at least in the 1920s.5 Further, while producer-
distributors would quietly admit that arbitration boards had been abused in the past in 
such a way as to be “a club against exhibitors,” Hays and the Association worked hard to 
standardize arbitration practices and ensure some level of fairness in the process.6  
From a legal standpoint, the case against consolidated big producer control over 
the industry required proof of an unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and 
commerce in motion picture films. The pertinent question centered on whether standard 
exhibition contracts or practices such as block booking impose an undue and 
unreasonable restraint on interstate trade. In Standard Oil Company of New Jersey vs. 
United States (1911), the term restraint of trade was legally defined and narrowed to 
contracts that resulted in a monopoly or “the consequences of monopoly.” Without this 
narrowing, restraint of trade could be interpreted to fit any sort of contract regardless of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pettijohn to Hays, MPPDA memo, March 19, 1925; Hays Speech at Vincent Astor’s house, March 19, 1925. 
Hays Papers, vol. 1, reel 21. 
5 Morning Telegraph, January 28, 1927. Clipping in: Hays Papers, vol. 1, reel 31. 
6 W. E. Wilkinson, Annual Report of MPPDA, April 1925. Hays Papers, vol. 1, reel 26. 
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whether it harms the public. The Association did work to suppress competition and shape 
the industry toward greater consolidation. The result, by the 1930s, certainly appeared 
to be the consequences of monopoly. Eight major companies dominated the field, with 
the largest five (Paramount, MGM, Warner Brothers, Twentieth Century-Fox, and RKO) 
having substantial interests in exhibition. These 8 major firms produced some 70% of 
American films, controlled 95% of distribution, and owned some 16% of the total motion 
pictures theaters in the country (but close to 80% of the first-run movie palaces in larger 
cities).7 With this kind of control, big producers were certainly in a position to dictate 
terms and force independents (be they in production or exhibition) to do their bidding.  
By 1935, more vocal antitrust agitation in the New Deal climate led to new 
congressional hearings and drafted legislation. Sponsored by Senator Matthew Neely and 
supported by the much of the same reformers, who argued that not only were big 
producer practices unfair, they also “compelled the showing of undesirable and immoral 
pictures,” the legislation garnered significant press attention, but was ultimately 
defeated by Hays.8 This time, however, the Department of Justice renewed their 
investigations into the industry, culminating in the antitrust suit United States vs. 
Paramount, first filed in 1938. It would take a decade to resolve this case, and its 
resolution was unprecedented. It did not end in criminal prosecution but in an industry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ellis Hawley. The New Deal and the Problem with Monopoly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 
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apology and consent decree by the Association and its members in 1948, after which they 
agreed to sell off their exhibition holdings and end the practice of block booking.9 The 
results of this momentous case were hardly what reformers had in mind. The industry 
thereafter was more decentralized and competitive, but in the context of numerous other 
changing conditions—such as the rise of television, shifting American demographics 
toward suburban lifestyles, changing movie tastes, and greater interest in other culture 
and leisure activities—there is little definitive proof that the Paramount case was the 
deciding factor.10 Moreover, the case certainly did not bring about cheaper ticket prices, 
more moral movies, or higher quality films.11 It took over a generation for the law to test 
the claim that antitrust action would solve the moral problem of American movies, but 
in the 1920s, for the time being, it was a question that was as much political and cultural 
as it was legal and economic.  
Would greater competition bring about more moral movies? From a policy 
standpoint, the distrust of consolidation in the movie industry worked to antithetical 
ends for the progressive moralists. We see in the development of the Production Code a 
capacity for moral self-regulation remarkably cautious, if not conservative, that could 
have only happened through vertical integration and coordinated practices of the big 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Legal review of Justice Department investigation into film boards of trade, Wickersham, Grosevnor, Hess, 
and Pettijohn, May 1926. Hays Papers, vol. 1, reel 26. 
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producers. Moralists assailed big producer control as the source of movies “capable of 
evil,” animated by progressive-era fears of trusts and a nativist fear of a Jewish-
dominated industry. Indeed, anti-Semitism appears to be a significant factor not only in 
the attacks on “immoral” Hollywood, but in the fight against its economic monopoly. 
Canon Chase, for instance, was publicly sympathetic to the Ku Klux Klan, and may have 
himself been a Klansman. Industry consolidation and coordination were greatly 
hampered by the nativist ideology of the era, but the discursive and ideological strategies 
that shaped the depoliticization of the American movie screen necessitated economic 
consolidation and cooperation—it did not necessitate greater competition, and certainly 
not film free speech. 
 Consolidation and scientific management actually fit with progressive thinking 
and ideals, and so it is hard to understand the moral concern over the big producer trust 
in the 1920s without a broader understanding of the cultural and political forces at work. 
The movies were an infant industry, dominated by Jewish immigrants—factors that 
severely curtailed its path toward consolidated self-regulation. Political conditions of 
nativism and anti-Semitism cut against the economic conditions of the 1920s that were 
conducive to consolidation. Hays and the MPPDA office could not facilitate the latter 
without controlling the cultural impulses of the former. The politics of depoliticizing the 
American movie screen were indelibly tied to economic imperatives.  
 
Wither Ideology? Political Obscurity in The Jazz Singer 
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In Blackface White Noise, Michael Rogin writes of two “historiographical 
approaches” to the 1920s—one reactionary, nativist, and conservative, “which makes the 
1920s the last decade of the nineteenth century,” and the other rebellious, youthful, 
ethnic, urban, and entertainment-centered, “which makes the 1920s the harbinger of the 
future.” In a sense, the triumph of the latter over the former, of modern America’s 
pluralism and movie world of self-fulfillment over its sober provincialism, was a triumph 
only for the future to write. In its present, the 1920s appeared to many to be an era of 
nativist triumph, of a reactionary turn to what was always a narrowed and mythic 
America. For Rogin, The Jazz Singer (1927) performs the optimism of America’s future, 
but, in the end, the movie “lets America off the hook and fragments Jewish community” 
by replacing ethnocultural conflict with intergenerational conflict: “Instead of pitting 
Jews against nativism, The Jazz Singer pits father against son.” Within the film’s “culture 
of consumption” is an implicit shoring up of mythic America—a hopeful abstraction of 
spiritual promise and preservation of the whole. Jake Robin rises up by overcoming not 
only his father but “radical, ethnic-based politics as well.”12  
The process of depoliticizing American movie screens and internalizing the moral 
regulation of movie content were strategies that mitigated against both the threat of 
antitrust action and the threat of censorship. Somewhat ironically, this process of 
denaturing the political was one of cultural assimilation for the Jewish movie men of 
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Hollywood, an attempt to accommodate the ideological and cultural modes of ethnic 
construction and deconstruction. It was, in other words, a cultural process that could not 
escape politicizing identity, even if it appeared to be an escape on the surface. Hollywood 
couldn’t have written the story of Hollywood’s ideological constitution any better. Or 
could it? Warner Brothers’ The Jazz Singer (1927) seems to stand near the end of this 
transformation, a movie that signaled the twilight of the silent era and beginning of 
sound, the rise of the Warners to the status of big producers, and the embodiment of a 
cultural journey from Jewish ethnic to American whiteness. But it was also a movie that 
marked the end of a transformative era for the American movie industry, an era in which 
politicized film expressions and non-commercial alternatives were absconded away by 
Will Hays and the moguls in Hollywood. The Jazz Singer is at the end of this story, and so 
in mapping the politics and economic imperatives that denatured the American movie 
screen, Hollywood’s first talking picture is both symbolic and a product of the completed 
transformation. 
 In The Jazz Singer, Al Jolson plays entertainer Jake Robin, who grew up as Jakie 
Rabinowitz in the Lower East Side of Manhattan. His father, a cantor, detests Jakie’s 
Americanization and the godlessness of American entertainment. His hope is for Jakie 
to reject the decadence of jazz for the songs of his race. Jakie is cast out of the home, 
transforms himself into Jake Robin, falls in love with a gentile dancer, and becomes a 
successful entertainer on Broadway. He returns home to capture the heart of his mother, 
but is one again thrown out by his father. Just before the opening of his big break on 
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Broadway, Jake learns that the cantor is on his deathbed. He leaves Broadway for the 
synagogue, chanting the Kol Nidre on the eve of Yom Kippur. His father hears Jake’s song 
and dies in bed with love in his heart. Jake returns to Broadway, singing “My Mammy” to 
his mother and girlfriend as the movie ends. As a biography of Jewish-American life, The 
Jazz Singer is a complex layering of cultural transformation. Jakie’s passage into Jake 
marked the passage of Asa Yoelson into Al Jolson, of the Warners—first generation Jews 
whose father, Benjamin, was a cantor—into movie moguls, and the passage of many in 
the audience from ethnic, urban, and working class into all-American moviegoers. For 
Rogin, The Jazz Singer “displays the history of the men who made Hollywood,” but does 
so to bid farewell to their Jewish past and “mostly [eliminate] Jewish life from the 
screen.” It is a film remarkably candid in revealing the conflicts of Jewish-American 
identity in order to bury it, to move on from the ethnic identities of their past and become 
American.13 
 The Jazz Singer also signaled the ascendancy of big producer control over the 
industry. Before their acquisition of Vitagraph in April 1925, the Warners were small 
producers without a distribution arm. The Warner takeover of Vitagraph was deeply 
entrenched in movie industry politics. It pitted an up-and-coming studio against MPPDA 
defector in Vitagraph, one of the oldest studios and the last major production firm 
without any Jewish executives. The Vitagraph takeover came with Vitaphone, a unique 
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sound synchronization technology that was thought to have little commercial appeal. 
The successful release of Don Juan in August, 1926, a movie with synchronized orchestral 
and operatic numbers, paved the way for production on The Jazz Singer with Al Jolson.14 
The success of The Jazz Singer helped further consolidate the industry, giving Warners a 
smashing box office hit that helped them acquire First National and their impressive 
exhibition chain.15  
 As Rogin writes, “[a]nti-Semitism is The Jazz Singer’s structuring absence.” The 
nativism of 1920s American political culture is the touchstone of the movie’s inner fear 
that required a rejection of Jewish identity, a “wishing away [of] anti-Semitism [that] 
required leaving Jewishness behind, looking forward to the disappearance of the Jews.” 
This rejection of identity is also a rejection of ideology—wishing away politicized film 
required leaving ideology behind. On both levels, these are inherently political 
processes—they are the theoretical ground of politics in Hollywood’s depoliticization. 
The Jazz Singer’s silence and sound reveal these cultural and political rejections with such 
power that the film’s service to history (socio-political history, not strictly film history) 
overshadows its service to entertainment. Both young Jakie and mature Jake personify 
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the commercial and consolidated movie industry—indelibly modern, always in forward 
motion, stripped of the trappings of particular and ethnic identity. By bringing sound 
into the moving picture, Jakie/Jake signify the development of the movies from 
attractions through democratic expression and persuasion to domesticated 
entertainment. Mapped onto The Jazz Singer’s four musical and speaking scenes is the 
development of America’s dream factory, where culture is made, shaped by the myth that 
it can be made outside the political.  
In the first number, Jakie sings the “raggy-time” tunes in Muller’s café-bar, an 
expression of the crude commercial form of the nickelodeon era, performed beside 
vaudeville and other attractions. This first number is a primitive rendering of sound—
the words sung do not match up with the movement of Jakie’s mouth. This lack of 
synchronization indicates a developmental process to both the story and its 
signification. The cinema, burgeoning and new at the dawn of the 20th century, is finding 
its commercial voice. Alternatives to this commercial conception of the movies—
signified by the silent film aesthetic, old world traditions in the Lower East Side, and in 
particular by Cantor Rabinowitz—complicate Jakie’s transformation into Jake, casting 
him out of his Jewish upbringing and into the world of entertainment. Here is the vision 
that American movies could have been something else—particular, pluralistic, open to a 
constellation of voices and forms, rooted in the exhibition of ideas, and, potentially, 
radical in its politics. 
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In the second musical number, this time at Coffee Dan’s, Jake inaugurates the 
spoken word in cinema, warning the audience that “you ain’t seen nothing yet!” It is a 
more polished performance, in which Jolson’s mouth matches the words being heard. 
The number isolates Jolson the performer, casting out the multiplicity of attractions and 
interests. The cinema has found its focus. This number also begins the Jewish-Gentile 
love story that drives much of the narrative drama in the second half of the film, and 
signifies the ascendancy of an industry predicated on entertainment not just through 
spectacle and attractions but through drama and human interest as well. The shot-
reverse-shot sequences bring together close ups of desire with the object of its gaze. In 
its structuration, the number reveals the wish fulfillment of human desires in 
commercial entertainment.  
The third number returns to Jake’s boyhood home, where he sings “Blue Skies” to 
his loving mother. It is a domestic scene, more intimate, and the first in movie history 
with dialog. Jake serenades his mother, steals a kiss, tells her he loves her and that he 
will buy her a pink dress. He plays “Blue Skies” jazzy, slapping the keys with joyful 
exuberance. Whereas the number at Coffee Dan’s begins the love story, the romantic 
strain of the narrative, the number at Jake’s home inaugurates the erotic, a sexual an 
oedipal expression of Hollywood’s commercialism, all grown up and financially 
successful. As a door opens in the background and a small man occupies the space 
between mother and father, the musical number is violently interrupted by the old 
world—“Stop!” This, the cry of the father, the lament of the past, is the last spoken word 
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in the film. A painfully long silence fills the screen until the sorrowful music of Eastern 
Europe and the aesthetics of silent cinema return. If the history of American movies is 
laid over the passage of time in this film, this violent interruption occurs somewhere in 
the early 1920s, when erotic and unrestrained Hollywood was threatened with the 
righteous assault of moralism, nativism, and the mythic past.  
The final number is actually two, a schizophrenia of accommodation and 
rebellion. Jake leaves behind Broadway and his girlfriend to take his father’s place in the 
synagogue. In leading the Aramaic chant that begins the Day of Atonement, Jake returns 
the cinema to the particular in performance only, to ask for the forgiveness of sins 
through the form of cinematic climax. In many ways, it is the most stirring musical 
number in the film, and the only one that is not entertainment, at least diegetically. It 
seeks the accommodation of multiplicities—of non-commercial, religious, educative, 
and particular functions—into the grammar and film form of classic Hollywood. If 
American cinema could not be the pluralistic medium of expression, at least the movies 
could occasionally have pluralism as its subject.  
The other half of this schizophrenia is frenetic expression of ethnic mobility and 
racial immobility through entertainment. Jake returns to the stage, this time with mother 
and lover in the audience. His final performance, the only one in blackface, exudes the 
confidence of a form that has cast off its challengers. The triumph of this form—the form 
of classic Hollywood—was carried forward by the symbols of those challenges: the 
political as performance, the racial paranoia of American political culture, the 
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assimilation of the particular into the mythic whole. It was a long road, but the story of 
classic Hollywood had only just begun.  
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CHAPTER II 
LIQUOR AND THE MOVIES: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FORMATION IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 
 
Progressive Reform and the Moral Sentiment 
The pprogressive era has long been identified as a transformative moment for 
American capitalism and its regulation by the state. Out of the chaos of 19th century 
unrestrained industrial capitalism came the imperative of order and regulation. The key 
economic question of the progressive era was not whether the state should regulate 
capitalism, but rather how to regulate and under what conditions.1 The common law 
restoration in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act—which codified a state conception of trusts 
predicated on anti-competitive behavior, not bigness itself—was the culmination of and 
answer to these economic questions. The common law restoration was a legal 
codification of several developments shaping modern state economic policy, 
developments that welded together the Darwinian energy of bigness to emerging 
conceptions of managerial expertise and the application of the scientific method to 
business management. But twentieth century development in two industries—one built 
around an ancient practice and the other around a new technology—throw this ordered 
history into disarray, for common law restoration is not easily reconciled with state 
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regulatory policy in liquor and the movies. This requires a deeper examination of public 
policy in economic development as one animated by the paramount anxiety of the 
progressive storm: the moral preservation of the social body and the individual.  
Fears of the movie trust and the liquor trust were fears that economic 
consolidation would bring about social harms. And yet, consolidation appeared to be 
precisely what these culture industries needed to regulate the social effects of their 
product and its distribution and consumption. The liquor and movie industries were 
hardly trusts in the traditional sense. In the liquor industry, distillery and brewery 
interests clashed over numerous issues; regional associations fought with other regional 
associations; barriers to entry were low; and small firms flourished within local 
economies. For the movie industry, raw material suppliers tried to control the industry 
from the bottom up, but could never contain the disparate forces emerging in 
production, distribution, and especially exhibition, where motion picture entrepreneurs, 
with all their showmanship and civic pride, defined the early era of silent movies.  
Both of these industries were, in effect, deeply politicized in the progressive era. 
Reformers and regulators consistently viewed economic concerns in liquor and movies 
through the lens of moral problems. From an industry perspective, survival necessitated 
a response to this politicization. The response from the liquor industry was to develop a 
moral conception of liberal consumption—in tying the freedom to consumer to 
individual freedom, brewers in particular articulated a moral defense of their product 
and industry. But if moralism was the language of progressive politics, it was also 
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exhausting itself in the throes of ideology. It is a great historical dichotomy of politics in 
culture that an ideology’s fervent articulation is often the death knell of its very promise. 
The liquor men sought to use the moralism of the era in defense of their interests, but 
instead succumbed to the moral rages of the time. 
In the world of early American film, the response to the politicization of the 
industry was to reorient the motion picture into a politicized arm of progressive social 
justice. In defending their industry against progressive moralism, the movie men sought 
to define motion pictures as, in part, propagandistic cinema essential to American 
democracy, and to define the motion picture theater as a cathedral to democracy. In 
creating this politicized conception of the movies, no better opportunity emerged than 
the fight against evil liquor. In attacking the movies on the screen, at the site of 
consumption, and in chambers of local and federal government, the movie industry 
helped redefine and unthread conceptions of moral justice as modern social justice. It 
was a perilous gamble, as the political forces could so easily be turned against the movies. 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the trajectory of the American movie industry’s 
historical development was toward depoliticization of the screen, but in the 1910s, the 
political forces at work were temporarily harnessed, animated, and deployed by the 
emerging moguls of Hollywood, who had a useful antagonist in liquor.  
Understanding the conflicts over policy and reform in this era requires us to look 
beyond political institutions. Political reforms were in response to a radically changing 
social environment. The familiar story is that political elites and institutions, 
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recognizing this social tumult, readied a variety of responses to negotiate and control 
the social environment. It is also necessary, however, to account for the ways in which 
cultural formation responded to and subsequently shaped American politics. Any 
account of American political development in the progressive era is incomplete without 
reordering the causal relationship in which these conflicts are too often cast. Rarely had 
cultural currents so powerfully shaped political change than in the progressive era. The 
cleavages of America’s moral order from modern American liberalism are found in 
celluloid and alcohol. 
 
Moralism and the Progressive Policy Paradox 
From the early 1890s to 1916, these conflicts over state involvement in market 
forces coincided with a tumult of cultural change in labor, education, race relations, 
women’s rights, immigration, and general social health and welfare. Scholarship in new 
institutionalism and American Political Development has further highlighted the 
significance of the progressive era both for building and professionalizing governmental 
capacity for regulation and for analyzing the anxieties of cultural upheaval. But too often 
these studies compartmentalize the economic and cultural currents of progressive 
politics in this era. Yet other scholarship, seeking an overarching reform impulse in the 
era, collapse together civil rights issues such as women’s suffrage into the same reform 
agenda as economic and labor regulation, modernization of government in voting and 
civil service reform, and the institutionalization of democratic procedures of governance 
	  
29	  
such as the direct primary, ballot initiatives and so on. Such accounts of overarching 
reform are unconvincing in that they are tied together by nothing other than a broad 
conception of reform regardless of their motivations or effects.  
Attempting to reconcile social and economic transformations, Eileen McDonagh 
identifies a policy paradox persistent in the progressive era, where the state created new 
regulatory welfare policies while at the same time allowing for reactionary civil rights 
policies—be it disenfranchisement, segregation, or prohibition—to expand at the state 
and federal levels.2 The enduring political features of the progressive era were formed 
out of this paradox—federal institutions were conceived and refashioned as instruments 
to protect and expand economic welfare while advancing a program of negative civil 
rights. For McDonagh, the foundations of the modern American state were launched 
along these lines of disjuncture.  
Disjunctures though there were, economic and social reform were viewed together 
as moral reform by many elites of the era, a particular conception of morality often 
antithetical to the increasingly urban and multiethnic cultural landscape. Social and 
economic reformers struggled to define state involvement within this imperative of 
moral reform. Labor laws and trust regulation were often articulated through the need 
to remedy social ill, to treat the social body and its cancer of immoral economic effects. 
Progressive thought reordered the notion that “sins causes economic ills”: in this new 
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era, “economic ills cause sin.”3 So too, reconceptualizing police power and refashioning 
the legal system to attenuate social ill was as much about the state confronting 
immorality as it was the state confronting crime and poverty. How can historians 
separate the impulses behind criminal, social, and economic justice, and how can we 
distinguish these impulses from moral sentiment? Can the conception of social justice 
stand apart from moral reform? These questions cast the policy paradox of the 
progressive era in a different light: progressive era reform bound together social and 
moral imperatives indistinguishably. Justice in this era was almost always articulated on 
moral terms, terms that made it possible for reformers to view social repression as the 
instrument of justice. “The fact that they were potentially or actively repressive,” wrote 
Arthur Link of the progressive reformer, “does not mean that they were not 
progressive.”4  
The moral impulse of political elites clashed with cultural institutions and 
industries—in particular the film and alcohol industries—who responded by articulating 
conceptions of social justice severed from the prevailing logic of moral reform. The 
development of the American film industry, in particular, was a major force in 
unthreading moral politics from social politics. Progressive era cinema was often 
infected with progressive moralism, but movie interests frequently pushed back by 
understanding moralism through the inevitable social capacity of film to influence, 
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reveal, and inform citizenry. By refashioning progressive moral justice into cinematic 
social justice, a politicized conception of American movies could defeat legal liquor, but 
not the film censors. Understanding progressive era politics in this way challenges much 
of progressive era historiography: the moral cause articulated through state action was 
as much a death knell of justice seen exclusively through religious moral code as it was a 
culmination. As much as it was an entrenchment of moral reform, it signified the 
beginning of a social politics divorced from moral code, clearing the way for social justice 
to be refashioned as a civil right with constitutional, not necessarily moral, grounding.   
An overarching moral code helps us understand McDonagh’s paradox as it was 
understood in its time—far from a paradox, it was a response to an incontrovertible 
welding together of America’s social and economic realms. Moral imperatives ultimately 
failed to articulate a comprehensive state response to the new socio-economic tenor of 
America, but the development of a politicized cinema bound together social and 
economic spheres in ways that could endure outside the protestant moralism of the era. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, a transformation within American capitalism was 
well under way, from predominately producer-oriented market approaches to consumer-
orientated market approaches. The political effects of consumer capitalism’s 
development stem in large part from the moral impulse to regulate the social effects of 
both liquor and the movies. Progressives who looked upon an increasingly transformed 
society demanded a series of political and economic responses, many of which were 
repressive. The culture of consumption and consumptive industries were targeted by 
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these progressive reformers, for they often regarded consumption itself through moral 
terms, particularly public and working class consumption. But the culture industries 
pushed back, and in so doing shaped modern individual liberty in the American 
experience away from the imperative of property and toward an emphasis on freedom of 
choice, both in terms of consumption and expression. The unthreading of social justice 
from moral politics had lasting effect on the transformation of modern liberalism in both 
its political and economic senses.  
 
Why Did the Movies Succeed Where Drink Failed? 
In A Drunkard’s Reformation (Biograph, 1909) a father stumbles home from the 
saloon agitated and angry. None of the homely comforts soothe him—not the dinner his 
wife has prepared or the slippers his cowering daughter offers him. His lateness home, 
eruptive anger, and disheveled state mark “the same shameful story” of drunkenness 
tearing at the fabric of domestic tranquility in the progressive era. Reluctantly, the man 
takes his daughter to the theater. There, sitting in the dark among strangers, he watches 
intently as a story of intemperance unfolds: a hard-working and abstemious family man 
gradually succumbs to the lure of drink. Angry at his daughter’s attempts to stop him, he 
resorts to violence. The moral fall is dramatic. In the audience, the man clutches his 
daughter tighter as he witnesses “his own shortcomings mirrored in the stage play.”  
 Such mirroring extends beyond the frame. Cast as a stage play, this reformation 
of a drunkard is an early example of cinematic reflexivity—the images of stage and 
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audience mirror the experience of watching this film, casting the projection of social and 
political identity into the spectator of the movie house. Movie-goers could locate 
themselves within the frame, filling its images with their own hopes, fears, and 
experiences. This tremendous capacity for social and cultural formation in early 
American cinema necessitated, for progressive reformers, mastery and control over the 
images. The Drunkard’s Reformation was itself hardly a threat to the existing order of 
society and politics, but it revealed powerful social tools that could be refashioned as 
grave challenges to that order. But how could elites master the threatening potential of 
visuality in what was a commercial product of entertainment? Economic approaches to 
regulating the private sphere—one of the pillars of progressive reform—could not reign 
in the disruptive potential of representation. That the commercial product of 
entertainment could be either a vehicle for moral uplift or a wrecking ball of moral code 
casts representation and its political intention as a key site of progressive era political, 
economic, and social formation.  
 The liquor and movie industries were economic competitors under attack by social 
reformers of the era. But these reformers were not concerned merely with social 
regulation—they sought anti-trust action as an economic remedy to a social ill. The 
“liquor trust” and the “movie trust” were charged with enabling the moral decay of 
America’s social body. Consequently, the formation of public policy in these 
consumptive industries—in both economic and social regulation—located the cause of 
moral decay in economic bigness, often regarding consolidation in and of itself as 
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unlawful. At the heart of this economic and moral binding of regulatory policy was the 
site of consumption: retail semi-public spaces. The exhibition space of movie theaters 
was seen as the main purveyor of the social power of the cinema—the ideas emanating 
from the screen and their potential to influence the spectator public. From 1906 to 1920, 
exhibitors faced the brunt of America’s moral anxiety, but they could not control of the 
morality of screen content. Likewise, the liquor industries faced a full on regulatory 
assault at the site of liquor consumption—the ubiquitous and notorious saloon.  
In response, both industries and their interests argued that moral regulation was 
undemocratic, and both sought economic consolidation in order to ward off moral 
concern. These consumptive industries did not respond to moral attacks on strictly 
economic terms—they developed a unique moral language of their own, a conception of 
liberty, for both producers and consumers, that was about choice, expression, and the 
public production of culture from below. For the movie industry in particular, it was a 
cultural remaking of America that would shape the features of modern consumer 
capitalism. An economic system driven by consumer purchasing power, dominated by 
producers, consolidated at the production and distribution levels, and largely self-
regulatory, were all in part outcomes of the political contests surrounding motion picture 
entertainment and its industry in the first three decades of the twentieth century. It is a 
story in which social anxiety fueled political conflict that ultimately determined, in part, 
the economic structure of American capitalism. 
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The movie industry succeeded in fighting off the onslaught of regulatory power 
whereas the liquor industry not only failed to defend itself against regulation but was 
dismantled by the force of a prohibitory state. Why did American cinema succeed where 
legal liquor failed? By 1912, the impulse to regulate both industries appeared to be on 
the increase. The controversies surrounding prize fight films, white slave traffic, and the 
visual representation of immoral behavior had various political bodies clamoring for 
censorship of a nascent, chaotic industry still largely rooted in urban working class 
districts. Federal legislation prohibited the interstate commerce of prize fight films with 
the Sims Act of 1912, and the Tariff Act of October 1913 prohibited the importation of 
“obscene and immoral films” with authority to confiscate such films given to the 
Treasury Department.5 Local policing laws had authority to censor immoral films and 
several states began the process of institutionalizing censorship boards.  
 Prohibition advocates had by the 1910s adopted moderate gradualism of pushing 
local option laws over statewide or constitutional prohibition. This local and gradual 
political action necessitated acceptance on the part of state legislatures and state higher 
courts that legislative power could be exercised legitimately at the county, municipal, or 
township levels. With such an agreement coalescing in many states over the 1900s, 
prohibitionists were able to bypass opposition in larger urban areas and institute dry 
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policies across large swaths of rural America. When positive effects of dry laws resulted, 
or when saloon and liquor interests unlawfully ignored regulations, moderates could be 
turned into prohibitionists. Through measured grassroots activism, prohibitionists 
turned local gradualism into nationwide prohibition.6 
Local gradualism did not work in the political regulation of American movies. 
Municipal and local censorship boards could not translate regulatory principles or 
structures into a more consolidated state or national regulatory regime. Indeed, local 
censor boards or censoring activism often conflicted with state regulatory interests, as 
the controversies over The Birth of a Nation (1915) in Massachusetts and Illinois suggest.7 
But the lack of coordinated gradualism cannot fully explain the different pathways liquor 
and the movies take in navigating political regulation—film censor boards were 
established across the US in both local and state bodies. The Mutual v. Ohio Supreme 
Court decision fueled greater censorship agitation from 1915 on, and, while there were 
conflicts between municipalities and state governments, the devolution of legislative 
power was an agreement that effected both liquor and movies in roughly equal ways. 
What explains the success of the motion picture industry and the failure of the alcohol 
industry in responding to moral regulation in the decade leading up to nationwide 
prohibition?  
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 It is certainly the case that the prohibition forces were more unified than social 
regulators of the cinema. The Anti-Saloon League, perhaps the first and most powerful 
single-issue interest group in American history, successfully cut across the notoriously 
entangled political lines of the progressive era and marshaled the will to eradicate the 
legality of alcohol production. Their focus was to attack the private businesses that 
enabled public acts of consumption—the saloons. The ASL built a modern bureaucratic 
organization that was able serve “the powers of righteousness” by adapting the corporate 
logic of hierarchy and departmentalization.8 Unlike previous temperance organizations, 
the ASL was “bureaucratic and not democratic.” They attacked the political system at the 
margins with an “all-partisan approach,” swinging elections and cobbling together 
powerful voting blocks. Older temperance organizations like the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union and the Prohibition Party approached the issue through the logic of 
19th century party politics. They attempted to play in the partisan game, not exploit it. 
 The answer to the question of why the cinema succeeded where drink failed 
requires a closer look at both the cultural landscape in which these industries are 
embedded and the broader transformations of American capitalism taking place in the 
era. The ASL was not the only force that shaped regulatory power over alcohol, as The 
Drunkard’s Reformation suggests. The culture wars of the era were also fought between 
culture industries: competitors for leisure time isolated drink and the saloon, 
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eliminating alcohol in sites of entertainment such as vaudeville, motion pictures, and 
even sports venues. Baseball, for example, long part of the beer drinking traditions 
developing in the 19th century, began to disassociate itself from beer drinking by the 
early 1900s, despite the fact that the baseball business and saloon business had common 
interests in fighting against Sunday closing laws.9 But baseball was in a different league 
in terms of class. Throughout the 19th century and first two decades of the 20th century, 
ball games typically started at 2 or 3PM, far too early for the majority of working 
Americans to attend. Ticket prices, generally 50 cents for the National League, helped 
preserve baseball as an upper middle class form of leisure time, and ensure that 
professional ball players, the majority of whom where native born protestants, received 
salaries that put them in the upper middle income range.10 Liquor did not sit well with 
the myths and perceptions of America’s cherished pastime—clean, wholesome, 
democratic, ordered—that by the 1880s were already being constructed.  
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 Liquor interests tried desperately to marshal together a broader force of 
consumption industries against the reform impulse that threatened their trades. “The 
Prohibitionist frowns, scolds, knocks and hates,” wrote the brewers, “He wants to deprive 
us not only of the cup that cheers, but he also wants to take from us our pipe of tobacco, 
or our cigar. He wants to close our theaters and movies. Ball playing he hates, as he does 
hate dancing and a pack of playing cards. He wants our women to wear dresses that would 
hide their womanly charms. And all this to be able to rule and domineer over nations of 
knownothings and darenothings.”11 Liquor interests desperately tried to bind the culture 
of drink to the broader practices of American culture, but in a nation modernizing from 
within the moralism of the progressive era, powerful countercurrents isolated saloon and 
drink. 
 Consumption and consumer choice were at the heart of a radically transforming 
American economy in the progressive era. The transformation of a producer-oriented to 
a consumer-oriented economy coincided with a broader movement toward consolidation 
in American capitalism, where vertical integration tied together industrial sectors of 
production, distribution, and retail. The social effects of liquor and the movies required 
a complex negotiation of regulatory politics. Though the regulatory impulse was directed 
at both social and economic features of these industries, they stemmed from the same 
moral concern, a concern that understood these processes causally: economic 
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arrangements manifest social ill. Movies and liquor exploded open like few other 
industries in this new era of consumer-oriented and consolidated capitalism. The 
distilling industry had achieved vertical integration by 1880, and the brewing industry 
followed shortly thereafter. Only in the state of Louisiana was the vertical integration of 
the alcohol industry unlawful.12 The first twenty years of the American film industry was 
marked by numerous attempts to consolidate production, distribution, and exhibition. 
Industry leaders in both liquor and movies looked upon consolidation as a solution to 
their social problems that emanated from the consumption of their respective products.  
But, for state regulators, the solutions to these social problems were moral, 
political and repressive, not economic. Indeed, the state’s moral concern over the cinema 
and drink often overshadowed economic considerations. The movie industry, in 
particular, was able to achieve economic consolidation was impossible without complex 
political arrangements and the depoliticization of the movie screen. The political 
conflicts over movies and alcohol helped articulate industry responses to moral reform 
on terms that defended consumer rights and individual choice in capitalism. Both 
economic and moral conflicts were most prominent in the industries’ two sites of retail 
consumption—the saloon and the exhibition space. 
 
The Saloon and the Movie Theater: Conflicts at the Site of Consumption 
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Saloons and movie theaters were both threatened with closure by reformers, but 
not equally. The saloon was the most heavily regulated institution in American life, and 
had a vastly greater presence on the streets of America’s cities and towns. The presence 
of the saloon had undergone a remarkable proliferation since 1890, largely due to a “tied 
house” system whereby brewers could own such retail spaces, sell their beer exclusively, 
and offer attractive promotions such as a hot meal with the price of a beverage. “Public 
house” saloons thus became an ubiquitous feature of many urban neighborhoods—
relatively cheap investments for producers that could raise the profile of their products 
at the point of purchase. The number of retail liquor dealers went from 90,000 in 1865 to 
nearly 200,000 by 1900, far outpacing population growth.13 The consequence was a 
legitimate social crisis that fueled a new wave of temperance activism in America. 
Saloons quickly became a symbol of a new American society descending into urban 
disorder and crime. Brewers offered only nominal concessions to what was a problem of 
economic consolidation leading to excessive drinking in an oversaturated market. Too 
often they blamed clubs and off-license premises for the social ills of overconsumption. 
“It is a mistake to believe,” wrote the USBA Yearbook of 1910, “that the commercial 
interest of the brewer stands back of the excessive multiplication of saloons.” It was 
however hard for brewers to deny the obvious. In 1910, they published a report from the 
New York Committee of Fourteen that identified the business interest of the brewer as 
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“responsible for permitting the evil conditions” of the saloon, principally due to the fact 
that “the majority of saloons in the city [are] supported to a greater or lesser extent by 
the financial backing of the brewer.”14  
 The connections between the vertical integration of the industry, over-
competition, and excessive consumption was commonly misunderstood at the time and 
often overlooked by the anti-liquor advocates, but in cities like New York—which had a 
much larger percentage of brewery-owned saloons than most cities—the problems were 
hard to ignore. Arthur Huntington Gleason, writing for Collier’s, noted that “[t]he 
brewers’ pool is a failure as a pool.” He continued: 
It does not hang together with that cohesion which would enable 
it to withstand the assaults of the public. Recently its members 
secretly and unanimously agreed, in raising the price of beer from 
between 50 cents and a $1 a barrel, to hold their retail dealers to 
the new price, by refusing to take over a retailer who tried to jump 
from one brewer to another. Yet several of the pool brewers cut 
their rates and accepted other men’s dealers. This is the first point 
to be scored against the brewers—they have not as yet whipped 
their sinful brethren into line. They must either learn to combine 
for cleaning up their trade or prepare to meet the prohibition 
deluge. … the brewer must make two clear cut decisions. He must 
decide to combine with the other brewers for a clean-up and force 
the weaker, erring brothers to join in the good work … He has been 
driven to a fork in the road, and he must decide to take the 
responsibility as well as the profits in his retail trade, or else cut 
loose from the retailer.15 
 
By 1915, brewers recognized the threat the tied house system represented to the overall 
health of the industry, but despite attempts to divest themselves of some of the more 
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notorious saloons and saloon-saturated neighborhoods, the tied house system remained 
until prohibition.16 
 At the same time, brewers published numerous arguments on the unique social 
value of the saloon in working class society, a class consistently left out of traditional 
social institutions.17 American working men, they argued, refused to be “patronized or 
supervised” by the “attitude of conscious superiority” on the part of elite reformers.18 
The saloons offered “the poor man the center and source of much of his social life.”19 
Cast in class terms, the saloon offered working men the same kind of social capacity 
gentlemen’s clubs offered the privileged class—camaraderie, networking, and the 
development of social consciousness. This awakening of class consciousness was 
unambiguously bound to a democratic spirit and freedom of expression. “The saloon 
itself […] supplies a deeper and more subtle want than that of mere animal thirst,” wrote 
a committee of social reformers in 1901, “[t]his want is the demand for social expression” 
providing elements needed to foster “what we may call a ‘social center.’” Saloons were 
recognized, even by reformers such as the elite Committee of Fifty, as a site of social 
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formation that provided “some stimulus to self-expression.” The saloon, a report by the 
committee concludes, “is the most democratic of institutions.”20 The Committee of Fifty 
was an organization composed of businessmen and academics that sought to apply social 
science methods to the study of the liquor problem and to avoid the moralism of the era’s 
temperance agitation. Thus, the elite conception of a democracy for the masses in the 
saloon suggests impulses to control the liquor question that came from class and 
economic perceptions as much as moral or religious ones.  
 The rise of the nickelodeon took place in commercial spaces already populated 
with the saloon and drinking culture. Some saloons sought to exhibit motion pictures 
themselves. For saloonkeepers, exhibition of motion pictures provided an attractive draw 
that could edge out competitors in an oversaturated market. From a rudimentary picture 
sheet and a few benches back beyond the bar to the Mutoscopes and other visual 
amusements of Heinegabubeler’s national chain in Chicago, exhibition space of early 
cinema and the saloon shared a gray area of cultural consumption. “Indeed, it is often 
hard to tell whether we are dealing with a saloon or an amusement enterprise,” wrote by 
a report by the Committee of Fifty, “Is it a theatre saloon or a saloon theatre?”21 One 
Chicago survey in 1910 identified saloonkeepers as the largest occupation of theatre 
owners entering the movie business. Although evidence is scattered, property held by 
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saloon owners, either the saloon location itself or plots adjacent to saloons, often served 
as space for a nickelodeon start up, particularly in smaller commercial areas in working 
class neighborhoods. No systematic study has ever been done on the relationship 
between the saloon and moving picture exhibition in the years before and during the 
nickelodeon craze, but some examples may give an indication of national trends. Of the 
49 motion picture theaters that opened in Dayton, Ohio before 1915, for example, three 
were opened by former saloonkeepers on the site of saloons. The Comet Theatre opened 
in 1913 by Homer Williams, who converted his pool room in the back of the Oasis Saloon 
into an exhibition space. The Comet only lasted two years, however, and after a change 
in ownership the theatre closed and the saloon continued to operate. Dayton’s Majestic 
Theatre opened in 1911 from a converted saloon, and managed to last until 1925.22 In 
Lexington, Kentucky, two of the black moving picture theaters—Foster’s Pleasure 
Theater and the Fontenac Roof Garden—were located in and above saloons, 
respectively.23  
 Mixed saloon/nickelodeon commercial properties may have been more common 
in smaller cities and towns. Moving Picture World describes a Brooklyn motion picture 
theater above a saloon, where “one has to mount a flight of stairs” to see a movie, as “not 
an ordinary sight in large cities … where most of the houses are of a picturesque and 
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attractive appearance.24 This understanding of the relationship between movies and 
liquor in larger urban areas is shaped by perspective, however, and does not account for 
the brewer-owned downtown saloons of cities like Chicago, which had significant capital 
to invest in a wide range of amusements. Chicago, with its powerful brewer interests and 
ubiquitous tied-house system, was more an anomaly than example of national trends. 
Nonetheless, Chicago brewers used motion pictures frequently and in consumptive 
environments far more sophisticated than storefront saloon-theaters. Heinegabubeler’s, 
for example, was an impressive three-story saloon and restaurant in the heart of the city. 
A variety of amusements and social spaces kept patrons entertained, from reading 
rooms, gymnasiums, peep shows, museums, and a summertime rooftop garden.25  
Motion picture interests were keen to stress exhibition as a sole enterprise, run by 
men with business acumen, commercial interest, and a “sentimental feeling towards the 
picture.”26 Such an emphasis was intended to steer the industry away from 
entanglements with other consumptive practices and shape the motion picture theater 
as a unique and sole attraction. Keeping movies out of saloons was one of the first 
concerted efforts to preserve the self-defined theater’s right to exclusive use of the film 
product. Exclusive authority over film exhibition helped legitimize both movie theaters 
and the movies themselves, in turn giving the film industry the necessary leverage to 
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achieve victory in later conflicts over non-theatrical exhibition in schools, churches, and 
sports venues. Saloonkeepers who went into the exhibition business as a side interest 
could be publicly attacked for “weaken[ing] the confidence of the people to the point of 
disgust” and handicapping “more intelligent and worthy managers” who sought to 
legitimize the industry.27  
 Commercial interests in motion pictures were threatened with free movie 
exhibitions intended to draw customers to other amusements or consumptive activities. 
In a trend that may have begun in Youngstown, Ohio, for example, saloonkeepers 
exhibited free motion pictures “for the benefit of patrons” as early as 1906. Exhibiting 
pictures for the price of a drink (or two) proved a strong incentive, but Ohio’s reformers 
and motion picture interests united to stop the practice under the assumption that a 
combination of beer and movies tended to attract “a class of men and women of low 
repute.” In response to the Youngstown situation, Akron’s mayor and police chief 
pushed through an ordinance making motion picture exhibition in saloons a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of no more than $100.28 Considering the fact that both 
liquor and movie interests often found it “cheaper to pay than object” it seems possible 
that the practice continued so long as the profits covered the fines on top of other 
expenses. The movie men realized the stakes were high, and that the fight was neither 
“a temperance proposition, nor … a claim of illegality,” but strictly economic, “in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 MPW 13, no. 5, Aug. 3, 1912, 439. 
28 MPW 1, no. 7, April 20, 1907, 104. 
	  
48	  
interest of the picture business as a whole.” These economic interests had an admitted 
moral dimension, since “uplifting the general business would be practically useless” 
should saloons continue to show free movies.29 Economic imperatives necessitated moral 
mastery, which in turn necessitated isolation of liquor and drinking culture. 
 One of the most visible conflicts between liquor and movies played out in Coney 
Island, where both products appeared simply as means to a particular end—amusement 
in the broader sense of the word. In economic terms, however, beer was hardly incidental. 
Most Coney Island attractions were “free”—revenue came largely from the park entrance 
fee and numerous food and drink stands. On hot summer days, beer proved a main draw 
for the hordes that escaped to Coney Island, and movies could occupy drinkers for several 
rounds. Free picture shows operated for an astonishingly long time on the Island, up 
until at least 1913. It seems likely that the practice died off not by licensing requirements 
for common shows but rather by the simple fact that the cinema had ceased to be a 
novelty suited for amusement park attractions. A glimpse of what the Coney Island 
motion picture experience was like is provided by Will K. Bradley, writing for Moving 
Picture World: 
A short walk through a dance-halled lane landed me on the “Bowery;” a 
place very familiar to “our own,” indeed. Right on the corner was situated 
one of the places to be “examined”—a so-called “family resort.” I entered. 
The El-Kalem, “Captured by Bedouins,” was in progress. No sooner than 
when I had procured an available seat, I was surrounded by a horde of 
inquiring waiters—who queried, simultaneously, my wants. I told one—a 
cup of coffee. […] Somewhat reluctantly, I disposed of the coffee—and 
ordered another one. Not that I was thirsty—you know—but that was my 
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admission. Edison’s “A Little Bride of Heaven,” with Mary Fuller in the 
lead, and an Essanay, “Billy Changes His Mind,” completed the “show.” 
 The pictures in this house were faultless,—but the “beer and—” 
murdered them! I exited, almost pleased. 
 A few doors away, I discovered another one. But the attractions—
there were posters outside—could they possibly be exhibited in a “family 
resort?” “Attell-Kilbane 20 Round Boxing Exhibition,” and the Burns-
Johnson” affair at Melbourne, in 1909, were the reels in question. And was 
this the kind of a “free show” a tired family would desire watching, while 
partaking of their hot dogs and beverage?30 
 
  
Bradley’s reflections were intended to give a critical perspective on both free movies as 
“attractions” and alcohol consumption in movie spectatorship. These distractions to the 
allure of the photoplay situated film exhibition within other consumptive leisure time 
activities. The self-defined moving picture theatre sought to cut itself against a variety 
of exhibitions spaces and more varied uses of movies to create the perception of “a safe 
and wholesome place of amusement for young and old.”31 Municipal licensing for 
exhibition provided some leverage for the more established houses, and exhibitor’s 
pushed municipal authorities to prohibit free movie exhibition without a license. 
Precedent had been set by an important but now forgotten New York Supreme Court 
case, Weistblatt v Bingham, heard in March 1908. The plaintiffs owned an “ice cream 
saloon” in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn and sought a court order 
to restrain city police from stopping free movie exhibition in the back of the store. The 
question before the court was whether or not the plaintiffs required a license for 
exhibition, and if so, which license.  
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The “common license” requirement of New York City was intended for 
amusements and shows that included “Ferris wheel, gravity steeplechase, chute, scenic 
cave, bicycle carousel, scenic railway, striking machines, switchback, merry-go-round, 
puppet show, ball game, and all other shows of like character, but not to include 
baseball.” Did a free movie fit within this definition of common license? The court ruled 
that it did, as “[i]t is common knowledge that the moving picture shows are run in the 
summer time in conjunction with summer gardens and saloons, are very common at 
popular seashore resorts for drawing and gathering a crowd into drinking places.” The 
free movies shown at the Weistblatt’s ice cream saloon constituted a “public 
performance and given for the purpose of entertaining patrons of the place” and so 
required a common license.32 This was a far cry from victory for the established exhibitors 
of the city, however, since the common license fee was well below the standard 
exhibition fee of $500 for commercial moving picture theaters. But such rulings set an 
important precedent in legally situating free movie exhibition within a variety of 
common show amusements. Embedded into constellation of consumptive activities, the 
threat posed by free movies could be disarmed, allowing commercial exhibitors to build 
up the industry and capture audiences with a unique and respectable experience.  
 Though critics in the nascent film industry looked at Coney Island’s movie 
attractions with both fear and disdain, they generally conceded that these particular 
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outfits hired good operators and provided high quality exhibition that did not “dish out 
a lot of junk such as the saloon-theaters in other parts of the boroughs.”33 New York 
exhibitors also saw Coney Island as an ideal test case for fighting against Sunday closing 
laws, a convenient beachhead to “beat out the authorities” so that “city exhibitors will 
have no fighting to do … as the precedent will be a strong one.”34 It was less of an alliance 
between Coney Island operators and the city’s commercial exhibitors than a convenient 
point of agreement between competitors.  
Moving Picture World noted important distinctions between the Island movie 
amusements and the saloon-theaters and tenement exhibition houses across the five 
boroughs. An exhibition license was not the only issue at hand—municipal fire and 
health authorities were particularly concerned with exhibition in “small, ill-fitted back 
rooms” where “there were but two means of exit, a narrow front door and a still smaller 
door at the rear which led to a small yard.”35 Picture quality was extremely poor in these 
saloons and tenement houses. Alcohol sales, often without a liquor license, provided the 
necessary revenue for such operations. These spaces were often identical to the private 
groggeries that provided drink before the saloon emerged in working class 
neighborhoods sometime in the nineteenth century—environments of semi-public 
consumption in the domestic sphere, often existing along ethnic lines, and often spaces 
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conducive to women running the operation. Political authorities developed various 
licensing strategies to force the domestic groggeries and tenement motion picture 
exhibition out into the open.  
 The contested definitions of the cinema, and what “movies” signified, is pulled 
into the conflict over beer. There is much scholarship in these discursive conflicts over 
acceptable and unacceptable terms for motion pictures—flickers and movies, photoplays 
and cinematographs—but none make mention of the relationship to beer.36 Calling 
motion pictures movies, “this slang name being paraded in an unseemly way,” seemed 
uneasily bound up in baser consumptive practices, like drinking beer. As Moving Picture 
World notes: 
The latest and still more unseemly use of this offensive slang appears … 
with the following heading: 
“FREE MOVIES ARE O.K. 
IT IS NO CRIME IF THEY ACCOMPANY THE 
BEER AND HOT DOGS  
It needed no prophet to predict that a slang name is soon connected 
with common and detracting associations.37 
 
Such associations cut directly against the vision of Hollywood’s dream factory and its 
palaces—free movies, hot dogs, and beer. Baseball had vanquished beer in the years 
before prohibition, but stadium owners fully embraced the food experience at the ball 
park—hot dogs were widely available and popular, as were relatively recent “hamburger 
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sandwiches,” among a variety of sweet and savory items. Baseball could get away with 
these “detracting associations,” likely because it was already a respected pastime that 
attracted an upper middle class clientele, though a longer, more casual viewing 
experience might have also helped.  
As noted above, the concern over more casual movie-watching experiences from 
established exhibitors was not legal or moral, but economic. Such a strictly economic 
conception, however, belies the entangled nature of moral purpose and economic gain—
deploying moral associations aided in economic mastery, or, in other words, economic 
development in the unique social and political environment of the progressive era 
necessitated control over the instability of moral meaning and purpose. Politicizing the 
cinema as an arm of anti-liquor propaganda made good business sense. Exhibitors were 
more careful in treading the ground of sex and violence. Self-censorship of screen 
content by the exhibitor was crucial in this context: “Be careful in the choice of your 
views. Avoid anything which has the faintest sign of suggestion, touch not the lewd or 
the fragrantly sensual. Produce nothing upon your screen which would cause your 
mother to blush.”38 Politicized cinema was okay, so long as it didn’t make the mothers 
blush. These were essential lessons for the early movie men, and as we shall see later, 
provided the key framework—moral control as the foundation for economic 
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development—that the MPPDA used to facilitate the consolidated and coordinated 
studio system in the 1920s. Economic mastery required a moral authority.  
 The moral crisis over liquor made it increasingly untenable for culture industries 
to provide alcoholic drinks at their retail sites. Nowhere was this process more telling 
than in the motion picture theater, a site of consumption that emerged from a working 
class cultural milieu populated by the saloon and drinking culture. Many entrepreneurs 
divested themselves of their saloon interests to attract more respectable middle class 
audiences or close their other venues and continue operating exclusively as a saloon-
keeper. Municipal licensing regulations further encouraged the disentanglement of the 
theater and the saloon. A comparison of liquor and motion picture exhibition licenses 
from 1906–1916 in San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, Chicago, and New York shows very 
little cross ownership between enterprises.39 In cases where theater and liquor licenses 
were issued by different bureaus, theater licenses were often only issued with promises 
that the proprietor will not apply for a liquor license, or, in some cases, required the 
liquor license bureau to request and be granted consent from the theatrical licensing 
bureau.40 While there were certainly incentives for liquor interests to capitalize on 
motion pictures, there were equally strong incentives—both political and social—for 
early nickelodeon operators to distinguish their places of business from drink.  
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In Portland, for example, of the 61 theater owners in 1915, only one, E. A. James, 
had any saloon interests. In this case, James, owner of the Majestic Theatre at 355 
Washington Street, had a liquor license for his saloon down the block, at 271 
Washington.41 These locations, southeast of downtown Portland, were in the working 
class and industrial Burnside district, where large saloons, or working men “resorts,” 
catered to as many as 250 patrons at a time with a variety of movie shorts and even 
features. Portland’s film censors would conduct inspections of these premises, often with 
the city police in tow, to enforce compliance of the city ordinances. Moving Picture World 
noted that motion picture exhibition in these saloon-resorts were a problem throughout 
Oregon and Washington. “[W]hile the pictures were of a character that would pass in 
saloons,” Abraham Nelson of Moving Picture World wrote in November 1915, “the city 
ordinance was not being complied with … George M. Harris, of the Burnside theater, and 
the Portland Amusement Company, operating the Casino and American theaters, located 
in the district where working men congregate, protested to the exchanges against 
supplying films to saloons.”42 As producer-distributor consolidation grows in the 1920s, 
these acrimonious relationships between exhibitors and exchanges would only grow 
worse over issues such as block booking.  
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Two competing forces are at play here: the pressure of over-competition and the 
need to attract patrons compelled many saloonkeepers to install projectors and screens, 
as well as a variety of other amusements, in their saloons; at the same time, nickelodeon 
proprietors who did not come from saloon backgrounds—men who came from the 
vaudeville and theatrical amusement traditions like Thomas Tally in Los Angeles and 
Harry Davis and John Harris in Pittsburgh, or men like Adolph Zukor, Marcus Loew, and 
William Fox, merchant-class Jewish immigrants from non-theatrical backgrounds—were 
entering a business field in which the isolation of drinking culture and the saloon was 
well under way. The development of vaudeville in the 1880s was itself a product of 
severing drink from entertainment. When Tony Pastor opened the first vaudeville 
theater in 1881, he borrowed the form of 19th century saloon hall shows that had existed 
for generations, banned alcohol on the premises and vulgarities on the stage, and 
repackaged an old entertainment for a new audience.43  
 From 1908 to 1915, saloons and motion picture exhibition underwent a gradual 
but nearly total segregation of their sites of consumption, at the same time that both 
spaces were under high-profile attacks from social reformers. Moving picture exhibition 
spaces across the country were under attack for poor lighting, danger of fire,44 and 
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unattended children. In New York City, Mayor George B. McClellan ordered all moving 
pictures houses—over 500 across the city—closed on Christmas Eve, 1908. The theaters 
were quickly reopened and the political furor did little to discourage demand, but it did 
encourage exhibition owners to coordinate responses to political reform. Theater owners 
underwent a massive campaign to “clean up” the exhibition space and make it more 
attractive to a middle class clientele.45 A crucial part of the campaign was focusing public 
attention on their competitors—the alcohol retail space. 
 This social capacity of alcohol consumption was consistently undercut by the 
cinema, competitors for American working and middle class leisure time. Contemporary 
accounts from municipal authorities and police chiefs indicate that an increase in motion 
picture theaters coincided with a decrease in the presence of saloons.46 The developing 
film industry—both at the exhibition and production levels—relentlessly attacked 
saloons and drink. Campaigning as a “substitute for the saloon,” the film industry sought 
middle class legitimacy by cutting itself against the social function of alcohol. The 
“cheap, democratic amusement” of the motion picture theater “possesses many of the 
virtues of the saloon and practically none of its vices,” wrote the Methodist World 
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Outlook.47 Exhibition spaces boarded up exits that led to saloon parlors and aggressively 
pursued legislation that prohibited saloons and restaurants from exhibiting motion 
pictures. Large film exchanges—the distribution sector of the industry—quickly 
determined that “the promiscuous showing of pictures is not to their advantage.”48 
Limiting the quantity of moving pictures in exhibition allowed distributors more control 
and discretion over their product, a key strategy in legitimating the cinema as a 
respectable form of leisure time. Potential exhibitors who would bring “discredit to the 
industry” were screened out of the trade by distribution, a practice focused on the saloon. 
 Brewers tried to fight back, but to no avail. They argued that licensed alcohol 
retailers were severely restricted in the entertainments they could offer patrons aside 
from drink, thus leading to overconsumption. “Music, dancing, cafe chantants, stage 
plays, cinematographs, and all games, save billiards, are either illegal or sternly 
discouraged,” wrote the USBA Yearbook of 1915, “[t]hus, in the absence of counter-
attractions, the only diversion left is to drink.”49 But much like the motion picture 
interests relative to the saloon, brewers needed a social practice to cut against in order 
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to legitimate their retail interests. Gambling was the most common scapegoat. The 
Clean-Up Movement in Ohio, led principally by the Vigilance Bureau, sought to limit 
licenses for retail sale by ridding the state of gambling houses. The Bureau was in effect 
an association established by the brewers to police their own. They worked closely with 
local elites in law, policing, and politics to focus their reform energies on gambling. Of 
the 14 letters from mayors, attorneys, and police chiefs published in the 1910 USBA 
Yearbook, most mention the elimination of gambling as the principal work of the 
Bureau.50 
 
Liberal Re-Awakening in Liquor and Movies 
Alcohol interests, better funded and more unified than the movie men of early 
cinema, consistently utilized arguments that defended the basic individual liberty they 
saw inherent in the right to drink and the unique social value of the saloon. These 
arguments levied against the ASL and competitors for working class leisure time 
emphasized the right of individual patrons, the customers, to consume the industry’s 
product. While the motion picture industry assailed the evils of alcohol throughout the 
early 1900s and 1910s, they waged their own fight against Sunday closing laws that relied 
heavily on a discourse of liberal tolerance. The Liberal Sunday League, financed by the 
Motion Picture Patents Company and advanced through the Moving Picture World, 
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agitated for a modern and liberal observance of the Sabbath that would keep theater 
doors open to the public.51 Analyzing the use of the term liberal in Moving Picture World 
from 1907 to 1920 reveals that the great majority of instances conform to long-standing 
uses of the word, either immoderate, generous, or tolerant, but the fight for a Liberal 
Sunday necessarily implied a right to an individual liberty of consumption. Blue laws, 
argued Moving Picture World, are everywhere an embodiment of a “Puritanical idea, that 
the man was made for the Sabbath. In agitating for a proper moving picture exhibition 
on Sunday we must emphasize the contrary opinion … that the Sabbath was made for 
man.”52 In arguing for a Sunday that is liberal, the movie interests sought to advance 
their own commercial interests by defending individual liberty against institutional 
authority, in this case the church. 
 Exhibitors, exchange men, and trade industry interests pursued a variety of 
strategies in responding to political censorship, some of which were accommodating. 
The National Board of Censorship (later National Board of Review) and it’s volunteer 
censorship was in particular praised as liberal to both the industry and the public, but 
similar words were used at times to commend the work of the Ohio Board of Censors, 
various clergy members advocating for censorship, municipal censorship authorities, 
and Major M. L. C. Funkhouser, chief of the Chicago Film Censor Board, who Moving 
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Picture World described as a “liberal and fair-minded man.”53 “An enlightened and 
liberal-minded body of censors,” wrote Moving Picture World, “have every right to regard 
themselves as competent judges of what is shocking to the religious sensibilities of the 
American public.” At the center of this strategy was a discursive reorientation of the 
debate away from extremism and toward liberal and illiberal forms of political 
censorship. In arguing against prior restraint of moving picture content, trade journals 
upheld the work of municipal courts and judges in enforcing obscenity laws, legal 
authorities that can be “depended upon to arrive at the right conclusion in such matters, 
nine times out of ten. They will not be disposed toward puritanism or fanaticism, but will 
on the whole be more liable to err on the liberal than on the illiberal side.”54 These 
discursive strategies helped shape the conflicts over film censorship on terms amenable 
to commercial interests by tethering liberal ideals to consumer capitalism, in effect 
aligning cultural norms to market forces within broad political limitations. Liberal 
morality were terms on which economic and political forces could work in harmony.  
 In the liquor wars, anti-prohibition forces consistently cast their struggle as one 
for personal liberty, even on moral terms. “Our religion is based on the freedom of 
choice,” wrote the Anti-Prohibition Manual, “[i]f we lose control of ourselves, the mind 
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and body run riot. Self-control, combined with temperance, in the individual, is the basis 
of society’s moral success. Prohibition begins at the wrong end.”55 A self-conditioned 
moral code was a prominent feature of the movie and alcohol industries’ defense against 
social reform from above. The development of consumerism in the progressive era 
inevitably brought with it moral concerns. Self-regulation by the consumer provided a 
political defense of public consumption that aided in the liberalization of society. Moral 
conditioning of the consumer’s mind and body thus revealed the political effects upon 
economic development. Modern society and consumer capitalism needed self-
regulation, and the moral conflicts in liquor and film would shape this developmental 
path.  
Cleveland mayor Newton D. Baker, and future Secretary of War, argued that “dead 
letter” laws in American cities were the product of “the most law-abiding people in the 
world.” This obedience to law was not an external power over the population, but rather 
a consequence of “the automatic self control of the people.”56 Pushing against the 
dominant social reform logic of the era, brewers emphasized that the solution to social 
ills was self-control through individual liberty. “Under the stress of modern competition, 
a man must be master of his faculties […] in other words, self-control.”57 Temperance 
could only be realized through the internalized moral code of each individual. Internal 
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conditioning through persuasion characterized much of the temperance movements in 
the 19th century. Such persuasive temperance agitation was largely absent from the 
progressive era prohibition movements. Brewers, horrified by the bureaucratic power of 
the ASL and its goal of external coercion, adopted much of the temperance language of 
the 19th century. Individual freedom, they argued, is realized only though the internal 
power of temperance, from a self-chosen moral code of moderation. Such discursive 
strategies cast liberty of the self against political regulation of social morality, helping 
to define the terms on which civil liberties would consistently be cast throughout the 
20th century. American cinema was also developing the complexities of moral 
internalization for regulating visual content—the long history of institutionalizing prior 
restraint and a self-regulating moral production code for the film industry required 
discursive shaping of the efficacy and justice of self-control. The modern liberal would 
have to be self-conditioned from within, a process made visible by the moral conflicts in 
liquor and movies of the progressive era. 
 The term “liberal” was itself reformulated within this conflict. In some cases, the 
use of liberal carried previous meanings, both as freedom from restraint (immoderate) 
and freedom from prejudice (tolerant). More common, however, are instances 
throughout anti-prohibition literature that articulate a liberal identity and liberal cause 
as a social struggle advancing consumer rights against the conservative moralism of the 
state. John Stuart Mill’s conception of liberty through free expression had been 
developed in an earlier generation, but these philosophical arguments tended to 
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circulate among the cultured elite. Mill’s own concept of cultural value explicitly 
excluded mass entertainment and popular consumption—push pins and baseball could 
never have the social worth of something like poetry. But by the 20th century, discourse 
on freedom of expression and consumption was often shaped by culture industries 
themselves, namely liquor and movies.  
 The brewing industry in particular was keen to bend the concept of freedom from 
restraint toward new mass cultural conceptions of freedom of individual consumption. 
For brewers, to be a liberal meant both a liberal consumer and a defender of free 
expression. This reallocation of old ideas for new purposes is nowhere more visible than 
in their principal publication, The Yearbook of the United States Brewers’ Association. The 
brewers first began publishing a yearbook of their annual convention in 1909, with the 
intention of providing comprehensive analysis of the industry and the political conflicts 
surrounding it. The yearbooks, which were published through 1921, are a unique series 
of volumes on the liquor question in that their intent was not solely for propaganda 
purposes despite being an official publication of the largest coordinating body of the 
alcohol interests. These were principally industry guides, intended to provide useful 
information for beer and bottling businessmen and their ancillary industries. While not 
without bias, the first 7 volumes show a remarkable amount of fair and objective 
information, particularly compared to the one-sided and often hysterical literature 
produced by prohibition advocates. In these volumes, the brewers develop a 
comprehensive account of individual rights in expression and consumption.   
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 This discourse often tied together liberalism and union in unique ways. The Civil 
War bicentennial was a visible part of the public consciousness of the time, and brewers 
often articulated the value of their industry through patriotism and service to the union. 
“Anyone familiar with our country’s history,” wrote the USBA 1909 yearbook, “knows 
that many years before the war Knownothingism and Prohibition were driven out of the 
arena by a mass of liberal voters who had so ardently devoted themselves to the Union 
cause.”58 While the beer tax was a significant source of revenue for funding the union 
army, German-American brewers themselves were “ardent unionists” who saved “some 
of the more important border States” from the confederates.59 This Civil War 
remembrance was authored by German immigrants in the early 20th century, looking 
back through the turmoil of their own time and casting the republic as a liberal union of 
tolerance and inclusiveness through individual liberty. For brewers, the “liberal cause” 
of individual freedom could be pursued by encouraging “the liberal elector to exercise 
his franchise.”60 It was, for many, a fight for democracy. So-called Liberty Leagues were 
formed to carry on the fight “for the liberal side … as a matter of principle,” by organizing 
voting drives in urban areas.61 Such a “liberal re-wakening” had the brewers positively 
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exuberant in the years leading up to 1912, as prohibition movements lost several crucial 
contests across the nation.  
 Abraham Lincoln had undergone a remarkable transformation in the biographies 
of popular magazines in the late 19th century—from a statesman over whom the nation 
was deeply divided to the universally loved “Great Heart” and father of the nation.62 Anti-
prohibition advocates sought to shape the legacy of Lincoln for the services of individual 
liberty in an increasingly consumer-oriented society. In “Abraham Lincoln, Liberal,” the 
1916 Anti-Prohibition Manual boldly declared that “the greatest humanitarian and the 
broadest statesman the world has produced” was an early liberal due to his willingness 
to imbibe strong drink on occasion. This usage touches on the older meaning of liberal 
as immoderate or licentious, commonly a term of reproach.63 Here, however, there is no 
negative connotation to the word but rather discursive practices that blend together 
immoderate and tolerant. Reading Lincoln as a liberal was, for the USBA, seeing in him 
both a capacity for social tolerance and defender of individual liberty and consumption.  
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 For anti-prohibition forces, there were limits to this new conception of liberalism. 
Women’s suffrage, long identified with the temperance movement, was characterized as 
a victim of prohibition’s political moralism. “Women’s suffrage owes its defeat to the 
Anti-Saloon League,” wrote the Saturday Evening Post, “which made of it a ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ 
issue, and thus alienated from it the sympathy of the liberal forces of the State.”64 The 
temperance movements of the 19th century were closely aligned with women’s suffrage, 
led by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and their iconic leader Frances Willard, 
who advocated for prohibition through “internalized conversion, rather than 
externalized coercion.”65 A cursory glance at the confluence of women’s suffrage and 
prohibition in the 1910s indicates the alliance was as strong as ever: 7 western states had 
adopted prohibition by 1916, and in all of them women had gained the right to vote.66 
The Brewers yearbook of 1913 admits that “liberal interests in Ohio cast their weight 
against women’s suffrage.67 But there were cracks emerging in the alliance between 
prohibitionists and suffragists. By the 20th century, the movements and tactics of 
prohibition politics had changed considerably. The Anti-Saloon League was led almost 
entirely by men who advocated for external coercion based on legal prohibition. Cultural 
elites weighed in on the “New Woman” of the 20th century, in some cases arguing that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Quoted from “Brewers and Woman Suffrage,” USBA Yearbook, 1913, pg. 245–46. 
65 McDonagh, “The ‘Welfare Rights State,’” 246. 
66 Okrent, Last Call, 88. 
67 USBA Yearbook, 1913, 245. 
	  
68	  
women prohibitionists “confuse a purely individual issue with a social issue,” bending 
society to the needs of women who “suffer from the curse of liquor as men do not.”68 
Such arguments muddled the brewers message, however, that the saloon had social value 
as much as the individual had the liberty to consume alcohol. More telling is that, from 
1911 to 1913, referendums on prohibition in Michigan, Colorado, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, and Phoenix all had women voting for the first time and all failed to legally 
prohibit alcohol. A closer look at county-by-county voting patterns in these crucial years 
shows no positive correlation between women’s suffrage and success for prohibition 
measures.69 Anti-prohibition forces attempted to exploit the 20th century cleavage 
between the cause of temperance and the cause of women’s suffrage, but could never 
successfully weld together the cause of individual liberty and women’s rights. For the 
brewers, women were merely hapless victims of the teetotalers, not a similar group of 
individuals fighting for liberty against conservative moralism. 
 Another crucial—and for the anti-prohibition movement—devastating limitation 
to this new conception of liberty centered on enduring white supremacy. Prohibition 
forces of the south were both stronger than any other region in the country and 
powerfully animated by the threat of black men consuming alcohol. Brewers were 
unwilling to extend their conception of individual liberty and rights to blacks, even when 
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acknowledging that repressive liquor laws of the south were often solely animated by the 
anxieties of whiteness. White voters animated by “the race question,” wrote Fritz Rudolf, 
“decided in favor of the prohibition laws,” admitting that while blacks in the South would 
likely not vote for prohibition, “the colored population is without civil rights in those 
States”70 They also proved unwilling to develop alliances with distilleries who were under 
fierce attack from Southern moralists. By the opening years of the 20th century, the 
distillery industry was largely controlled by Jewish Americans.71 Southern politicians like 
John Newton Tillman from Arkansas consistently made the connection between black 
violence and Jewish enterprise in attacking alcohol. “I am not attacking an American 
institution,” Tillman said, “I am attacking mainly a foreign enterprise.”72 A series of 
sensational articles in Collier’s on the rape and murder of fourteen-year-old Margaret 
Lear in Louisiana shocked the nation and galvanized southern prohibition, insinuating 
that a cheap gin distilled by Lee Levy & Company, the bottle “vile and obscenely labeled” 
with a scantily dressed white woman, incited a local black man, Charles Coleman, to 
commit the crime. After a four hour trial and 3 minutes to deliver a guilty verdict, 
Coleman was hung in the county jail.73 The “Black Cock Vigor Gin,” distilled by a Jewish 
businessman, crystallized many of the fears and anxieties of southern whiteness.74 The 
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case bore resemblance to the Leo Frank controversy: it bound Jewish and immigrant 
otherness to the threat of black masculinity and the defilement of southern white 
women. Levy’s company was kicked out of the Model License League—an association of 
distilleries intended to police retail sales and limit licenses to prevent over-
competition—but the damage had been done.75 By 1915, anti-prohibition forces had all 
but given up on the south.    
 With few alliances and increasingly isolated in industry and culture, the United 
States Brewer’s Association, the principal trade group of brewers and the most forceful 
advocate of the right to drink, continued to shape an argument for freedom of 
consumption as a constitutive feature of individual liberty. They argued for a nation-
wide referendum on prohibition, confident in their belief that “the liberal voters, who 
are, for the most part massed in the industrial states, would be able to defeat it.”76 Such 
discursive strategies helped reshape the public conception of liberalism, tying together 
liberal identity and the right of consumption. Like the term propaganda in the struggle 
to regulate film content, “liberal” in anti-prohibition literature signified a discursive 
shift in American political culture, broadening the classical conceptions of propertied 
liberalism into its modern and social iterations.77 
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 Industrialism and labor issues were crucial for anti-prohibition advocates, who 
cast the right to individual liberty against both puritan mores and the consequences of 
modern industrialization in which “all human beings should be machines whose wheels 
must revolve despite considerable grating.”78 Workers demand contact, wrote James E. 
Freeman, “not with mechanisms, but with life itself. He is the victim of a system of 
modern life that is so strenuous in its tendency that it threatens to make his labor one of 
large isolation.”79 Prohibition forces were consistently attacked as socialist and radical 
responses to individual consumption and choice. Labor leader Samuel Gompers argued 
that “[i]ncreasing wages, establishing a shorter workday, affording better tastes, better 
aspirations, higher ideals” could more effectively establish temperance in the populace 
“than to inaugurate prohibition by law.”80 Alcohol interests allied themselves with trade 
unions and big labor against more radical labor influences. Brewers and other employers 
“who treat their employees liberally” hailed government action against the IWW in the 
Paterson silk strikes of 1913. “The decline of the Industrial Worker’s of the World,” wrote 
the USBA yearbook of 1913, “must be a source of real satisfaction alike to all employers 
and wage-earners who recognize in the preacher of revolution the worst enemy of 
both.”81 Labor and liquor were not without conflict, but the brewing industry in particular 
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paid better wages than most industries in America,82 and publicly recognized that unions 
were “the natural means for securing justice” for workers.83 Certain conflicts with labor 
revealed the extent to which the brewers struggled to coordinate industry practice and 
policy, however. A nationwide compensation plan for injured workers did not materialize 
largely because the brewing association’s members “failed to comply” and showed 
themselves “curiously indifferent to the importance of the Labor question in our 
industry.”84 A fractured industry proved unable to deal with an increasingly unified and 
national labor movement, despite the fact that labor was more or less staunchly anti-
prohibition.  
 Both the alcohol and film arguments for liberty failed in their own ways. The 
landmark Supreme Court Case Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio (1915) ruled that the cinema was 
not art or speech but a commercial product like bacon, baseballs, and railroads, to be 
regulated through the interstate commerce clause. From 1908 to 1918, political 
censorship of the movies was institutionalized in a handful of states and and in 
numerous local and municipal bodies. The strictly economic definition of cinema offered 
by the Mutual decision, however, gave little guidance on how to regulate the social 
capacity of the movies. Political censorship bodies were on the whole mired in 
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corruption, disorganization, conflict over what was acceptable and what was obscene, 
and a deluge of film products in need of review. The social capacity of the cinema—the 
power of ideas and their potential influence over the public—did not rest easily within 
the economic definition of motion pictures. The liberty to drink, on the other hand, was 
swept up in the prohibition wave—neither the defense of individual liberty nor the 
inefficacy of political prohibition could hold back the moral force of policy formation in 
this era. But, in another way, these arguments for individual right to expression and 
consumption helped shaped a modern discourse of liberty that outlasted both political 
censorship of movies and prohibition of drink.  
 
Consolidation and the Reform Sentiment 
The film and alcohol industries both struggled to consolidate the industry by 
incorporating sites of consumption into a vertically integrated combine. These sites of 
consumption—the exhibition space and the saloon—were the most difficult sectors to 
consolidate. They were widely dispersed throughout the country, tied to traditional and 
more local property holdings, closer to the public, and subject to greater scrutiny by 
police and municipal power. Where the alcohol industry’s tied house system failed, 
producing over-competition and social crisis, the movie industry successfully integrated 
the exhibition space into the vertical monopoly of the studio system. The consequences 
of consolidating these retail spaces go a long way toward explaining the success of the 
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movie industry in warding off regulation and the inability of the alcohol industry to 
survive progressive moral reform.  
 As prohibition became a reality, movie exhibitors had little love lost for their 
dying competitors, but the temperance fervor among movie men had begun to wane after 
1916. From 1917–1919, there is a visible drop off in temperance agitation in the film 
trade journals like Moving Picture World, which stated, rather remarkably, that 
“prohibition is too closely akin to censorship to make it good medicine for a theater 
management to take up actively.”85 This was likely due to the combined effects of 
America’s entry into the Great War, the increasing inevitably of nationwide prohibition, 
and the threat of theater admittance taxes to replace lost liquor revenue.86 Another cause 
may have been the American film industry’s broader turn away from “propaganda 
pictures,” as discussed in chapter four. Though the hammer of the state’s regulatory 
power could pound the nails of both censorship and prohibition, exhibitors tried to 
leverage the failures of legal liquor to their benefit. “[I]f the screen is denatured,” wrote 
the Exhibitor’s Trade Review, “its ability to take the place of the saloon will disappear … 
humanity is going to have its stimulants—in one form or another.”87 Even the familiar 
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film fight against drink could be recast in depoliticized terms, an argument not for 
prohibition films but rather for entertainment, pure and simple, that can stimulate the 
public without the effects of alcohol.  
A survey of exhibitors published in the April 12, 1919 issue of the Exhibitor’s Trade 
Review showed that 72% of motion picture theater owners were in favor of prohibition, 
23% were indifferent, and only 3% were against.88 The majority of exhibitor’s reported 
that business had improved in their houses, particularly from the family and working 
class trade, by an average of 22% over receipts from 1918.89 The phenomenal change 
within the motion picture industry from 1906 to 1918 coincided with and was reinforced 
by conflict between liquor and movies. In the early years of the nickelodeon craze, the 
fluidity of consumptive spaces for working class leisure time created opportunities for 
drinking culture to be a part of movie-watching practices, influencing the character and 
form of a growing, infant industry. But the imperatives of class, aided by state regulatory 
action, necessitated a clear demarcation between the saloon and movie exhibition, a 
divorce that freed the movies toward greater profits, respectability, and ultimately 
artistic recognition for the masters of 20th century popular culture.  
 These parallel histories of integration show that, more broadly, the development 
of consolidated capitalism in America did not produce uniform results. Consolidation in 
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the alcohol and motion picture industries was intended to correct the greatest economic 
danger to the industry: over-competition. The tied-house system in the alcohol 
industries was intended to check against over-competition at the level of production, as 
the barriers to entry in the industry were always very minimal, but this policy unwittingly 
fostered even greater over-competition at the level of retail consumption as brewers and 
distillers capitalized on the bargain of backing numerous saloons to give the public 
exclusive product offerings. For the motion picture industry, vertical integration was, by 
the 1920s, eventually able to successfully check over-competition at all levels, partly due 
to higher barriers to entry, but also due to a more coordinated economic policy among 
industry leaders. Nonetheless, for the American film industry, the first two decades of 
the twentieth century was marked by fierce competition, great economic successes, and 
spectacular failures. Conflict was ever present in the nascent motion picture industry, 
but so too, even at the very beginning, was coordination and cooperation, however 
rudimentary. Producers and distributors had from the origins of the industry developed 
coordinated practices that standardized the industry’s flow of product, but the 
relationship between distributors and exhibitors was famously toxic, the former too 
often in a position to impose unfavorable terms on the latter, particularly block-
booking.90 One of the first steps of industry reform for the Motion Picture Producers and 
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Distributors of America, formed in the spring of 1922, was to establish uniform contracts 
between distributors and exhibitors. This was not an immediate success, and the MPPDA 
precipitated an all-out war with the organized independent exhibitors, but increasing 
horizontal coordination by producers and distributors finally overcame the independents 
in exhibition and, by the late 1920s, the industry achieved near total vertical integration.  
 Distilleries and breweries were thrown into internecine competition following the 
Civil War-era introduction of taxes on alcohol, as productive capacity was significantly 
greater than demand. The industries struggled to consolidate horizontally, but regional 
differences and the ease of entry meant that competitors could easily undercut prices. 
Vertical integration, while relatively easy for the brewers, brought about a social crisis at 
the retail level. Growth and consolidation in the liquor business was effectively checked 
at every turn. The horizontal fracture between liquor and beer could never be effectively 
managed. Internal dissension and conflict had long characterized the relationship 
between brewers and distillers, and as the 20th century temperance movement 
flourished into a full blown nationwide campaign for prohibition, the alcohol industry 
was unable to coordinate a response. Brewers were too often quick to criticize liquor as 
the real instigator of the social crisis surrounding alcohol, while singing the praises of 
beer as a health drink that aids in temperance. The lack of horizontal coordination, 
coupled with the inability to effectively make vertical integration in beer more 
responsive to public concern, lay at the heart of the moral crisis destroying the industry. 
The motion picture industry, on the other hand, was able to utilize economic 
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coordination in moral politics—both in keeping social reformers at bay and in using the 
screen to integrate the industry within the broader reform impulse of the era by turning 
the power of movie propaganda against liquor. Temperance films situated the medium 
within a culture war against drink and the saloon from the earliest years of the medium. 
A number of film shorts on Carrie Nation—the axe-wielding temperance warrior—were 
released on 1901.91 From 1907 to 1912, producers increasingly utilized the evils of drink 
and the saloon as the moral foundation of fictional melodrama. These films often used 
longstanding temperance narratives that date back to the first movement in the 1850s. 
 
The Drunkards on the Screen: Conflict and Social Power 
Film producers visualized the horrors of drink in their high-profile temperance 
films, but portraying the saloon as a den of iniquity was a common narrative device 
across a wide range of movies. A look at movie plots during the fall season of 1915 
indicates the extent to which the anti-saloon message saturated the movies. The 
Universal film Renunciation (1915) centers on the story of two factions in a small town 
who “become embroiled in a gun fight in the biggest building of the settlement, a 
combination dance hall, gambling saloon and cafe. A stray bullet strikes a lantern which 
explodes. The saloon is instantly ablaze and soon the entire street is a roaring mass of 
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flames.”92 From Kids and Corsets (1915): “Hubby has gone to a saloon nearby to drown 
his troubles. The two men meet and hubby offers to fight a duel.”93 The thieves of 
Weighed in the Balance (Mutual, 1915) “took the money to the billiard saloon”94 and in 
Salvation Nell (California, 1915): “… her father in a drunken rage brutally murders her 
mother, and a few moments later at the saloon, the murderer meets his death at the 
hands of his associates.”95 These films used saloons as a stock narrative device to convey 
social evil, violence, and moral fall, an element of the mise-en-scène that helped to 
“sever cinema’s associations with ‘vice’ and reposition cinema as ‘respectable.’”96 
Brewers tries to push back against such images of the evil saloon, claiming 
misrepresentation in the movies. Brewers in Wisconsin wrote lengthy letters to film 
producers deploring the anti-saloon crusade in the cinema, claiming that “producers 
have shown a tendency to associate every dive scene, every human derelict, wayward 
son, or ruined home with a beer sign or a mug of beer, and nowhere in the productions 
have the producers ever associated beer with a decent atmosphere.”97  
 That movies could be formidable artillery in the social reformer’s fight against the 
pernicious liquor interests underscores the tension between propaganda and film free 
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speech. The movies were hardly a neutral medium for the dissemination and deliberation 
of ideas. By the 1910s, the movies were already showing a tremendous capacity to shape 
and influence public debate and perceptions of social and political issues. As an open 
and contested field of social and political formation, the cinema was malleable enough 
to be fashioned for numerous and sometimes conflicting purposes. This open and 
contested field of ideological formation is precisely what constituted the social 
liberalism of cinema’s free expression, but economic interests and class considerations 
narrowed this field toward prohibition and against the liquor trade. For brewers, despite 
the fact that “there is noticeable a counter-current of greater liberalism in social 
intercourse and greater tolerance of alcoholic drink in private life … [i]t is extremely 
difficult to get a hearing for our side of the question.”98  
 American cinema was a powerful tool for shaping public imagination of drink’s 
destructive capacity, but it was not without conflict over such images. Liquor interests 
were accused of infiltrating film censorship boards to control visual representations of 
drink. The center of much of this controversy was Pennsylvania, a state known for its 
powerful wet politics and uncompromising film censor board. The Pennsylvania State 
Board of Censors, composed of three quintessentially progressive interests—lawyer, 
mother, and educator—made liberal use of the scissors, and temperance pictures with 
moral uplift were often not given the benefit of the doubt.99 “The direful rum interests of 
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the country are credited with a desire to get control of the various moving picture 
censors,” wrote the Johnstown (Pa.) Democrat of the film John Barleycorn, “a great many 
films that depict the sad fate of the drunkard have been suppressed … [t]he movie has, 
to some extent, become part of the temperance propaganda.”100  
 The film adaptation of Jack London’s John Barleycorn (Bosworth, 1914) is the most 
visible conflict over drink on the screen in Pennsylvania. The censor board demanded 
the elimination of barroom scenes and acts of intemperance in John Barleycorn, arguing 
that these images incite the young and impressionable to mimic observed behavior.101 J. 
Louis Breitinger, chief censor of the board and political ally of U.S. Senator Boise 
Penrose, provided legal representation to brewers and distillers in Pennsylvania and kept 
the inciting images of intemperance at bay with the power of the scissors. The extent to 
which Brietinger’s liquor connections influenced his position of censoring John 
Barleycorn is impossible to know, but it is perhaps no coincidence that less than a few 
months before Barleycorn’s release the Pennsylvania state legislature drafted a bill to 
“prohibit cabarets, dancing and moving pictures in places where beer and liquors are for 
sale,” thus segregating and sharpening the competition between liquor and movie 
interests.102 The controversy was also an opportunity for temperance reformers to build 
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strong alliances with movie men. William E. Smith, producer of Barleycorn, organized a 
free exhibition at the Philadelphia YMCA, thus maneuvering around the Pennsylvania 
censor board since non-commercial exhibition did not require the board’s approval. The 
Anti-Saloon League was one of the principle sponsors of the event.103 The film received 
valuable free advertising from the political controversy. Non-commercial exhibition—
itself a threat to the interests of the film industry—provided a useful strategy for turning 
public sentiment against film censorship. As we shall see in later chapters, free motion 
picture exhibition would be a source of conflict that shaped industry consolidation in the 
1920s. 
 The attacks on John Barleycorn pushed Pennsylvania movie men into organizing 
the Moving Picture Protection Association to better coordinate efforts against legal 
censorship in the state.104 Although these efforts failed to overthrow state censorship 
following the Supreme Court ruling in Mutual v. Ohio, the fight in Pennsylvania is an 
example of how moral conflicts in cinema and liquor cuts across much of our historical 
understanding of the progressive reform impulse: the “newfound morality of cinema” 
that attacked the social evil of drink was itself the target of progressive state action that 
sought to limit such expression.105 To fight against this educative and moral cinema, 
alcohol interests filled the coffers of their political allies. “Movie censors of 27 states 
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[are] ruled by rum ring,” wrote The North American. Alcohol’s control over state film 
censorship enabled the suppression of “pictures displaying the demoralizing effects of 
beer and rum, and even pictures teaching temperance lessons.”106 In effect, what the case 
of John Barleycorn shows is that social reformers were hardly unified over how and what 
to regulate within the mass culture industries. This conflict also revealed how the 
politicization of early American movies was geared toward legitimizing the industry and 
its product, a strategy that would change considerably in the 1920s.  
 The Anti-Saloon League and other prohibitionists made ample use of John 
Barleycorn to advance the anti-drink cause. The ASL bought the rights to Barleycorn in 
Massachusetts, making it the official film of the Bay State chapter.107 “It is the first time 
that an entire moving picture show has been installed to promote interest in a saloonless 
nation,” commented Moving Picture World. The Personal Liberty League, an anti-
prohibition group, offered Bosworth $25,000 to keep Barleycorn from the screens in six 
states until after the 1914 elections, only serving to give the movie men and their 
prohibitionist allies yet more terrific advertising.108 The producers followed an identical 
strategy in Texas in the spring of 1917. Free screenings were held in both theatrical and 
non-theatrical venues. They distributed numerous copies throughout the state and 
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advertised aggressively.109 By November, 1917, after Barleycorn and other temperance 
pictures had played throughout the summer and autumn, Dallas, Austin, Waco, and 
several counties that were “heretofore distinctly ‘wet’” had gone dry.110 Advertising for 
John Barleycorn appealed to class consciousness by identifying liquor as the destroyer of 
working class economic well-being: “The saloon always offers a warm welcome to the 
workingman. The liquor bill of the American nation is $1,500,000,000 annually. What 
per cent. of this does the wage earner pay?” Such appeals could situate the cinema as 
both a medium for working class expression and, perhaps more visibly, as a “protector” 
of the interests of workingmen by sounding the familiar call of moral reform. “The saloon 
has always exercised a great social power over the workers,” commented Moving Picture 
World, “[t]he picture trade is the only heir to this social leadership and has the power to 
cultivate it to an unlimited degree.”111 The movies could take up the cause of both the 
working class and progressive reform sentiment. To push back against censorship, the 
commercial film industry allied itself with core progressive causes.  
 Barleycorn also factored heavily in the prohibition war for Ohio, home state of the 
Anti-Saloon League and one of the few with a state film censor board. When Ohio’s film 
censors sought to cut Barleycorn’s drinking scenes to a “flash,” Wayne Wheeler and the 
ASL went into action. They protested the board’s decision and publicly attacked the 
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board’s members as duplicitous lackeys of the liquor interests, a rather ironic charge 
coming from Wheeler, the man who turned political control of special interests into an 
art form. The board bristled at the charges but held firm. The cut were made, despite 
claims that “liberals are attempting to suppress the film because they fear its effect on 
public sentiment.”112 Nonetheless, it seems possible the combined prohibitionist–film  
Fig. 1. Advertisement for John Barleycorn in MPW, July 13, 1914   Fig. 2. Breitinger on the  
rampage in MPW, Aug. 1 1914  
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industry assault on the Ohio board had some effect in softening the actions of 
censorship. Mrs. Maude Murray Miller, the “dominating spirit” of the Ohio censor board, 
was accused in January 1914 of directing a “tyranny of censorship … [t]hat is the Russian 
way of dealing with mediums of expression.”113 By 1917, however, after a public 
onslaught of temperance film agitation that included non-commercial screenings of John 
Barleycorn, Prohibition, The Spender, and Battle of Ballots, Moving Picture World regarding 
Mrs. Miller as “more or less liberal in her views toward censoring,” and that the board 
overall had “become liberal,” adopting “a more lenient policy and will treat the film 
business in a broader way than they have in the past.114  
 1915 was a watershed year for the film industry and the liquor wars. Throughout 
the spring and summer of that year, as movie-goers flocked to see America’s first 
blockbuster feature film, The Birth of a Nation, several heavily publicized prohibition 
movies were also making the rounds, among them was Robert T. Kane’s production of 
Prohibition, produced by the Prohibition Film Company of California of which Kane was 
president. Prohibition was a typical melodrama and love triangle in which two brothers—
one an alcoholic and the other temperate—fall in love with the same woman. The very 
visible advertising campaign for the film sought to create a high profile bidding war for 
state’s rights distribution, with trade journals noting that territorial rights are “going 
fast” and that the Prohibition Film Company has “gone the limit in the handling of the 
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big feature.”115 The film was shown to Ford Motor Company employees at the plant, and 
drew well in places like Chicago and Ohio.116 The film also acted as a “government agent,” 
drawing interest from officials in Russia, France, and Great Britain who hoped that the 
movie could help weld prohibition efforts, and the cinema, to the war effort.117 Back in 
America, Prohibition waded right into the conflicts over visual representation and 
political meaning that had been laid bare by the release of John Barleycorn the year 
earlier. Breitinger and the Pennsylvania censor board took exception to some scenes in 
Prohibition and demanded cuts. Kane was ready for them, however, and spent 
considerable time and money giving private exhibitions in Philadelphia to well-known 
temperance and prohibition advocates. Film interests were quick to note that “[t]here is 
no mistaking the meaning of the scenes nor the motives which actuate the characters. 
He who looks may understand.”118 Breitinger made no reply to this public pressure, but 
the latest conflict cast further doubt on the effectiveness of the board and gave yet 
another anti-liquor movie valuable free publicity.119 Whether Breitinger was influenced 
by liquor interests or had legitimate concerns about the representation of drunkards on 
the screen and the attendant threat of mimicry, in either case the censor board’s 
responses to both John Barleycorn and Prohibition reveal the ineffectiveness of state 
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regulation of screen content. Political authorities had grossly miscalculated the social 
capacity of the cinema.  
 The movies would take the fight against liquor straight to Washington. The Anti-
Saloon League teamed with Kane to make Prohibition a key component of the 1915 “white 
ribbon” march on the capitol. The goal was to project Prohibition on the white wall of the 
U.S. Congress, “spreading a sheet over the classic marble and projecting through the dark 
of night by agency of a powerful and giant lens.”120 Projecting the anti-liquor crusade on 
the wall of government symbolizes the intertwined nature of economic, political, and 
social forces in shaping early 20th century American democracy—film exhibition was the 
medium through which public interest cast a commercial product onto the institution of 
federal legislative government. The audience in this case was not comprised of political 
authorities—instead, government becomes the screen itself, part of the medium of public 
expression and commercial exploitation. “‘Prohibition’ is intended for the masses,” 
wrote Moving Picture World, “for the public that once supported the most inexpensive 
grade of melodrama. It fulfils its mission.”121 In Kane’s Prohibition, government provided 
the picture sheet for a commercial product that intended both mass consumption and 
political agitation. Such a remarkable vision troubles our historical understanding of the 
distinctions between commercial and non-commercial cinema, entertainment and 
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propaganda, public interest and political authority, as well as our understanding of the 
contests over democracy in the progressive era.  
Fig. 3. Scene from Prohibition, April 17, 1915  
Another conflict centered around the Spokane, Washington premiere of D. W. 
Griffith’s blockbuster, The Birth of a Nation, in August, 1915. Municipal authorities 
declined to censor much of the virulent racism of the film, including the sexualized 
convulsions of the character Lydia, images that were heavily censored elsewhere. But the 
saloon sequence of Birth, where a young Wallace Reid plays a hard working white man 
who raids a saloon full of black patrons to track down the infamous Gus, was cut entirely 
from the positive prints in Spokane.122 This scene reveals many of the common southern 
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white fears of the saloon—a site of black violence and inebriety, it is a safe house for Gus 
after his foaming-at-the-mouth pursuit and subsequent death of the youngest Cameron 
daughter.123 The saloon, in Birth, offers protection from the black violators of southern 
female innocence, but such images were simply too unacceptable to local censors in 
Spokane, necessitating that such racially charged moralism be expunged. A few months 
after the premiere of Birth in Washington, the state ordered all saloons closed, outlawing 
retail alcohol 4 years before nationwide prohibition.  
 If Griffith’s Birth and his earlier temperance pictures for Biograph cast him as 
cinema’s most influential social reformer, his next production—the epic Intolerance 
(1917)—criticized the very reform moment that he had so powerfully given visual 
expression. The brewers, unsurprisingly, celebrated the message of Intolerance. “[I]t is 
estimated that perhaps 80,000,000 persons had the futility of prohibition revealed to 
them in … the stupendous spectacle ‘Intolerance,’” wrote the American Brewers’ 
Review.124 That 80 million people saw Intolerance is a gross overestimate, but the liquor 
men were nonetheless overjoyed that such an “effective means of education and 
enlightenment” was finally being “used by the organized brewers of this country in their 
campaign against ignorance and systematic falsification.”125 The brewers quoted Griffith 
at length: 
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I believe what I’m preaching in this picture. We have too many 
laws—too many professional reformers. They have tried to tell the 
whole people what they shall do. It’s time the public told the 
reformers what is to be done. “Intolerance” brings up the liquor 
question. For myself, I have no doubt whiskey and strong liquors 
are bad for the system, but here’s a fact to be considered: the study 
of history indicates that not a single race not addicted to liquor has 
shown itself a strong people.126   
  
Brewers also made note of other movies that undermined the prohibition crusade—A 
Temperance Town, a film satire of prohibition life adapted from the successful play 
penned by Charles Hale Hoyt; The American Sahara, which illustrated the “evasions and 
violations of law in such regions”; and The Story of a Glass of Beer, a movie “much in 
demand by public exhibitions and by a number of higher educational institutions.”127 
These three movies are no longer extant, and so it is hard to evaluate their content and 
meaning, but judging from the brewers’ praise and free advertising it seems plausible 
they presented satirical and critical views of dry culture that aligned with broader anti-
prohibition arguments. The use of comedic satire is interesting to note here—stuffy blue 
nose reformers and their pious righteousness were an easy target for mass cultural 
expression at the time, animating the chasm that existed between America’s protestant 
and elite traditions and a radically transforming modern society. But political satire in 
progressive era cinema appears to be far less numerous and visible than the reform-
minded uplift movies that are so present among histories of the era, from temperance 
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and white slave movies to exposés on economic greed and unreasonable trusts. Although 
research on the topic is almost non-existent, the tension between satire and realism in 
progressive era screen content was no doubt a powerful force in determining what 
influence the political meaning of visual expression had over the public.     
 Social conditioning, economic interest, and political conflict converged in the 
realism of motion pictures and their potential to instigate mimicry. Such conflicts were 
fueled by the instability of visual meaning and intention in what was still an emerging 
technology. Were the drunkards of the screen reinforcing learned and patterned 
behavior? Or did they reveal the “dark side of wrong, that we may illuminate the bright 
side of virtue”?128 How could audiences and social reformers distinguish an immoral film 
from a moral one? How could political authority in this era, so consumed by assaults on 
the traditions of America, read the codes of screen morality? For critics of the movies, a 
heightened level of realism only signified a more destructive potential than that found 
in the more crudely produced images. But for defenders of the screen, the same terms 
led to different conclusions. “It is their very realism which makes them moral,” wrote the 
New York Tribune, an argument aggressively advanced by the National Board of 
Censorship, a volunteer organization funded by the Motion Picture Patents Company—
Edison’s combine—and largely run by the People’s Institute, a civic reform group that 
reflected elite protestant anxiety over urban American life. One of the first films 
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reviewed by the National Board was A Drunkard’s Reformation. According to the New York 
Herald, the Board would seemingly “have reason to object” to the drunkard’s excess 
illuminated on the screen, but the moral fall and reformation of the man was “so sudden 
and complete” it passed unanimously and praised as a film of educative uplift.129   
 By 1915, the economics of the movie business had undergone dramatic 
transformation. The Edison Trust—the first attempt at a monopoly in the film business, 
finally succumbed to anti-trust action and by 1917 was all but destroyed. Regulation of 
the Trust proved possible because government action rested on strictly economic 
terms—monopolistic control by the Edison combine was built around property and 
patent protection as instruments in limiting competition. This was familiar ground for 
the state to pursue anti-trust action. As the progressive era gave way to World War I, the 
state found it increasingly unable to regulate the social capacity of cinema as it had the 
Edison Trust. The captains of the American film industry were increasingly exhibitors 
and showmen concerned with the software of the movies—the production of images—
not the patent holders and property owners of the old era. The social capacity of the 
cinema required a greater importance be placed on the regulation of morality, not 
regulation of property. Because of the necessity of moral regulation, industry leaders 
were able to consolidate and coordinate the industry free from economic regulation. For 
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the resurgent film industry in the early 1920s, the suppression of the liquor trade 
provided valuable lessons in how to deal with the regulatory powers of the state.  
 Ironically, as the MPPDA analyzed the failures of legal liquor for lessons in their 
own fight against prohibitory regulation, the inability to create broader inter- and intra-
industry alliances was deemed a crucial mistake. The movie industry that had helped 
crush legal liquor was now decrying the inability to foster ties across other culture and 
consumptive industries. The American Development Foundation, in a memo to Hays 
dated September 11, 1922, compared the film industry’s resistance to non-theatrical 
production and exhibition (both educative cinema for schools and religious cinema for 
churches) to the “opposition on the part of saloon keepers and brewers to prohibition.” 
The memo goes on to say that “if saloon keepers and brewers had made concessions to 
conciliate the less radical prohibition advocates they might have continued to operate 
with profit under temperance instead of bringing absolute prohibition upon themselves. 
While there is no idea that any such fate awaits the motion picture industry there is a 
parallel in the two situations.”130 Vertical consolidation needed coordinated 
development because such coordination was crucial in the social value of motion 
pictures. Coordination was also effective in building relationships across industries. The 
path to prohibition was aided by the liquor industries’ inability to foster social alliances 
that could have integrated alcohol consumption into the social fabric of America. 
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Perhaps it was a losing game for liquor from the start—baseball, vaudeville, motion 
pictures, amusements of a wide variety, all conspicuously eliminated drink from their 
consumptive practices in order to protect the economically viability of their businesses. 
Conversely, the saloons were emptied of nearly any other diversion except drink. The 
isolation and destruction of legal liquor in American life was as much a cultural and 
economic processes as it was political and moral. What comes out most visibly in the 
history of the movie and liquor war of the progressive era are the foundational lessons in 
the development of consumer capitalism—identifying and fostering the social value of a 
culture industry was necessary for its survival, and so required a high degree of 
coordinated practices and consolidation by producers. Early consumer capitalism 
required a moral and social dimension to its consumption. 
 Such a social capacity to drink and the saloon was powerfully undermined by the 
cinema and its interests. Brewers responded by clinging to the argument of property, 
increasingly an antiquated defense in the new environment of liberal corporate 
capitalism. The state responses to capitalism were changing, away from a basic right to 
property and patent protection to an expanded right of consumption and expression. The 
American movie industry developed at the very center of this change, as Edison’s Trust 
dissolved and the moguls rose to power. Edison’s powerful combine, so exclusively 
focused on property and patent protection, could not properly attend to the moral 
controversies of the screen. The marriage of social and economic spheres necessitated a 
different set of industry interests and pressures, and in so doing influenced a 
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fundamental reworking of both American capitalism and American liberalism. As the 
movie men realized vertical integration and horizontal coordination were necessary to 
stave off moral regulation of the screen, they looked back at the vanquished liquor 
industries for lessons. The American film industry thus shaped its contours out of the 
ruins of legal alcohol, contours that ultimately bore little resemblance to the liberal 
corporate capitalism political economists agree is the dominate economic structure of 
America. Instead, Hollywood developed a unique alternative to the dominant structure 
American capitalism, far more cooperative and coordinated, that continues to define the 
film industry today. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BIRTH OF A NATION AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 
Scholarship on America’s liberal tradition has long ignored American movies, not 
just as a visible marker of liberal thought and anxieties, but as a spring to its flow. In the 
previous chapter, we saw how both the liquor and film industries articulated unique 
conceptions of liberty and liberal identity, tying individual freedom to freedom of 
consumption and expression. These political expressions by culture industries were 
severely limited by elites and authorities who were concerned over their social effects. 
In the film industry in particular, this freedom of expression created both perils and 
promises for the politics of free speech in America. Free speech had a long development 
from colonial America to the First World War, but postwar historical scholarship—
particularly Zechariah Chafee’s formative work Freedom of Speech in 1920—significantly 
narrowed the historical perspective of free speech politics. But in limiting the history of 
free speech in America, Chaffee’s seminal work sought to maximize free speech 
protections. Although heavily criticized in its time, Freedom of Speech laid the modern 
foundations of First Amendment civil libertarianism in the United States.1  
The political conflicts surrounding movies as speech coincided with the broader 
development of modern free speech in America. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
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concerns over public health and safety, as well as national security, created political 
climates in which free speech rights were limited. By the end of World War Two, the civil 
libertarianism of modern free speech began to flourish. By 1952, the Supreme Court ruled 
that motion pictures were in fact speech, to be constitutionally protected by the First 
Amendment. The politics of free speech, both in and out of the movies, had come a long 
way since the 1910s. Such a development belies an intriguing historical paradox, 
however—while film free speech was championed in the 1910s, it was, by the early 1920s, 
explicitly cast aside by the MPPDA and the emerging moguls in Hollywood. The 
development of classical Hollywood had no use for film free speech; indeed, such a 
conception of free cinematic expression cut against the big producer control of the 
Hollywood dream factory, a self-regulated and consolidated industry that sought to keep 
both independent producers and non-commercial cinema at bay. The story of how film 
speech became narrowed, to be buried and rendered dormant for a generation, is not the 
familiar story of reformist elites and political authorities clamping down on the business 
of movie-making—that story runs parallel to another, in which the movie industry itself 
absconded away the film free speech cause in the service of consolidation and 
coordination. But to fully capture this story requires going back further, before the 1920s, 
into the failures of film free speech in the progressive era.  
1915 was a watershed year in the politics of film free speech—the failure to censor 
the insidious racism of D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation and the Supreme Court 
decision of Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio seemed to heighten the conflict over cinematic 
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expression: Where Birth forcefully articulated the cause of free speech through the 
terrorism of white supremacy (and thus casting anti-Birth protesters as censors and 
opponents of free speech), Mutual v. Ohio narrowly defined the definition of cinema as 
neither speech nor art, but as an economic product “pure and simple.” These two 
developments—one a movie that defended film free speech through racist propaganda 
and the other a court case that denied the constitutionality of film free speech—were in 
fact not as contradictory as they may appear. Both marked the beginning of the end of 
film free speech in America. The Mutual decision debilitated any legal grounding for the 
cinema’s social and political capacity in an era in which propaganda, democracy, and the 
movies were closely intertwined. The censorship fights over The Birth of a Nation 
fractured the cause of free speech from the politics of social justice in nascent modern 
liberalism, a fracture that remains to this day.  
In Freeing the First Amendment, David S. Allen writes that “[t]oday’s talk of free 
speech often reflects the desire to protect private interests—increasingly that seems to 
mean corporate interests—at the expense of understanding what the purpose and 
mission of the First Amendment is all about.” From cross burnings in St. Paul to Neo-
Nazis in Skokie, the development of free speech in 20th century America too often 
appears antagonistic to the parallel development of modern liberalism. Such 
antagonisms rest upon a particular ideological interpretation of the First Amendment, 
in which “hurtful speech might conceivably be of some value to society and therefore the 
proper answer to that speech is not censorship, but more speech.” This narrowed 
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conception of free speech rights fails to attend to inequalities of gender, race, sexual 
orientation, and economic status, but existing scholarship on the politics of American 
free speech, dominated by legal cases and constitutional interpretation, also leaves out 
the cultural conflicts over speech and inequality. To “free the First Amendment” requires 
us to look back into history at where and how these currents of free expression were 
narrowed.  
The American film industry emerged at a transformative moment for liberalism in 
American political culture. The politics of race, gender, and economic equality 
increasingly overlaid propertied individualism as the nexus of American liberalism, but 
it was no coordinated advance of revision—modern liberalism was built on a series of 
fractures: the tension between racial justice and free speech, between democracy and 
propaganda, and between commercial cinema’s war fever and a war-making state. As an 
infant industry and medium of democratic propaganda, the movies were well positioned 
to shape the tumultuous currents of this political and economic reorganization of 
liberalism. Hollywood’s first blockbuster—D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation—is a 
crucial starting point for this historical trajectory. 
 Stephen Skowronek’s “The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, 
Liberalism, and the American Political Tradition” traces the apparent contradictions 
between President Wilson’s pro-segregationist racism and his liberal idealism of self-
determination. An erudite Southerner and father of modern liberalism, Wilson was both 
a liberator and a racist. Highlighting these contradictions, Skowronek writes that “[t]his 
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is the liberator who arranged an early screening of D. W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation at the 
White House (the first White House screening ever) and pronounced its incendiary 
celebration of national redemption by the Ku Klux Klan ‘all so terribly true.’”2 But what 
if these three historical footnotes of Wilson—that Birth was the first movie shown at the 
White House, that Wilson had arranged it, and that he pronounced it “all so terribly 
true”—were actually fictions of history? How does it change the reassociation of 
reactionary ideas toward antithetical ends? 
 These historical inaccuracies do not so much trouble the apparent contradictions 
of the racist liberator—he was indeed both—as it calls into question why historians, 
social scientists, and film scholars have been carrying these myths for the past one 
hundred years despite evidence to the contrary. In some ways, it speaks of a desire to 
push Wilson and America’s first blockbuster together, to shape the story beyond the 
historical record, to see fire where one only saw smoke. This very tendency to force the 
events of the past to be consistent with our understanding of political thought is the 
tendency Skowronek cautions against. “Often one of these Wilsons is discounted,” writes 
Skowronek, “but to highlight his reactionary racism or lionize his liberal idealism is 
simply to submerge uncomfortable facts on the other side.”3 If evidence does not elide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Stephen Skowronek. “The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the American 
Political Tradition.” American Political Science Review 100 no. 3 (August 2006), 389. Even Melvyn Stokes’ 
recent history of Birth, which clarifies much of the innumerable ambiguities surrounding the film’s 
exhibition and reception, carries the oft-stated claim that this was the first motion picture shown in the 
White House. See: Melvyn Stokes, D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007, 111. 
3 Ibid., 387. 
	  
102	  
with what we imagine to be a racist Wilson cheering on the hooded Klan at Birth’s climax, 
we quietly ignore the evidence. 
 If this was not the first film shown at the White House, if Wilson hadn’t arranged 
it and hadn’t call it a “terribly true” history “written with lightning,” the oversight is 
both historically meaningful and indicative of a story far more fascinating, for it is the 
starting point of a crisis in liberalism, in which emerging politics of free speech collide 
with emerging politics of racial justice, two sites of cultural formation that defined in 
part the contours of modern liberalism. These currents of power in the years leading up 
to America’s entry into war did indeed shape the Wilsonian features of modern 
liberalism—the association between Wilson and Birth reveals a contest of power, political 
meaning, and new media in American government’s highest office that sets the stage for 
a wartime administration deeply concerned with the preservation of a democracy that it 
was simultaneously threatening to imperil.  
 The birth of modern free speech politics can be located in the reactions to The 
Birth of a Nation. Supporters of the movie formed a vanguard of reactionary democracy 
that was also, in Richard Hofstader’s view of this era, populist in its heightened 
expression of nativism and racial anxiety. A populist conception of Birth makes sense, 
not least of which because D. W. Griffith himself was a prominent articulator of populism 
in many of his early Biograph movies,4 but Birth also strikes the tenor of populism’s 
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anachronistic place in 1915 American culture—the economic success of Birth had a 
significant effect on making movies seem more respectable, cultured, and prepared to 
move beyond the storefront nickelodeons in working class districts that had so defined 
the first era of American movies. Birth simultaneously shaped and destroyed cinematic 
populism at a defining moment in which progressive liberalism “turned sour, became 
illiberal and ill-tempered.”5 With American agrarian radicalism long in decline, populism 
of this era was left with little more than nativist reaction and racial anxiety. Elite 
progressive reformers, for their part, were confronted with a film that stoked racial 
anxiety and enmity and aided in the separation of populism from progressivism. The 
politics of free speech was left to the populists, whereas the nascent and half-formed 
foundations of modern liberalism were left to the progressives, who in many cases 
understood little of the meaning and scope of this fracture. 
 
The Movies Come to Wilson 
On February 3, 1915, Thomas Dixon, Jr. met President Woodrow Wilson at the 
White House in Washington. Dixon—the author of two works of sensational racism, The 
Clansman and The Leopard’s Spots—had come to ask his old Johns Hopkins University 
friend for a favor. A motion picture production based off his work had just been 
completed in Southern California and he wanted Wilson to see it, “not as President, but 
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as a scholar and student of history.”6 Dixon thought it better to give as few details as 
possible. Dixon later wrote to Wilson aide Joseph Patrick Tumulty that: 
I didn’t dare allow the President to know the real big purpose back of my 
film—which was to revolutionize Northern sentiments by a presentation of 
history that would transform every man in my audience into a good Democrat! 
… What I told the President was that I would show him the birth of a new 
art—the launching of the mightiest engine for moulding public opinion in 
the history of the world.7 
  
This would not be the first time Wilson had watched a movie at the White House. Some 
seven months previous, the president and his first wife had entertained 40 cabinet 
members and distinguished guests for an exhibition of Cabiria (1914), the epic 
production of Italian imperial glory that was drawing fairly well in America. It was an 
outdoor affair, and the screen, “set in the rose gardens behind the west terrace,” had a 
grand piano providing accompaniment below.8 It wasn’t entirely unusual, then, for D. W. 
Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation—a film that, in its monumental and historical form, owed 
some debt to Cabiria—to get a hearing with the chief executive. Wilson agreed to Dixon’s 
wishes on two conditions: that the film be screened at the White House since he was still 
officially in mourning; and that the press should not in any way be informed of the 
event.9 That Dixon hid his motives—to reveal the power of film propaganda, “the 
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July 18, 1914, 461–62; Stokes, D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, 111.  
9 WWP 32, 142, n1. 
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mightiest engine for moulding public opinion”—and that Wilson wanted to hide this 
screening from public knowledge, is telling. Both intentions indicate that Wilson was 
sensitive to the tension between propaganda and democracy, between the social power 
of the cinema and the political power of the presidency. Is propaganda an expression of 
democratic will, or a manipulation of it? Could censorship cut propaganda out of the 
democratic organism and still preserve the virtues of free expression? For Wilson, these 
questions—surfacing in the White House screening of Birth and carried into the 
subsequent controversies over the film’s exhibition—lay the ground for the political 
contests of preparedness and neutrality, and ultimately the World War itself, in which 
the struggle of preserving democracy is situated within the push and pull of propaganda 
and censorship.  
 A few weeks after Dixon’s meeting, on the evening of February 18, two simplex 
projectors were set up in the East Room. Cast on the white wooden panels was a stunning 
three-hour film on American myth, history, and race paranoia that was as captivating as 
it was contradictory. Heroic battle sequences of the Civil War were imbued with a 
powerful pacifist message; racial masquerade of white fear and demonized black identity 
carried with it the undeniable moralism of national unity; “historical facsimiles”—
veritable copies of the past—reinforced the myths of Reconstruction, the frontier, 
Lincoln as “the great heart,” and the righteousness of the Ku Klux Klan’s terror campaign 
in the south. There were also moments in the film of deeper, emotional contradictions, 
an ambiguity of fear and desire, as when Flora Cameron, hiding in the cellar, appears to 
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be overwhelmed with glee as her family’s home is pillaged by “an irregular force of 
guerillas.”  
   Fig. 4. An “irregular force of guerillas”       Fig. 5. Flora can barely contain her excitement 
Wilson’s reactions to Birth have sparked an ongoing historical debate, particularly the 
claim that Wilson had remarked upon the film’s completion that it was “like writing 
history with lightning. And my only regret is that it is all so terribly true.” This statement 
has no contemporary source. While it may be true, there is plenty of evidence that the 
remark is apocryphal. In a 1977 interview, the last survivor of the White House Birth 
screening indicated that Wilson “seemed lost in thought during the showing,” and as the 
movie ended, Wilson “walked out of the room without saying a word.”10 As for the film 
striking Wilson as “terribly true,” there are indications that Wilson distrusted the “truth” 
of the moving image more generally, as his speech to the Film Board of Trade a year later 
seems to indicate.  
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 In these remarks, made at the Biltmore Hotel in New York on January 27, 1916, 
Wilson made no mention of censorship or the growth of the motion picture industry—he 
focused solely on the inability of moving pictures to reveal human truth. Describing his 
astonishment and annoyance at seeing himself on film, Wilson concluded that “the 
external appearances of things are very superficial, indeed. I am very much more 
interested in what my fellow men are thinking about than in the motions through which 
they are going. While we unconsciously display a great deal of human nature in our 
visible actions, there are some very deep waters which no picture can sound.”11 For 
Wilson, a “great nation” is not a “visible thing” but a “spiritual thing,” beset by the lies 
and half-truths of self-interest and superficial appearances. As a select group of powerful 
movie men looked on, Wilson mused: “I wonder how men venture to try to deceive a 
great nation.”12 One can only speculate on whether Wilson’s thoughts on moving images 
were at all formed by The Birth of a Nation, but the speech is an unusual rebuke of the 
truth-revealing power of the cinema, a power that was commented on and celebrated 
almost ceaselessly in Wilson’s time. His subsequent time in office, through America’s 
entry into World War I and after, was marked by noticeable trepidation and concern over 
the social power of commercial cinema.  
 Melvyn Stokes has noted that the Birth’s historical account of Reconstruction and 
the Civil War were not very different from Wilson’s own views, that quotes of Wilson’s A 
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12 Ibid., 17. 
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History of the American People are shown in some of the film’s inter titles, and that it was 
unlikely for the Southern-born Wilson to be “bothered by the film’s rampant racism.” 
But the idea that Wilson would not be bothered by Birth’s racism glosses over some of 
the complexities of Wilson’s views on segregation, miscegenation, and his relationship 
with Dixon. Dixon had clashed with Wilson previously on the former’s obsession with 
racial intermixing. On July 27, 1913, Dixon wrote to Wilson protesting a decision to 
appoint a black Register in the Treasury Department, an appointment that put a black 
man in a position to “boss white girls.” For Dixon, this was “a serious offense against the 
cleanliness of our social life.” In Wilson’s pointed response, he tells Dixon he is well 
aware of the “considerations,” and that they “do not need to be pointed out to me.” 
Furthermore, Dixon did not understand what was going on at Treasury: “We are trying—
and by degrees succeeding—a plan of concentration which will put them all together and 
will not in any one bureau mix the two races.”13  
 Although they agreed on the principle of segregation, they came at the issue from 
differing perspectives: for Dixon, segregation was a response to a social and historical 
reality, that race violence, riots, and the “infamy” of miscegenation needed to be met 
with segregation; for Wilson, segregation was preventative, it kept the undesired racial 
ferment at bay. With segregation Wilson sought stability, Dixon a righteous vengeance. 
This distinction does not absolve Wilson of racist sentiment but it does indicate the 
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possibility that the “rampant racism” of Birth could have disturbed Wilson greatly—that 
he saw Birth’s opprobrium of black desire for white women and the subsequent white 
terror of vigilantism as precisely the kind of violence he thought institutionalized 
segregation would resolve. Throughout his public career, Wilson sought to avoid any 
entanglements with race—his support of segregation, then, can be seen as a strategy for 
insulating himself from any potential and more inflammatory racial incidents. A naive 
and sad point of view, to be certain, but qualitatively different from Dixon’s paranoid 
proselytizing.  
 Wilson’s policies of segregating federal government could not insulate him from 
William Monroe Trotter, a Harvard-educated black newspaper editor, businessman, and 
political activist from Boston. Trotter, well known as strong-willed and opinionated, 
confronted Wilson in November, 1914, to protest against segregation. Wilson was 
shocked that Trotter had treated him as merely a man blind to racial injustice, not a 
revered president. In the encounter, the famously austere Wilson lost his self-control, 
surrendering “to the ‘passion’ he accused Trotter of bringing into the president’s 
office.”14 He later expressed regret over how he handled the incident, that he was “a damn 
fool,” not for recognizing the injustice of segregation, but for letting his emotions 
control his behavior. In his unparalleled biography of Wilson, John Milton Cooper Jr. put 
the encounter into context: 
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More was involved here than Wilson’s usual desire to avoid issues 
involving race. It was revealing that he suffered this breakdown of self-
control not long after Ellen’s death. Nothing like it would happen again 
while he was president, except in smaller, less conspicuous ways after he 
suffered his stroke.15  
 
A little more than 3 months later, the widowed Wilson sat in the White House East Room 
watching The Birth of a Nation. If Wilson was troubled over the race paranoia of Birth, it 
helps explain his embarrassment over the film’s subsequent controversy— and attempts 
to distance himself as much as possible from the production. When his secretary 
recommended he draft a letter stating clearly he did not approve of the film, Wilson 
replied with an affirmative, so long as he would not be seen as supporting Trotter, who 
had spearheaded the campaign against Birth in Boston.16 When revival screenings of 
Birth were planned during World War I, he expressed his disapproval of this “unfortunate 
production” and sought to have it suppressed.17  
 The evening that followed the White House screening saw another private 
exhibition of Birth, this time in the grand ballroom of the Raleigh Hotel in Washington. 
In attendance was a distinguished group of political elites—perhaps the most impressive 
group of political-power-players-turned-movie-spectators yet assembled—that 
included Supreme Court Justice Edward Douglass White and Secretary of Navy Josephus 
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16 WWP 33, 68; Moving Picture World 24, no. 7, April 15, 1915, 1122. 
17 Arthur Link, Wilson: The New Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 252–54. 
	  
111	  
Daniels, along with 38 U.S. senators and 50 members of the House of Representatives.18 
Press accounts of this screening placed both Griffith and Dixon in attendance, with the 
director in particular lavishly praised by the audience at the film’s completion. These 
private Washington exhibitions were intended to shore up political support for the film 
before its premiere in New York.  
 Political support from Washington, however, proved disappointing for the 
producers. Justice White—a Southerner and former Klansman who had sided with the 
majority in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), a case that affirmed the constitutionality of 
“separate but equal” state segregation—also attempted to distance himself from Birth. 
In April, 1915, he threatened to denounce the film publicly if the producers did not stop 
using his name in its promotions, and suggested Wilson do the same.19 White was at this 
time busy drafting the majority opinion for Guinn v. U.S (1915), a case that struck down 
the grandfather clauses of the South, recognizing the “direct and positive language” of 
Fifteenth Amendment’s suffrage rights.20 His wariness of Birth, like Wilson, may have 
been politically motivated, belying his own personal opinions on the question of race.  
 That Southerners Wilson and White were wary of Birth and the controversies 
surrounding its exhibition is remarkable: though the film was not universally praised, it 
had substantial critical and popular backing; moreover, there are few examples in 
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American film history of a production that courted political allies so aggressively, allies 
whose careers had indicated at least a similar sentiment to the political meaning of the 
film itself, and whose very works of political history would appear in the film, to be so 
publicly and unequivocally shunned by those very allies. Wilson and White’s decisions 
to distance themselves from the production indicate ambivalent if not antagonistic 
political responses to the power of commercial moving pictures.  
Historians have yet to question this ambivalence directly. Wilson and White’s 
reactions reveal the constitutive entanglements of liberalism and America’s white 
supremacy present from the origins of the American experiment. Griffith was able to 
harness a new technology for the vision of America’s historical myths of racial demise 
through racial integration, but, in so doing, it could not help but envision the realities of 
race terror and paranoia. Did The Birth of a Nation undermine the antiquated paranoias 
of whiteness? If the reactions of Justice White—a former Klansman and architect of 
segregation—and President Wilson—an ardent Southern apologist who segregated the 
White House—are any indication, the political meaning of Birth cut both ways: it was a 
fascist spectacle that revealed as much as celebrated its racist logic. In laying bare the 
foundation of white supremacy and its racial terror, the movie imperiled the 
development of film free speech, the liberty on which it defended its vision. 
 
Democracy Imperiled: Birth and the National Board of Censorship 
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The political reactions to Birth were mixed, but on the whole state and municipal 
censors who approved the film found mayors, governors, and a few police chiefs willing 
to overstep the censor’s authority in suppressing exhibition, in some cases using old 
“master and slave” laws designed to control racial ferment and violence. In turn, 
municipal and state courts on the whole were willing to overturn these executive 
decisions, sometimes using the 14th Amendment in protecting the film producers’ 
property. These ironic instruments of fighting for and against the film—slave laws used 
to censor the racism of Birth and Civil War Amendments used to defend its exhibition—
are examples of the kind of “reassociation of ideas and purposes” or “ideational drift” 
that were often at the center of the progressive era’s political entanglements. American 
law itself formed the basis of some of the contradictions through which the history of the 
film would unfold. If the ideas deployed to fight for and against the film were 
contradictory, the purposes fell along fairly predictably political lines: Birth was more 
often suppressed by executive authority, reflecting that branch’s immediate concern 
with public peace and order; such orders were in some cases overturned by judicial 
rulings concerned with protecting private property from government seizure without 
just cause.   
 The fight began in New York, and almost immediately threatened to tear apart the 
quintessential progressive institution of motion picture regulation, the democratic 
National Board of Censorship. This Board, founded by the progressive People’s Institute 
and funded in part by the Motion Picture Patents Company, agitated against political 
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censorship by local, state, and federal authorities and advocated for so-called “volunteer 
censorship,” that is, the voluntary submission of films by producers and distributors to a 
board of voluntary censors for review, suggested changes, and approval. By 1915, the 
Board had gained much respect in the industry, in some government circles, and among 
the more sympathetic reformers. The Board, which later in 1915 would change its name 
to the National Board of Review to reflect its more advisory role, was exemplary of 
regulatory authority in the progressive era—a quintessential progressive organization 
composed of a citizen body of white, well-educated protestant elites, many of whom were 
women. Political authorities often looked to the Board as a guide for how and what to 
censor. Further, producers and distributors would often use the Board’s approvals as 
leverage in pushing back against political censorship. The Board was active nationwide, 
sending representatives to state capitols at the first hint of censorship agitation. Though 
it was consistently criticized as being bankrolled by the very commercial interests it was 
charged with regulating, financial records of the Board show that operating funds were 
quite modest, and executives earned salaries commensurate with middle to upper middle 
class wage earners.21  
 A democratic middle way toward regulating the social effects of the cinema—a 
mediator between the reform sentiment and commercial interests that bypassed state 
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authority—had taken hold in an era conducive to moral volunteerism. For the members 
of the Board and other progressive elites, political reform often entailed reorienting the 
mechanisms of democracy toward moral control and conditioning that was 
administrative, not coercive. As John Collier put it, the Board intended to create a new 
kind of censorship for public morality, which would be “radically administrative in 
character rather than statutory, and would eliminate the courts as far as possible from 
the problem of morally regulating [public] performances.”22 For Collier and others, this 
moral regulatory power would emerge from the public will, in effect, the public 
regulating its own morality through the administration of elite progressives—“collective 
control must be exercised over the morals of public performances.”23 Such a notion of 
voluntary censorship, as we will see below, would be deployed as guiding principles, if 
not in administrative practice, by the Committee of Public Information after America’s 
entry in the war, and, in part, laid some of the conceptual groundwork for self-regulation 
in the industry. This last point is more than a bit ironic, since the NBR had come out 
publicly against so-called trade industry censorship—self-censorship of the movies—by 
1919, arguing that the only effective censorship should be democratic and voluntary, not 
political and not wholly controlled by commercial interests.24  
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23 Ibid., 2. 
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 Critics of political censorship defended the Board and its mission, arguing that 
such a voluntarily administrative process would bring about good citizens and a healthy 
society. Although the film industry was developing its own self-regulatory capacity, it 
used the existence of the Board to push back against agitation for political censorship. 
The link between propaganda and film free speech was explicit in this conception. “The 
essence of free speech and a free press is the power of propaganda as the media of 
intelligence,” wrote members of the House Education Committee who were opposed to 
federal censorship of the movies.25 Propaganda was the essence of free speech, and what 
better body to “review” and evaluate this propaganda that progressive moralists at the 
National Board of Review. 
But what kind of propaganda would be deemed acceptable by the Board? 
Propaganda for whom and for what? The Birth controversy struck at the heart of the 
Board’s main weakness—there was simply no universal agreement on how a democratic 
censor board should adjudicate the political meaning of the screen. The Board was 
hopelessly divided on the question of Birth. Although it initially passed the film on 
January 20, 1915, a unanimous vote without much controversy, the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People pressured the Board’s chairman, Frederic C. 
Howe, to reconsider the film. The NAACP was at this time a rather small organization 
with a minimal and scattered presence across the nation. The Birth of a Nation would do 
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much to change that, galvanizing the organization into a more national and prominent 
role in the fight for racial justice. Howe, who had already been making plans to leave the 
chairmanship and take the post of Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island, was a 
liberal-minded reformer from Ohio who considered Griffith’s epic feature an unfortunate 
and hopelessly racist film.  
 The confusion over the Board’s views stemmed at least in part from the fact that 
W. D. McGuire, the executive secretary of the Board, personally saw nothing wrong with 
the film. Much of the executive leadership agreed with McGuire, though in a confidential 
letter to J. W. Binder, McGuire admitted that “I expect we will have several resignations 
from the Advisory Committee on account of [passing the film].”26 It seems as though 
Howe, by his own admission, did not leave the National Board because of the Birth 
controversy, as some historians had later claimed. In a letter to McGuire, Howe stated 
acknowledged that the Board “must feel embarrassed at my protest against “The Birth of 
a Nation” but that his decision to resign was not “in a spirit of protest … for I tendered 
my resignation a long time ago.”27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 McGuire to Binder, March 13, 1915. NBRMP records, Box 16, Binder correspondence. McGuire orders 
Binder to destroy the letter after reading it, but, unlike much of the Board’s correspondence on Birth, this 
letter survives, likely because it was tucked away in the Binder correspondence papers, not in the general 
film files. The film file on The Birth of a Nation in the NBR archives contains just 3 documents totaling 4 
sheets of paper, surprisingly little on such a prominent and controversial film. For comparison, the film 
file on The Black Stork—a rather obscure program feature—is more than 100 times larger than the one on 
Birth. Of the documents that survive, many are labeled confidential or indicate that the information is for 
the recipient only, suggesting that there was interest in white washing the Birth files before archiving the 
Board’s papers.  
27 Howe to McGuire, undated. NBRMP records, Box 29. 
	  
118	  
 Howe nonetheless asked that the film be reviewed by the Board’s General 
Committee, which occurred on March 1, 1915. J. E. Spingarn, chairman of the NAACP, 
was given a few minutes to present the case against the film’s exhibition. Howe spoke as 
well, arguing that “the picture portrayed the Negro in such a brutal and degrading way 
that half of it, or the second part, should either be eliminated or cut so completely but 
that little of it would be left.”28 The NAACP took Howe’s message as a condemnation of 
the last half of the film by the entire Board. May Childs Nerney, national secretary of the 
NAACP, wrote to the Los Angeles branch that the Board had disapproved of the entire 
second half of the film.29 According to Board documents that survive, the Board resolved 
to “condemn in the second part of the picture certain incidents which it felt might create 
race hatred and prejudice, and which constituted a reflection on ten million citizens” 
(emphasis mine).30 The NAACP wanted to believe that Howe spoke for the entire Board, 
and that their justifiable grievances would be heard by the democratic body. The Board 
itself gave the appearance that—whatever the actual outcome over reviewing the film—
the process was fair, liberal-minded, and reflected the will of the majority. The reality it 
seems, is that the Board was faced with a crisis that called into question the very 
democratic values the Board claimed to embody—that they represented not the public 
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will but commercial interests squarely aligned with the dominant racial order of white 
supremacy.  
 A final meeting was called on March 12, where the Board approved the film by a 
vote of 15 to 8, subject to two additional changes: that the inter title reading “Having 
profiting by the trade and having no use for slaves themselves, the traders of the 
Seventeenth Century became the Abolitionists of the Nineteenth” be changed to “The 
Nineteenth Century Abolitionists demanding the freeing of the slaves”; and that one 
additional subtitle be added, stating the ridiculous claim that “This is an historical 
presentation of the Civil War and Reconstruction period and is not meant to reflect in 
any way upon any race or people of today.”31 These changes were made and remain in 
the surviving versions of the film today. With Howe now resigned and working at Ellis 
Island, the Board set about rehabilitating Birth32—it made several mentions of the fact 
that the Ohio State Board of Censorship had approved the film (which, as we will see, is 
not true) and that a “member of the Supreme Court … and the President’s Cabinet” had 
sent “letters of recommendation regarding the film.”33 Fifteen years later, in a review of 
Birth for the NBR magazine, the Board wrote that it “has always considered … “The Birth 
of a Nation” which it reviewed in 1914 [sic], as one of the most outstanding pictures ever 
to come before it … the “Nation” is not dead. It’s subject is too vital to ever let it die, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. 
32 And, presumably, decided to destroy much of the details of the controversy from its files. 
33 Ibid. 
	  
120	  
it is probably regarded with more sentiment within the industry than any other film ever 
made.”34  
 From 1917 to 1920, the Board’s power began to wane—assailed by reformers as an 
industry-funded lackey and looked upon by movie men as a regulatory annoyance, the 
Board simply had few allies in its mission of voluntary censorship. By 1921–22, as the 
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America was formed in New York, the 
National Board of Review was already well on its way to becoming an antiquated 
organization. Will Hays, MPPDA president, was not very receptive to the National Board, 
refusing to attend its functions and at times failing to respond to the Board’s requests 
for cooperation and collaboration. By March 1923, an internal memo to Hays 
recommended that “we should at once move to abolish the National Board of Review.”35 
Though the Board managed to hold on and survive into the 1960s, by the early 1920s its 
days as an important administrative body for the social regulation of American cinema 
had long since passed. The coming of sound in 1927 was the final nail in the coffin to any 
relevancy for the Board. Talking pictures necessitated the institutionalization of prior 
restraint—censorship at the script development and production stages—while the 
Board’s censorship had always been a post-production process. The quintessential 
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NBRMP records, The Birth of a Nation film file, Box 103. 
35 Unauthored Memo to Hays, March 22, 1923, WHH Papers, vol. 1, Reel 9. 
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progressive organization was able to carry on in muted form, but only as a powerless 
bystander to the development of American film in the sound era. 
  
Boston and Chicago: Racism and the Limits of Moral Justice 
Meanwhile, Birth was thrown into the urban conflicts over machine party politics, 
democracy, and the reform sentiment with exhibitions in Boston and Chicago. Boston—
with its long abolitionist history—was the site of the most contentious battles over the 
exhibition of Birth. Democratic mayor James Michael Curley, who had managed to cobble 
together a powerful voting block from the city’s minorities and disadvantaged, was 
sensitive to the calls to censor Birth but insisted he was powerless to stop its exhibition.36 
It was in Boston that Griffith’s representatives began an aggressive appeal to authority—
the names of numerous political and cultural elites, who presumably had seen and 
approved of Birth, were published in a Boston Herald editorial written by Griffith’s 
manager, J. J. McCarthy. The same editorial offered $10,000 to anyone who could find a 
single historical inaccuracy in the film—a preposterous claim in hindsight, but a 
testament to the racism that characterized much of America’s sanctioned historical 
record up to that time.37  
 After a public hearing and some minor changes to the film (changes that were 
recommended but not required), the Boston premiere began at the Tremont Theatre on 
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April 10, 1915. Ushers dressed in military blues and grays escorted patrons to their seats, 
and Griffith—with his usual combination of humility and eagerness to bask in praise—
emerged from the wing after the screening to address the audience and receive their 
applause.38 In the coming days, critical and popular praise of the film swelled in the 
Boston press. William Trotter—who had spoken at the public hearing to remind the 
mayor that he relied on black votes to stay in office—continued to pressure Curley for 
the film’s suppression, but the mayor feigned powerless, despite the fact that he did have 
the legal power to stop an exhibition of a film that threatened “to injure the morals of 
the community” or that could be deemed “immoral or obscene.”39  
 As the Boston exhibition was under way, Griffith followed a two-pronged 
offensive: he hired detectives to trail and watch black leaders of the anti-Birth protests 
and attacked them in the local press; he also sought an addendum to Birth that he 
thought would defuse the racial outrage: during some screenings, a 5 to 6 minute short 
film on black progress at the Hampton Institute in Virginia directly followed the 
feature.40 The so-called “Hampton Epilogue” of Birth was only sporadically screened, and 
while the film does not survive, it does not take much to imagine the sad hypocrisy this 
epilogue must have appeared to many: At the end of The Birth of a Nation, the Klan rides 
victoriously through the town of Piedmont and black residents flee in terror. “Dixie” 
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39 Quoted in: Stokes, Birth, 143. 
40 Ibid., 144. 
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plays as the “next election” is shown, where Klansmen on horseback and with guns 
drawn intimidate black residents to return to their homes and stay away from the polls. 
The film culminates in the consummation of love between the Camerons and Stonemans, 
as visions of heaven and hell at the “sea’s edge” give way to an eternal city on a hill. 
Griffith thought it wise to follow this fever dream of white paranoia and utopian racism 
with a short newsreel on black progress.  
 A week after the Boston premiere, Trotter had had enough. He led of group of 
black men to the Tremont on April 17 and tried to purchase tickets for the Birth 
exhibition that evening. When refused, Trotter and his group remained in the lobby, 
accusing management of instituting Southern-style segregation in Boston. The police 
arrived and attacked the group—Trotter was assaulted with a club and ten men were 
arrested.41 Despite this, several “agitators” managed to get into the theater for the 
screening, where, during the infamous Gus–Flora rape sequence, someone threw an egg 
that hit the center of the screen.42 Stink bombs were ignited and the theater was cleared. 
Sporadic fighting, including physical altercations and more arrests, spilled out into the 
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lobby and the street. It proved to be some of the worst racial violence Boston had seen 
since the Civil War. 
 The following day a mass meeting took place at Faneuil Hall where a majority 
black audience heard Trotter and others speak out against the film. This was one of at 
least 18 mass meetings held by black Bostonians over suppressing Birth of a Nation. Most 
of these meetings had hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of concerned citizens in 
attendance. Unlike other Birth fights in New York and Chicago, the Boston campaign was 
waged mainly by black citizens. According to Stokes, direct agitation, lobbying, and 
organizing against Birth proved to have a lasting effect on racial solidarity in the Boston 
area. But, ultimately, they would not find success fighting against this vicious film—the 
machinery of democracy proved both cumbersome and ineffective in being dominated 
by indifferent white elites.43 Realizing that Curley’s sympathies were not translating into 
action, the meeting resolved to carry the fight to the governor’s office to push for a 
statewide censorship bill. Governor David I. Walsh—also a Democrat and with hopes to 
pry black votes from the Republican Party—proved equally as sympathetic as Curley, but 
with some resolve to act: he instructed the state attorney general to prosecute the 
Tremont management for violating a 1910 law prohibiting obscene and immoral 
performances; he also called on the Massachusetts legislature to pass legislation on state 
censorship.44  
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 Prosecuting the Tremont Theater for exhibiting immoral pictures proved telling, 
not just for the Birth controversy but for the relationship between the progressive era 
and race. Municipal Court Judge Thomas H. Dowd stated in his judgment that the 1910 
law did not apply to The Birth of a Nation because “the arousal of racial prejudice” did not 
apply to expressions of immorality. In other words, racism is not immoral in the logic of 
the progressive era. It would require a new normative grounding to create the political 
conditions for racial justice in America—a grounding not in moral justice but in social 
justice. The antiquated framework of good and evil in a white and protestant dominated 
society could not capture the social complexities of racial inequality and prejudice. 
Although some attempts to suppress Birth on grounds that it incited racial violence and 
unrest proved successful, nowhere in the fight against this film did censorship prevail on 
the reasoning of morality—an overlooked but crucial aspect of Birth’s history, if only 
because film censorship generally was almost always articulated through moral precepts. 
The exception of Birth underscored the exception of race in the political projects of 
progressive moral reform. 
 Censorship legislation was the last option in stopping Birth screenings in Boston. 
The NAACP and black leaders threw themselves fully into the legislative process, 
lobbying state representatives directly and keeping public interest in the process high. 
Though several competing bills were submitted, the Sullivan bill was eventually passed 
with the NAACP amendment that only a majority of the censor board—not a unanimous 
decision—was needed to suppress a film. Governor Walsh signed the bill into law on May 
	  
126	  
21, 1915. That day Trotter pressed Mayor Curley to act. As Stokes writes that the Boston 
mayor was “interested in including as many blacks as possible in his coalition of 
supporters. Yet he can hardly have been unaware that by the end of May, 100,000 or so 
white Bostonians had watched (and often expressed enthusiasm for) the movie and that 
African Americans still made up only a small percentage of the total population of the 
city.”45 A public hearing was held on June 2, in which more speakers were invited to 
present their case for and against Birth. The newly empowered Boston censor board 
closed the hearing with an announcement that the Tremont Theater would not have their 
license revoked for screening Birth.46 The Boston fight over Hollywood’s first blockbuster 
was now over.  
 In Chicago, the fight over Birth was less protracted than in Boston. Outgoing 
mayor Carter H. Harrison made the unusual move of ordering the chair of the Chicago 
Board of Censors, Major Lucius C. Funkhouser, to approve the film before the Chicago 
board or the deputy police superintendent could review and pass it.47 This effectively cut 
out potential trouble for the film by limiting the number of political authorities involved. 
But Mayor Harrison was a lame duck—newly-elected Republican machine politician 
William H. (Big Bill) Thompson was about to begin his long tenure as one of Chicago’s 
most notorious mayors. Thompson—indebted to the black voters of the city who had 
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voted overwhelmingly for him in the Republican primary and general election—
rescinded the approval of Birth in mid-May, before any public exhibition of the film in 
Chicago. While Thompson did not cite any legal justification for rescinding the permit, 
the NAACP—who had turned their energies to Chicago even before Harrison’s decision—
cited the city’s “Ordinances Governing the Exhibition of Motion Pictures” in defending 
the ban, which prevented the issuance of a license to any film that created “contempt for 
any class of law-abiding citizens.”48  
 The producers of Birth quietly followed the same strategy they had developed in 
the east—private exhibitions to the city’s political and economic elite in order to 
influence the public perception of the film from the top down. Chicago fight against Birth 
was unusual, however, in that this all took place before any public screening of the film. 
In Boston and New York, where public exhibitions had created substantial white public 
support for the film while the fight to suppress it was taking place, defenders of the film 
maximized public sentiment and kept censors on the defensive. In Chicago, however, the 
lack of public approval only necessitated a political struggle in which public will and 
pressure played a more minor role. One aspect of that struggle pitted city officials against 
state government. Upon hearing that Mayor Thompson had revoked the film’s license, 
the Griffith interests began pushing for a censorship bill in the Illinois state legislature. 
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The threat of statewide censorship from Springfield might put pressure on Chicago to be 
more amendable to Griffith’s film.49 That Griffith—an ardent defender of film’s free 
speech rights and soon to be a prominent figure in the fight against the reform 
sentiment—pushed for state censorship over municipal censorship indicates that, 
unsurprisingly, his financial interest was greater than his political interest. More 
noteworthy, however, is the indication that, like in Boston, Birth stirred up censorship 
agitation. “Censor Bills Aplenty,” warned a headline from Moving Picture World, which 
noted renewed interest in censorship in almost every location where Birth was 
exhibited.50 A film that masqueraded as a principled call for free speech stoked the calls 
for censorship at nearly every stop of its roadshow tour. The question of a statewide city 
board put the Chicago censors in an awkward position. City officials argued that a 
statewide board could not “properly express the wishes of the people in each 
community” whereas “Home Rule in subjects of this kind is of utmost importance and is 
most desirable.”51 This protracted struggle would not be resolved until well after Birth 
had left town. The fight over Birth would have to be taken up in the courts.  
 On June 2, just as the fight against Birth was unraveling in Boston, J. J. McCarthy 
filed a petition seeking an injunction against Mayor Thompson’s order at the Superior 
Court of Cook County. It took a mere 20 hours for the petition to force a hearing, much 
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to the dismay of the NAACP and others who needed time to prepare a case against Birth. 
Scheduled for June 4 and presided over by Judge William Fenimore Cooper, the hearing 
was a disaster for the film’s opponents. No one who spoke out against the film at this 
hearing had actually seen it.52 Judge Cooper’s decision agreed that the producers of the 
film had property rights from which they could not be deprived without due process of 
law. In relying on the 14th Amendment, Cooper’s decision was not unique in the sense 
that private economic power was consistently upheld on the basis of the 14th 
Amendment throughout the progressive era. What makes this decision unique, however, 
was the way in which race prejudice was cast as the antagonist to this private power, 
reassociating the purposes of the slave-era amendment. The ascriptive hierarchy of 
white supremacy was articulated through landmark legal precedents that sought to 
protect individual liberty. Judge Cooper went further in his decision: he remarkably 
reoriented the racial inequalities so powerfully formative in Birth toward the film’s 
protesters, arguing in effect that to censor the film would amount to racial prejudice 
against whites. “No one race or nationality,” wrote Cooper in his decision, “has greater 
right under the law than any other has … the law should be the same for black and white 
alike.”53 With this decision, Birth was freed for commercial exploitation throughout 
Chicago, where it played to packed houses through the summer and into the fall.  
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 Both Boston and Chicago’s Birth controversy revealed the barriers to racial justice 
in America’s democratic system, and indeed, the ways in which the very mechanisms of 
democracy function through and strengthen the durable hegemony of white superiority. 
Boston’s celebrated tradition of town hall meetings and direct democracy at the 
municipal level could not stop the racist propaganda of Birth even as it succeeded in 
bringing agitation for censorship to the Bay State. This agitation for censorship 
continued to be a crucial aspect of Massachusetts politics until a statewide referendum 
at last settled the issue in November, 1922, when residents voted overwhelmingly against 
censorship. Likewise, in Chicago, mayoral power was checked by the courts, which 
affirmed the right of private property over public welfare, a ruling highly unusual for a 
film exhibition case against censorship. As the Mutual v. Ohio ruling of 1915 seemed to 
indicate, property rights were superseded by the state’s legal right to protect the morals 
and safety of the public. Birth proved an exception to these legal justifications for 
censorship simply because white America did not see racism as a moral issue. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, the concerns over liquor were undeniably moral in the 
progressive era, to the extent that anti-liquor movies were subject to intense censorship 
scrutiny. The threats of the social capacity of the cinema—the ideas emanating from the 
screen and their potential to influence the public—so potent in the exhibition of almost 
any movie, even so-called morality plays, could not attend to the entrenched racism of 
American culture. 
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 There were several municipal battles over Birth that showed Chicago was no 
anomaly—sympathetic mayors or censor boards in Oakland, Gary, St. Louis, 
Minneapolis, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Springfield, Massachusetts, all 
had orders to ban the film overturned in the courts. In Louisville, an arrest was made of 
theater owner Anson O. Bigelow on charges that he had violated the city’s old “master 
and slave” law that forbid any public performance tending to incite racial prejudice. This, 
too, was thrown out in the courts.54 Outrage and protest could at least be heard through 
party politics and elected executive authority, but the legal system held firm to the pillars 
of white supremacy.  
 
State Censor Boards and the Fight Against Birth 
In 1915, there were three states in which legislatures passed bills for the 
establishment of motion picture censorship: Kansas, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Kansas 
and Ohio both initially denied the license to exhibit Birth, whereas Pennsylvania’s censor 
board approved the film without much controversy. The controversies over the film in 
New York, Boston, and Chicago indicated that initial resistance to the film could be 
weakened with pressure on political elites, public approval through aggressive 
exploitation, and ultimately the courts’ propensity to protect property rights over public 
welfare. Despite initial refusals to license the exhibition of Birth in Kansas and Ohio, both 
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states eventually relented and exhibited the film. But the censorship history of Birth also 
showed countervailing forces of increased resistance to the film after wide exploitation. 
In Pennsylvania, for instance, after the state board unceremoniously approved the film 
and months of exploitation across the state, censorship agitation stiffened, particularly 
in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Pittsburgh followed an almost identical course to that of 
Chicago—Mayor Joseph G. Armstrong initially banned the film only to have it overturned 
by the courts. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas ruled that the film “is in 
character and tone, highly educational, moral, and instructive, as well as emotional.”55    
 Likewise, in Philadelphia, initial actions to ban the film by the mayor were 
overturned in the courts. A few weeks later, with the film set to premiere in the city, anti-
Birth protesters were ready. 500 black men and women assembled outside the Forrest 
Theater on September 20, 1915, with 150 police blocking the front of the theatre. The 
protest was initially peaceful, but after a brick went through a window of the theatre, the 
police moved forward, breaking up the demonstration by force. A firearm was discharged 
and several protesters were badly beaten by police. Many of the protesters were leaders 
of the community, people from “the educated classes, a lawyer, two ministers and several 
doctors and institutional heads being among the number.”56 A handful appeared the next 
day at the mayor’s office to demand action. Despite the violence at the Forrest Theatre 
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and the significant outcry over the film, the controversy over Birth abruptly ended in 
Philadelphia and the movie continued its run.  
 In “Bleeding Kansas”—a state with a violent and formative anti-slavery struggle—
Birth’s denigration of blacks and pleasant portrayals of Southern slavery warranted an 
immediate ban on exhibition in the state. Their decision was based on four reasons: that 
the film was historically inaccurate; that it was “full of with race hatred”; that the film 
was sexually immoral; and that the film “could inspire sectional bitterness between the 
North and the South.”57 There were several reasons why Kansas was probably the most 
outspoken critic of the film: the anti-slavery tradition was unique in the state—the 
unmitigated violence of the “Border Wars” contributed to a deep-seeded hostility to 
Southern views of the Civil War; the governor, Republican Arthur Capper, had developed 
strong ties to black Kansans and held racially progressive political beliefs for his time; 
lastly, Union veterans had a powerful and visible presence in the state (Kansas 
contributed more men per capita to the Union cause than any other state) and 
representatives of The Grand Army of the Republic protested the film directly, calling for 
a statewide ban.  
 Kansas was the first instance in which censors directly challenged the historical 
inaccuracy of Birth. During the Appeal Board hearing on January 24, 1916, a hostile board 
grilled the Epoch Producing Company manager H. A. Sherman, who seemed genuinely 
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surprised over the charges that the film distorted history.58 Sherman countered that 
Sardius Brewster, Kansas attorney general, was the first living man to ever question the 
film’s historical accuracy, and offered to attach a short production to the film—the 
“Hampton Epilogue”—that showed the advances of black Americans since 
Reconstruction.59 Brewster replied with a valid rejoinder, something that went 
unmentioned in all of the numerous hearings and meetings on Birth in Boston—why does 
Birth need an extra film showing black progress if its intentions are “not prejudicial”? In 
response, Sherman simply lied, stating that Booker T. Washington had seen and 
approved of the film. The Kansas appeals process was complete; the film was banned in 
the state, a ban later upheld by the state supreme court. It took a Democratic governor, 
the rise of the KKK, and 8 years to pass before Birth was commercially exhibited in the 
state of Kansas.60   
 The Ohio censor board also banned The Birth of a Nation, and through two appeals 
processes and two state supreme court cases, the ban was upheld. The fight over Birth 
was preceded in Ohio by another film on miscegenation, The Nigger (1915), which was 
initially banned outright in the state. The Nigger, a Fox Film release, cast the progressive 
era anxieties over liquor and race into a political drama: Philip Morrow, a Southern 
aristocrat, is elected governor of his state with the help of liquor interests. When the 
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governor tries to enact a statewide prohibition bill, the liquor interests turn on their ally, 
revealing in the press that the governor “has negro blood in him. Morrow, undaunted, 
makes the Prohibition Bill a law, and resigns his office and sacrifices his love to devote 
his life to the uplift of the Negro.”61  
 The conflict around this film was centered along familiar lines of screen morality: 
several censorship bodies including the National Board of Censorship approved the film 
on the basis that moral tone of the film was uplifting and positive, whereas there were 
instances in Minnesota, Maine, and Ohio in which censors or public authorities objected 
both to the name of the film and the story.62 After two rounds of cuts in Ohio, the film 
was subsequently approved with a new title, The Mystery of Morrow’s Rest. Birth came to 
Ohio just as the fight against The Nigger subsided, and in the context of this, it made 
sense for the Ohio board to take a particularly strong stand against Griffith’s film, which 
could not in any way be regarded as racially progressive. Despite Griffith’s attempts to 
overcome censorship of Birth with an aggressive strategy of dividing black Ohioans—
several prominent black citizens were offered money in exchange for their public 
approval—the Ohio ban on Birth held.63 
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The Crisis in Liberalism and the Limitations of Moral Reform 
The praise of The Birth of a Nation—both among the public and the press—was far 
from universal, but it was far less divided than the reception among elected officials 
whose fortunes required a tenuous balancing of competing public interests. 1915 was a 
high watermark for governmental reform—to rejuvenate and evolve the institutions of 
government toward a more democratic mechanism responsive to public will. Public calls 
for equal rights and free speech—aided by the accelerating women’s suffrage 
movement—were vanguards of this democratization. The racist incitements of Birth 
drove a wedge between equal rights and free speech rights, triggering a crisis within 
liberalism. Political controversies in American cinema did not begin with Birth—boxing, 
white-slave, and prohibition films had all helped redefine the movie landscape as a 
political field of public contestation—but Griffith’s blockbuster had sharpened the 
contrast between key liberal ideas of equality and freedom of expression, thereby setting 
the purposes of censorship, for a time, toward very different political ends. In this 
context a heightened anxiety of war was already present, forcing the tension between 
democracy and propaganda to be reconciled within an environment of national security 
and preparedness.  
 However briefly, the fight against The Birth of a Nation aligned the moral reform 
sentiment with an emerging civil rights movement—blue nose progressives were 
suddenly in the same camp as various, and often competing, anti-racist movements. 
Liberals of the era—at least that variant of a liberal identity indebted to equal rights—
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were now confronted with the unsavory politics of censorship that undermined often 
deeply held convictions on the right to free speech. “Liberals are torn between two 
desires,” wrote William L. Chenery of the Chicago Record Herald on the Birth controversy 
in that city, “They hate injustice to the negro and they hate a bureaucratic control of 
thought.”64 This crisis in liberalism is at the heart of the policy paradoxes of the 
progressive era, complicating the already entangled relationship between economic 
reform, moral reform, and civil rights. From the Chaffee view, free speech politics in the 
United States really locates World War I as the turning point in the modern free speech 
movement in America, in which repressive government censorship by the Wilson 
administration ruthlessly harassed hyphenated Americans and anyone who did not 
exhibit unflinching support for the American war cause. Such a view cleanly aligns free 
speech rights with emerging modern liberalism, ignoring the fractures caused by the 
exhibition of America’s first blockbuster. Birth of a Nation cast free speech proponents 
on one side and proponents of social justice on the other. It turned liberals into censors 
and racists into civil libertarians.  
 Moreover, free speech rights were highly visible and publicly contested before the 
war, both in the controversies associated with The Birth of a Nation, and in the activism 
of Margaret Sanger, whose birth control advocacy became a crucial free speech contest. 
In January 1915, just as Birth was playing in Washington to Wilson and other political 
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luminaries, Sanger’s husband, the artist William Sanger, was arraigned on charges of 
violating the Comstock Law by distributing obscene materials. He was, in a sense, the 
victim of a trap (not unlike Wilson vis-a-vis Birth). A man posing as a family friend of 
Margaret’s showed up at William’s apartment in Lower Manhattan asking for a copy of 
her pamphlet on birth control, Family Limitation. Authorities arrested Sanger shortly 
thereafter, and a highly publicized trial ensued in which radicals such as Emma Goldman 
and Alexander Berkman took up the Sanger cause, publicly lambasting Comstock and the 
repressive moralism of the era.65 Satire and sarcasm proved effective weapons for these 
leftists—one political cartoon published in The Masses showed a fattened Comstock 
holding a frightened woman before a judge. “Your honor,” bellows Comstock, “this 
woman gave birth to a naked child!”66 This early free speech agitation was, coincidentally 
playing out just as the Birth controversy was capturing the attention of the American 
public.  
 In a sense, both of these causes for free speech were failures—Sanger was found 
guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail; and while Griffith and his backers succeeded in 
fending off the calls for censorship, none of the legal arguments rested on free speech, a 
right explicitly denied film in Mutual v. Ohio. But both of these issues laid important 
political groundwork for the free speech movements of the 20th century. They also 
revealed some of the cross purposes and conflicting uses of free speech liberties—where 
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Birth’s free speech cause was in support of a racist, ascriptive and mythologized vision of 
the nation’s union under white supremacy, the Sanger trial espoused a cause of free 
speech in support of civil rights and women’s equality. In short, the two pre-WWI 
beachheads of the modern free speech movement worked toward contradictory political 
ends, revealing the ways in which the struggles of race equality and women’s equality 
operated very differently in the progressive era. As for Birth, with free speech liberals 
and equal rights liberals either internally conflicted or working at cross purposes, the 
conception of moral reform—the emotional lynchpin of the progressive moment—
proved limited to an implicit reliance on whiteness.  
 White popular reception of the film was overwhelmingly positive in almost every 
corner of America. Many whites simply saw nothing racist in the film—a pervasive racial 
blindness of white popular culture that went public in remarkably revealing ways. As 
Birth became a symbol of the emerging politics of free speech, these foundations of white 
supremacy, advanced by the armies of popular culture, shaped the character and 
contradictions of modern liberalism. Griffith, emboldened by the protests of Birth as well 
as the Supreme Court ruling against film free speech in Mutual v Ohio, fashioned his film 
into a weapon for free expression, a visual call to “demand, as a right, the liberty to show 
the dark side of wrong, so that we may illuminate the bright side of virtue.”67 In the next 
few years, Griffith was to become “perhaps the leading publicist for the motion picture 
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industry in its struggle against censorship,” speaking for the art of cinema and its speech 
rights across the country and publishing a short history on the politics of free speech in 
1916—“The Rise and Fall of Free Speech in America.”68 The consequences of Birth 
revealed the strands of liberalism in American political culture deeply wedded to, and 
indeed constituted by, a racist, ascriptive hierarchy that remained salient through the 
20th century.   
 Censoring the economic product of Birth proved to be a failure precisely because 
the instruments of democratic will, fashioned within the conditions of an ascriptive 
white supremacy, were remarkably ineffective when oriented toward racial justice. 
Where suppression of the film was at least initially effective, judicial limitations on the 
grounds of basic property rights were enough to overcome executive and legislative 
censoring authority. The NAACP—which was to emerge from the Birth fight a more 
cohesive, visible, and national organization—was forced to acknowledge the strategic 
failure of advancing racial justice solely through legal action and existing democratic 
institutions, later abandoning the exclusive use of these tactics for more direct and 
militant resistance that would do much to shape the character of America’s civil rights 
movement in the 20th century. This delimited conception of democratic response is all 
the more striking when compared to the anti-liquor crusades of the era, in which a 
concurrent majority of reformers deftly and effectively captured the margins of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid. See also: “The Rise and Fall of Free Speech in America,” undated pamphlet, NBRP, Box 28. 
	  
141	  
democratic process, forcing prohibition on what was at best a nation deeply divided over 
the liquor question. So whose democracy was America’s? And what character would 
commercial cinema play in the story of America’s democracy? 
 Griffith, who took control of the censorship fight for NAMPI, was increasingly 
absent and distracted by his work. In late April 1917 Griffith set sail for Europe, having 
in mind an epic war film—with scenes from the front lines—as a follow up to the 
extravagant productions of Intolerance and The Birth of a Nation. The resulting picture, 
Hearts of the World, was produced in collaboration with the British government. Though 
Hearts was a minor success at the box office and some of Griffith’s finest work was yet to 
come (such as Broken Blossoms and Way Down East) it was already the beginning of a long 
professional decline for Griffith. In the early 1920s, he made the disastrous mistake of 
building a studio from scratch at isolated Mamaroneck Point, New York. He struggled 
economically for much of the 1920s and was far from California, essential years for the 
development of Hollywood.  
 In the meantime, Griffith’s Birth was still in its peak earning years and had 
successfully fought off censorship throughout 1915. But postwar America was an entirely 
different environment for Griffith’s race melodrama. Exhibitions were planned in 1920 
and 21 in Boston, New York, and other cities. The NAACP made a renewed effort to fight 
the film, this time with more pressure on political elites and peaceful street protests in 
front of theaters—but little in the way of direct calls for censorship. The protests were 
highly successful, in part because many black veterans protested in uniform, in some 
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cases wearing foreign medals of valor. Commercial exhibitions of Birth were cancelled 
throughout the country, declining rapidly throughout the 1920s as private exhibitions by 
the resurgent Klan grew. The movie, a mainstream blockbuster success in 1915, had 
evolved into a shameful piece of Klan propaganda by the early 20s, absconded away to 
private screenings. While the film was repeatedly mentioned on lists of classic American 
pictures and great historical works, such mentions were empty signifiers of an 
increasingly forgotten era. Plans to synchronize sound to Birth in 1929 proved a financial 
failure, and planned remakes in the 1940s and 50s fell flat.69 The environment of 
progressive propaganda that had nurtured and helped bring about America’s most racist 
feature film had stunningly, almost instantaneously, evaporated in the horrors of the 
Great War, just as it had reached its peak.  
 Unable to devote his energies and attention to the censorship issue, Griffith’s free 
speech argument of cinema largely receded from the industry’s view. As a vanguard of 
film’s right to free expression, The Birth of a Nation proved to be a colossal 
disappointment. The war was in many ways a death knell for film’s free speech 
arguments. If American citizens’ First Amendment liberties could be so easily 
undermined by the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, the movies didn’t 
have a chance. The MPPDA, an association of producers and distributors that formed in 
early 1922, made little mention of the right to free speech or free expression for the 
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movies throughout the 1920s. It would take a generation for the fight of film speech to 
reach its successful end, culminating in the Supreme Court case Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson (1952), which ruled that the movies were indeed protected by the First 
Amendment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AMERICAN MOVIES AND THE TRIAL ON PROPAGANDA 
Vachel Lindsay, the itinerant poet and early film theorist, argued that the movies 
were “such a good natural medium for architectural propaganda that architects could use 
it to stimulate the rebuilding of America into a sort of perpetual World’s Fair.” Mass 
culture’s new visual medium could stimulate the rebuilding of the world from the true 
pulpit of the people—the motion picture theater. What Lindsay envisioned was an 
instrument of democracy—the movie and movie theater—that could uniquely realize 
“the destiny of America.”1 From 1900 to 1920, American progressivism was fostered in 
the age of propaganda. It was through propaganda that the anxieties of immigration, 
industrialization, and urbanization were given voice and made visible. The movies, an 
infant industry growing up in urban centers and increasingly dominated by immigrant 
entrepreneurs, became the medium through which the ubiquitous spirit of persuasion 
could shape American culture. Propaganda defined progressive era cinema, but it also 
determined the boundaries and limitations of a transforming American liberalism, in 
which conceptions of liberty through property were increasingly in conflict with new and 
expanded conceptions of liberty through equality. The demand for democratic reform 
emerged from this crisis in liberalism.  
In his unparalleled history of propaganda, Philip M. Taylor identifies it as “a 
process for the sowing, germination and cultivation of ideas” and is therefore neutral as 
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a political concept.2 This process describes well the everyday practice of politics in the 
first two decades of twentieth century America. Mass persuasion was seen as a 
revitalizing mechanism of democracy itself. From the early origins of American film to 
the end of World War I, the persuasive powers of the motion picture were often the terms 
on which early movie men—both producers and exhibitors—sought respectability for 
their industry, arguing that persuasion was part and parcel of the democratic value of 
free expression. Prohibitionists, suffragists, child welfare advocates, and reformers of all 
stripes “can bring their propaganda before 5,000,000 people—mostly young people […] 
Think of it! Probably neither the churches of the country nor the theatres of the country; 
nor any other institution of the country [can] reach as many people as these in a week, 
and appeal to them through that most effective of all agencies in attracting the 
understanding, the human eye.”3  
 The terms of propaganda were also the terms on which the industry shaped 
educational cinema—film for use in classroom instruction—which was useful in making 
movies more respectable but cut against the interests of commercial cinema. Progressive 
era propaganda helped temper this uneasy relationship between the educational and 
commercial functions of motion pictures. The social power of motion pictures could 
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“drive away much prejudice, increase true sympathy, secure greater encouragement and 
so raise the standard of public sentiment, by the propaganda of such an educational 
nature […] you must not be a ‘stand patter,’ but a ‘progressivist’ in everything pertaining 
to cinematography and its educational advancement.”4  
This conception of propaganda as a force against prejudice seems counterintuitive 
to our modern senses, but it was integral to American progressive culture, and the 
American movie industry was its most visible advocate. “The motion picture screen is no 
place for the airing of sectional or sectarian prejudice,” wrote Moving Picture World one 
month before The Birth of a Nation screened at the White House, “no matter how good 
the story may be. This does not mean that you cannot write propaganda stuff of a certain 
sort, but that it must not be written in such a way as to make enemies.”5 Institutions as 
diverse as the U.S. Postal Service and the Oral Hygiene Association— who campaigned 
to eliminate “existing prejudice against dental examination in the public schools”—used 
the instruments of movie propaganda to combat prejudice.6 Even the blue nose reformers 
who sought movie censorship used movie propaganda in their cause—reels were 
developed from the condemned cuts of numerous films into a “greatest hits” of 
objectionable material, a propaganda movie composed of censored images used in the 
service of greater censorship. Apparently the subversive possibilities of reorienting the 
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methods of this remarkable irony toward satirical, pro-movie arguments was lost on the 
industry, who could only comment with apoplectic disgust: “Could anything be more 
unfair and more contemptible … [than] this sort of garbage?”7 From the moral sentiments 
of film censorship, women’s suffrage, prohibition, child labor, and the trusts, there was 
hardly a progressive cause that was not articulated through a widely embraced and 
celebrated spirit of propaganda.   
 Propaganda defined progressive era cinema as a burgeoning, expressive field of 
democratic contestation. The state’s limited economic conception of the cinema, 
articulated through Mutual Film Co. v. Ohio decision in 1915, ironically aided in the 
formation of this democratic propaganda of the screen. This Supreme Court decision 
ruled that the state’s interest in censoring movies was constitutional, but in so doing it 
bound commercial cinema closer to progressive government and its contestations over 
democracy: it gave state authority over regulating the movies at a time when the 
propagandistic power of cinema was at its height. The limited economic definition of the 
movies in Mutual v. Ohio ultimately proved a foundational failure for legal censorship, 
for it affirmed the states’ censoring authority over an economic product “pure and 
simple” with no indication as to how to regulate its social or moral functions. The ruling 
gave justification for regulating the social capacity of the screen, but provided no 
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direction for how that legal authority should be used. Such direction would come from 
progressivism itself, and this explains in part why legal censorship was so ineffective 
over time—progressive thought proved difficult to sustain in any substantial form 
beyond World War I, but the progressive regulatory machinery of the movie screen lived 
on in muted, anachronistic form through the 1920s.  
This relationship between a particular kind of industry—the movies—and a 
particular kind of government—progressive—determined the legacy of modern 
liberalism: the movies helped give voice to progressivism and propaganda, but ultimately 
became the primary instrument in the politically-motivated destruction of both. The war 
was the central turning point in this political transformation—the progressive cause, in 
both commercial cinema and the political state, reached its zenith and exhaust point, 
culminating in the prosecution of Robert Goldstein under the Espionage Act for his 
production The Spirit of 76 and in the war fever paranoia of Robert Cochrane’s Kaiser: The 
Beast of Berlin and The Yellow Dog. Early modern liberalism in American political culture 
was both progressive and propagandistic, but this was only its nascent form—both were 
to be cut out and cut against the later stages of modern liberalism’s development.  
America’s trial on propaganda was a contest over democracy between commercial 
cinema and liberal state authority. A reluctant Wilson was pushed into the propaganda 
movie wars, torn between the preservation of democracy and the imperative to control 
it. Though democratic will was welded to war, President Wilson, George Creel, and the 
Committee on Public Information spent much political energy controlling and mastering 
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these democratic outbursts. They were not able to control or master democracy, 
however. The liberal articulators of democratic will ultimately became prosecutors of 
America’s undemocratic witch hunt during the Great War. The progressives who fought 
World War I for America destroyed progressivism through that war. Political imperatives 
in wartime ran contrary to modern liberal ideals, limiting speech and censoring thought. 
America’s war effort was the apotheosis of progressivism, both in its more hopeful 
guises—articulating the spirit of democracy, unity, and strength—and its repressive 
underside, in its anxieties of democracy imperiled, in 100% Americanness, in prohibiting 
liquor, and standing by the entrenched racial divide. 
For the state, over the long haul of the development of American silent cinema, 
regulating the social functions of the screen entailed regulating democracy itself, thus 
the delimited economic definitions of the cinema served an opening of democratic 
expression through commercial images. Wartime commercial cinema decoupled the 
movie–propaganda relationship that so characterized progressive film, reorienting itself 
away from explicit political persuasion toward publicity, both for the industry and for the 
American democratic ideal. The movie industry would refashion itself as the prosecution 
in American political culture’s trial on propaganda, which would ultimately render a 
postwar verdict of guilty that would be indelibly tied to state authority. 
 
Unity, Nationalism, and the Power of Propaganda 
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The Birth of a Nation changed American propaganda. The film industry’s efforts to 
combat censorship now had to reconcile their efforts with a contentious and racist film 
that seemed to stoke the flames of the censors at nearly every stop along its roadshow 
tour. If Griffith and his producers realized short term profits and success with Birth, over 
time censorship efforts and national embarrassment over the movie would grow 
stronger, turning the movie into something of an unspoken pariah in the American 
commercial film industry, a touchstone of the racial anxieties Hollywood would spend 
decades trying to white wash from the screen. As Ruth Vasey has shown, the American 
film industry’s interest in pushing their products into foreign markets created strong 
incentives to police their racial and ethnic representations on the screen, offering 
unprejudiced views of national identities in exchange for commercial access. This made 
good business sense for Hollywood, but movie screen villains there had to be. Could 
Mexican villains could be changed to Japanese villains? As the controversies over Patria 
suggest below, it would not be easy.  
 If Hollywood was sensitive to the way in which it produced racial and ethnic 
identities for consumption abroad, what about black Americans at home? Racial 
segregation in both the north and the south not only institutionalized separate movie 
audiences but also separate movie products. The race film industry—movies often 
produced by black Americans for black American audiences—was a parallel culture 
industry not unlike segregated professional baseball, lasting from the 1910s to the late 
1940s. The segregated race film industry limited the black American audience share for 
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mainstream studio product, thereby mitigating against the commercial incentive of 
representing black Americans in a respectable manner. Black identities were constructed 
almost exclusively as servants fixed to the background of the Hollywood screen, if they 
were constructed at all.8 By the late 1920s, Hollywood began to tap into the black movie-
going audience with the all-black musical Hallelujah! (1929), but these were exceptions 
to the norm. Hollywood had a vested interest in whitewashing the screen, keeping black 
characters to a minimum and only in minor roles. The intense and highly visible 
racialization in The Birth of a Nation was simply something most producers did not want 
to touch. The racial blindness of Hollywood movies between the wars was not borne out 
of shame over the racism of Griffith’s seminal film, nor any vague sense of social 
responsibility—it was an economically motivated decision reproduced out of the 
structure of American segregation. 
 In the years following its release, The Birth of a Nation influenced a number of 
subsequent film productions, from movies that protested the racism of Birth to movies 
that sought to copy its narrative structure or cinematic form. The first of these film 
responses was probably The Fall of a Nation (1916), Thomas Dixon’s war preparedness 
sequel which, unusual for the time, had an original orchestral score composed by Victor 
Herbert. An anti-pacifist drama, the film was, in the words of Dixon, “a study of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There are examples of more subversive uses of black identity, as in Baby Face (1932) where the character 
Chico (in a great performance by Theresa Harris) is afforded some agency and autonomy as a sidekick to 
Barbara Stanwyck’s Lily Powers. Though Chico is Lily’s maid, their relationship is playfully subversive and 
open to changing roles. 
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origin, meaning and destiny of American Democracy” through an urgent call for military 
preparedness.9 The picture was a commercial success, bringing Dixon $120,000 in profits. 
The Fall of a Nation welded the propagandistic strategies of Birth to the war itself—the 
movie was fashioned as a “super-production” or special feature with a roadshow 
exhibition strategy designed to incrementally build public awareness and publicity for 
the film as it traveled America’s theaters. Through 1916 and into early 1917, Dixon was 
building America’s war fever on the Birth template, an example he followed to the finest 
detail, filming battle scenes on the same ground as Birth’s Civil War reenactments,10 
opening in Los Angeles at Clune’s Auditorium, and booking the New York premiere at 
the Liberty Theater.11 Dixon also sought help from President Wilson, this time to grant 
an exception to a ban on filming the country’s naval forces. Wilson responded with 
incredulity, calling the film itself “a great mistake.” “[The public] is already soberly and 
earnestly aware of its possible perils and of its duty,” wrote Wilson to Dixon, “and I 
should deeply regret seeing any sort of excitement stirred in so grave a manner.”12  
 The reluctant Wilson again fretted over popular film’s influence on the American 
people, seeing Dixon’s Fall as a threat to the country’s commitment to neutrality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 WWP 34, 427, n. 1. 
10 On the north slope of the Hollywood Hills overlooking the San Fernando Valley. The area is now part of 
Universal City and the Forest Lawn Memorial Park. In an ironic footnote of history, the park is home to 
The Birth of Liberty, the largest mosaic in the United States, depicting scenes of early American history and 
flanked by statues of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. See: Forest Lawn Memorial Park 
Association, http://forestlawn.com/hollywood-hills/ (accessed on July 7, 2015). 
11 Stokes, Birth, 268–69. 
12 WWP 34, 427. 
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Although Dixon’s film conflicted with Wilson’s stance on the war, the president’s 
concern over commercial cinema did not wane with America’s entry in the war in April, 
1917. In fact, Wilson and George Creel, Chairman of the Committee on Public 
Information, spent much of the war deeply concerned over the way in which commercial 
cinema could excite the public “in so grave a manner.” That Creel and Wilson were both 
reluctant censors is an under-appreciated aspect of the history of propaganda in World 
War I. Though they fell short of their ideals as America’s war effort developed, the 
liberals in the Wilson administration were more concerned about political suppression 
and censorship than later historians give them credit.  
 At the same time, commercial cinema was “ablaze with propaganda for the people 
(not for politicians) in the great struggle for the establishment of universal democracy.” 
The industry was beginning to shape the political power of cinema away from 
“politicians” and toward the “people.”13 These discursive changes placed the movies at 
the center of a populist skepticism of government authority, long an American tradition, 
that was to be revitalized and modernized in the years after the war. Underpinning this 
discursive transformation was the reassociation of propaganda as the voice of state 
authority. Writing in Moving Picture World, W. Stephen Bush declared that, despite the 
inevitability of propaganda being crafted in more subtle and sophisticated ways, “[n]o 
man will want to turn his temple of amusements into a political pagoda.”14 If Progressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 MPW 36, n. 5, May 4, 1918, 670. 
14 MPW 30, n. 1, October 7, 1916, 49. 
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Era cinema was defined by the utility and celebration of movie propaganda, the war 
created the conditions of a fever dream that exhausted those resources. Propaganda as 
an explicit definition and goal of the cinema was to be lambasted and shunned, as the 
methods of political influence were tamped down into the ground of “mere 
entertainment.” For the wartime Wilson administration, they were left holding the 
propaganda bag as the ground of America’s political culture began to shift underneath 
them.   
  
The Reluctant Censor 
George Creel, a liberal muckracker from middle America, was a firm believer in 
the democratization of American politics through ballot initiative, direct election of 
senators, and women’s suffrage. While he rejected Marxism for what he saw as an 
unwavering conviction in materialism, he nonetheless believed in a “high degree of 
socialization,” falling short of eradicating monetary incentive and stifling “initiative, 
industry, and ability.”15 He saw his chairmanship of the CPI as a platform to produce and 
express the democratic will of Americans during wartime through the typically 
progressive language of reform. The CPI acted as a “veritable magnet, attracting 
intellectuals, muckrackers, socialists, and other reformers.”16 Creel and the reformers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Quoted in: Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on 
Public Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, 20. 
16 Ibid., 23. 
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who worked under him in the CPI saw themselves as crusaders of a new kind of liberalism, 
to “weld the people into ‘one white-hot mass’” that could demonstrate the virtues of 
American democratic ideals and institutions. Taking pains to avoid censorship, Creel 
argued that the CPI’s mission was productive as opposed to suppressive, a policy of 
publicity that, with the aid of popular support, could sell American ideals to the world.  
 Creel was a believer in using the tactics of propaganda to better inform the public 
on the ideals of democracy. The danger, as he saw it, was a democratic government that 
tended to “operate through the emotions rather than the intellectual processes. […] To 
feel is instinctive: to think is laborious.”17 Propaganda, Creel believed, could grease the 
wheels of intellectual engagement so crucial to democratic governance. Propaganda was, 
for Creel and many liberal progressives, the foundation of the constitutional right to free 
expression, a necessary component to open and contested public deliberation. As the 
American war effort developed, Creel and the CPI grew more emboldened both in their 
use of “expressive” propaganda and in the inclination to censor dangerous speech.  
 Although stressing that the nation’s press had agreed to submit themselves to 
“voluntary censorship” he nonetheless applied the pressure of censorship where he 
could, and with increasing regularity as 1917 turned into 1918. Creel and the progressives 
working under him at the CPI did not believe in an absolute right to free speech and some 
of the literature published by the CPI reflects this belief. America had “never had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 George Creel, The War, The World, and Wilson. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1920, 14. 
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absolute freedom of speech” but, maintained Creel, “there is a difference free speech and 
seditious speech.”18 Edward S. Corwin, a Princeton scholar widely regarded at the time 
as an authority on the Constitution, argued that the “clear and present danger” doctrine 
of free speech should be amended to give government power to censor speech that 
merely showed “a bad tendency.” This First Amendment reading was upheld in Abrams 
v. United States (1919) which affirmed the constitutionality of the Sedition Act (1918).19 
Thus, Creel pursued dual aims for America at war: to censor “bad tendencies” that 
threatened the country, and to publicize the propaganda of America’s democratic ideals.  
 Creel did not need to convince the American public of much—scholars of 
American society in World War I have shown that the explosive war fever that had 
captured the American public’s imagination was spontaneous, ubiquitous, and in many 
ways remarkably self-directed. Citizens Defense Leagues, composed of community 
leaders, were formed in towns and cities large and small. These citizen leagues were often 
guilty of the worst kinds of political suppression, forming vigilante groups to root out 
German sympathizers and terrorizing anyone who appeared less than 100% American. 
Though the CPI provided some direction and funding, Creel was hopeful that such 
grassroots wartime movements could largely run their own affairs and in particular 
produce their own propaganda tailored to the specifics of the community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Vaughn, Holding Fast, 227–28. 
19 Ibid., 230. 
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 Motion picture exhibition was in an ideal position to be a liaison between 
government-directed propaganda and the democratic war fever of the American public. 
With the nickelodeon era all but over and the rise of more “respectable” motion picture 
theaters, the movies had by 1917 become the shared site of cultural consumption across 
economic classes that contemporaries had long celebrated as the future of the medium. 
The movie theater was an essential cog in the war effort, providing venues for the direct 
dissemination of war propaganda through the Four Minute Men—locals of the 
community who wrote their own speeches on patriotism and war sacrifice to be delivered 
in four minutes, the amount of time it took to change a movie reel. Pamphlets for the 
Four Minute Men produced by the CPI give advice on how to prepare and deliver an 
effective speech, but left the specific content up to the individual speakers. One can 
imagine the effectiveness of such speeches in unifying nation and community to the 
cause of war. Some fifteen to twenty minutes into a picture, the reel would spin out as 
the screen went white. The lights would come on and a community member would walk 
to the front of the audience, standing between them and the picture sheet. For Creel, this 
was the essence of the CPI’s propaganda mission—to direct private business (the movie 
theater) and individual Americans to give a venue for and produce their own expressions 
of the nation’s cause and ideals. 
 With exhibition houses doing their part, film producers sought to aid the war 
effort through the production of war-themed patriotic films. The history of American 
film in World War I, however, has suffered from an overemphasis on the most sensational 
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pictures, such as The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin, To Hell with the Kaiser, and The Prussian 
Cur. But as Leslie Midkiff DeBauche points out in her illuminating study of American 
cinema in the era, only around 14% of the available 568 movies were war-related, with 
most of these films appearing in 1918 and in the latter months of the war. Production 
schedules in the era were organized around a roughly 3- to 6-month process for feature 
films. Although producers sought to accommodate the country’s immediate wartime 
needs within their own commercial interests, for the most part the war “did not alter 
producers’ long term strategies” or the need for a variety of film topics. 
 Nevertheless, worried about the fate of democracy in wartime, Wilson and Creel 
sought to control and tamp down the growing excesses of commercial cinema. On March 
27, 1917, a few weeks before America’s entry into the war, Wilson took in a part-
vaudeville, part-feature film presentation with Colonel Edward M. House. The film was 
called Patria (1917) a serial produced by a William Randolph Hearst company that 
portrayed an invasion of America by Japanese and Mexican troops. As Colonel House 
wrote of the event, “I could not fail to observe how easy it would be to assassinate 
[Wilson] should anyone desire to do so.”20 Wilson was less concerned with his own safety 
than with the “extremely unfair” portrayals of Japanese and Mexican villains that was 
bound to “stir up a great deal of hostility which will be far from beneficial to the 
country.”21 He wrote to Jacques A. Berst, vice president and general manager of the film’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 WWP 41, 483. 
21 WWP 42, 447. 
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distributor, Pathé Exchange, Inc., asking that he withdraw the serial from exhibition. 
Berst replied that Pathé could not bury the serial entirely, with the considerable sum of 
money already tied up in the project and the threat of lawsuits from exhibitors seeking 
damages if there contracts for the film were violated. Berst offered to make numerous 
changes to the film, eliminating any reference to Japan.22 Wilson was unmoved, believing 
that it would be impossible “to cut out the offensive parts without changing the whole 
motive and action of the story.”23 Wilson sought aid from Frank Lyon Polk, State 
Department legal counsel, who advised the president that there was simply no Federal 
legislation available that would “make the production of this play in any way unlawful” 
and that the “suppression of improper motion pictures is a matter entirely within the 
control of State and local authorities.”24  
 The matter dragged on through the summer and into the fall of 1917. Wilson had 
taken an active interest in the issue and arranged for State Department officials and 
members of the Embassy of Japan in Washington to view a new revised version of the 
serial in late August, 1917. They found the changes, according to Wilson, “entirely 
inadequate.” The Japanese villain had been changed into a Mexican villain “but the 
producer neglected to remove his Japanese kimono and substitute therefor suitable 
Mexican dress.” Japanese themed interiors and soldiers remained unchanged. Wilson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 WWP 42, 467, n. 1. 
23 Ibid. 
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requested that the producers remove these scenes or reconsider “whether you are not 
prepared to withdraw the film entirely from exhibition.”25 After another round of cuts, 
Wilson was still unsatisfied. The whole ordeal proved frustrating to the president, for 
while he believed that “no instrumentalities which create international ill feeling should 
be permitted to affect the feelings and the opinions of the people of the country,” he 
nonetheless confessed to Tumulty that he was “very much mixed up about it. I am afraid 
there are a number of things still in the film which are objectionable, but it is true that 
they could hardly be eliminated now without destroying the whole thing, and I am 
inclined to think we cannot insist upon more than has been done.”26 In the end, Wilson 
and the CPI were relatively powerless to stop the exhibition of Patria. 
 Towards the end of the war, the CPI began producing its own movies for domestic 
and foreign consumption. Most of these were newsreels and documentary shorts, but 
perhaps the best known was the feature film Pershing’s Crusaders, which opened in large 
cities across America in April and May of 1918. Roughly an hour in length and 
photographed by the Signal Corps and the US Navy, Pershing’s Crusaders received a great 
deal of free publicity and played to enthusiastic audiences.27 But such CPI-produced 
films, with their long lines of marching soldiers, close-ups of waving flags, and practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 WWP 43, 431–32. 
26 WWP 43, 13 and 231–32. 
27 Profits from Pershing’s Crusaders helped edge the overall expenses of the CPI’s Film Division, 
meticulously recorded by Creel, near the breakeven point. This in itself is an astonishing fact of the CPI’s 
work: in mobilizing millions of Americans as well as millions abroad through film, the Film Division 
recovered $850,000 out of the total expenditures of $1,077,730.59. See: Vaughn, Holding Fast, 210.  
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advice such as best hygiene or farming practices, were simply no match in terms of 
audience draw to the barbarizing war pictures from the commercial film industry. Creel 
and the CPI spent some time worrying about the effects of such pictures, as they cut 
against the kind of positive publicity of America’s ideals the committee tried to foster. 
The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin was in particular condemned by the CPI’s Film Division 
secretary and Wilson privately expressed his reservations of such bloodthirsty films.28  
 
The Yellow Dog Campaign 
Wartime paranoia was the theme of a Jewel Productions Inc. campaign for boy 
detectives to hunt down yellow dog traitors in cities across America. These Yellow Dog 
Detective Agencies or Anti-Yellow Dog Clubs were organized by motion picture theater 
owners, who distributed badges, ribbons, and circulars for young moviegoers, bringing 
together the drum of detective movie thrills with patriotic espionage, harassment, and 
rooting out Hun sympathizers. In the summer of 1918 an advance publicity campaign 
appeared for The Yellow Dog, a film based off of the sensationalist story of anti-
Americans and the struggle of patriotic fervor by Henry Irving Dodge. The movie, which 
would not be in production for another month, was “so practical an idea for the 
elimination of a dangerous form of enemy influence that the Jewel company decided to 
abandon all regular forms of advance publicity and devote its energies to making a reality 
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of Mr. Dodge’s fictional campaign against ‘yellow dogism.’”29 Publicity had turned film 
illusions of war paranoia into a reality. The idea had gone viral—it was to be the last 
spasmodic display of war fever and paranoia  
Fig. 6. Ad for The Yellow Dog in MPW, July 27, 1918 
 
before the influenza outbreak that swept across the country killing a half a million 
Americans.  
The Yellow Dog movement was a highly effective publicity stunt that would be 
described today as a kind of guerrilla marketing campaign for the right kind of 
commercial product—an action-packed, patriotic, and intensely xenophobic movie with 
a then-substantial budget of $500,000.30 The campaign, in place nearly a half a year 
before exhibition of the film, was designed both to “serve the Government in the 
elimination of insidious German propaganda” and “to publicize the picture by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 MPW, July 27, 1918, 536. 
30 For production cost, see: MPW, October 12, 1918, 260. 
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indirect method of making the ‘yellow dog’ […] as intensely hated as the Kaiser 
himself.”31 This reorientation away from American propaganda to American publicity in 
the Yellow Dog campaign allows us to pinpoint discursive shifts in the broader 
formations of modern liberalism—fixing propaganda to state authority and fashioning 
commercial influence of political thought as “going public.” Industry trade journals show 
a decided shift away from propaganda and toward publicity: 
… when we sell American films to a foreign land we are selling American 
publicity, too. We are selling American idealism, American physical 
prowess, American grit and stick-to-itiveness. … Do not misunderstand 
me to infer that American films in the foreign lands are American 
propaganda in foreign lands. We are not using our position to 
“propagand.” But we can’t help publicize America with our films—
publicize the splendid things she champions. There is a difference 
between propaganda and publicity, you see.32 
 
 
The Yellow Dog campaign was the perfect vehicle to combine the newfound virtues of 
publicity to the movie industry. An ad angle in Moving Picture World offers some 
strategies for theater owners in developing an Anti-Yellow Dog Club for the film’s 
exposure and publicity:  
Don’t book this story unless you are willing to go the limit. Leave it to 
your opposition. It must be circused, plus. Form the boys into a Yellow 
Dog Club, if you have not already done so. Hold a morning Yellow Dog 
meeting for grownups. Get the papers working with you, they’ll be willing 
to give you extra space for the patriotic angle. Use as a keynote the line 
from the story, “He realized that many yellow dogs might be yellow 
without knowing it.” Work from that angle. Get employers of labor to buy 
blocks of tickets. Work the schools and churches, and begin not less than 
two weeks in advance. It will all come back in box office returns.33  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 MPW, July 27, 1918, 536. 
32 MPW, July 20, 1918, 331. 
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With posters warning Americans not to be “a Tool of [the] Hun By Spreading Kultur’s 
Propaganda” and to put “a Curb on Fool Tongues Wagging for the Kaiser,” binding 
propaganda to an enemy state made good business sense, but they were also the tactics 
that served the reassociation of these new conceptions of propaganda, a target of 
malicious persuasion aimed at the CPI and American government authority. As early as 
May, 1917, industry trade journals were warning exhibitors against showing “Moral 
Propaganda” movies: “It is just as reasonable to expect pure water from the sewer as to 
find a film of this sort that will give good, clean, wholesome entertainment. If you want 
to kill your theater and disgust your patrons and outrage public decency, we can think of 
no better way than the showing of films of this class.”34 If the Great War was both the 
“apotheosis and liquidation” of progressive thought, the same could be said about the 
conception of propaganda in American political culture. While Creel and the CPI were 
busy extolling the virtues of American propaganda, commercial cinema, in particular the 
Yellow Dog campaign, was busy tearing it down. 
  With millions of Americans already members of various Yellow Dog clubs, 
production of the film finally began in late August and finished on September 21. It was 
directed by Colin Campbell and starred Ralph Graves and Antrim Short as the leader of 
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the Boy Detectives.35 Moving Picture World describes the production as a “great win the 
war” story but not a real war film: 
There are no battle scenes or troops introduced in any part of the story 
and but one uniform is seen, that of a single recruit who is the victim of 
subtle Hun propaganda. 
 In its entirety the story deals with the malignant influence 
exerted by the fireside propagandists of the Kaiser and the disastrous 
effect of circulating lying rumors manufactured by our secret enemies. 
Unlike most stories pointing to an evil, “The Yellow Dog” develops a cure, 
and the practical solution of the problem of suppressing enemy 
propaganda has already been taken up seriously and made a reality in 
practically every municipality in the United States.36 
 
It was not unusual to see the idea of propaganda tied to the enemy during the war and 
even before, but the number of instances and the almost obsessive focus on the 
propagandistic power of the enemy was unusual in the Yellow Dog campaign. In the 
above quote, the word propaganda, tied to the German enemy, is used three times in 
three sentences. Other Yellow Dog articles are similar, and in no instance is propaganda 
used positively.  
 By late August, the war paranoia stoked by the Yellow Dog fever had reached its 
peak. More than a million boys in New York City alone were enrolled in detective squads. 
Rules of proper patriotic behavior, written up as the “Ten Demandments” were sent out 
to local chapters along with buttons, badges, and report cards. The report cards, which 
had a condensed list of offenses, allowed the detectives to fill out a report on yellow dogs 
caught in the net of the “Catcher’s Association.” These publicity devices were well suited 
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to motion picture exhibition houses, who had long developed “chase and catch” 
gimmicks for children such as the “fly catcher” campaign in Pittsburgh.37 Though 
community exhibitors took the lead, the Rotary Club, Masons, local chambers of  
Fig. 7. Scenes from The Yellow Dog in MPW Sept. 21, 1918 
commerce, and private businesses—mostly manufacturers in Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
and West Virginia—were all heavily involved.38 “The infectious spirit of Americanism” 
had turned a movie ad campaign into a national movement: 
men and women in all walks of life have stepped forward and are leading 
campaigns that are stamping out enemy propaganda, and it is safe to 
predict that when the Jewel Productions fires the last gun in the campaign 
to suppress Prussian propaganda by presenting the film version of the 
“Yellow Dog” the public will view the production to look upon the 
mongrel patriot as a bygone species.39 
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A parade honoring the Yellow Dog detectives was held in Dallas, with more than one 
thousand members being presented badges by Mayor Joseph E. Lawther and local leaders 
of the Council of Defense, after which the boys were treated to a free movie at the Old 
Mill Theatre.40 In Cleveland another big Yellow Dog parade was held with the city’s mayor 
in attendance, this time with help from the Boy Scouts of America and the Red Cross. 
The Cleveland school board announced cooperation with the campaign, agreeing to write 
out excerpts of the original Dodge story on chalkboards while encouraging students to 
see the movie.41 To the movie men, this must have seemed a stunning victory—that 
school teachers and administrators were encouraging students to attend a local motion 
picture theater would have been unthinkable before the war.  
 The movie premiered at the Superba Theatre in Los Angeles before a September 
29 booking at the Broadway Theatre in New York City. “Clothed in a strong vein of 
humor,” wrote a Moving Picture World review, “‘The Yellow Dog’ points to a double 
enemy—the secret agent of the Hohenzollerns and the incontinent tongue of the 
headstrong, thoughtless American.”42 Part comedy and part wartime paranoia, The 
Yellow Dog was a children’s movie produced and distributed entirely by the commercial 
film industry with no direction from the CPI. War patriotism had found its most 
convenient ally in profit-motivated publicity: “Every theater owner is asked to help make 
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41 MPW, October 12, 1918, 256. 
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his particular neighborhood 100 per cent. American.”43 By October, Creel and the CPI, 
while not involved in the campaign, nonetheless gave it a hearty approval, noting that 
the successful campaign “sounds a note of robust Americanism that is vitally needed at 
this time when destructive gossip and petty unfaith are so calculated to sap the 
foundation of courage.”44  
 Also in October, Robert Cochrane, vice president of Universal, came out publicly 
as the man behind Jewel Productions and the Yellow Dog campaign. Cochrane, who had 
also headed The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin project, had received criticism at Universal for 
both films. Cochrane rejected the criticism and pushed through Kaiser, “[t]he result was 
a crackerjack picture that has won acclaim far and wide.” The success of Kaiser helped 
Cochrane launch the even more ambitious Yellow Dog campaign, which he described as 
“a tremendous power for good in America.” “I believe it will be a mighty help,” Cochrane 
told reporters, “in guiding the public against the Huns and the real ‘Yellow Dogs’ that 
lurk about the country.”45  
 Sensing the war itself was drawing to a close, and with many Yellow Dog clubs 
already in place, the distributors quickly put The Yellow Dog into general release, where 
it showed across the country in early October. But the second wave of the influenza 
outbreak had already begun on the east coast. This new deadlier strain of the virus 
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devastated American communities as it moved to the west, from September to 
December, 1918, shutting down motion picture theaters for weeks and in some places 
months. The outbreak happened just as the Yellow Dog movement had reached its peak, 
with the movie and the virus arriving in towns and cities at the same time. The Yellow 
Dog likely made little of its substantial investment back in return. With the war and war 
fever now subsiding, with over 100,000 dead Americans in Europe and another half a 
million dead from influenza, America looked a different place in December 1918 as the 
moving picture houses began opening up for business.  
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Fig. 8. Universal’s drive against the Yellow Dogs, Aug. 10, 1918 
 The war had been the “apotheosis as well as the liquidation” of the progressive 
era.46 The ideal of democracy was welded to a propaganda fever that imperiled 
conceptions of both. Discursive shifts in conceptions of propaganda were also aligned 
with major changes in the tactics of propaganda—ever more subtextual and embedded 
with commercial entertainment. Propaganda did not dissipate so much as become less 
visible, serviced by commercial interests of entertainment. The Yellow Dog campaign 
served as a decisive moment in the ideological shift of propaganda in American political 
culture, an advanced publicity campaign for a movie on the dangers of propaganda that 
changed the way publicity and propaganda were understood in America. Indeed, 
publicity had created reality out of movie dreams, dreams that hadn’t yet manifested 
themselves into a commercial product. Once the film completed the production process 
and was ready for exhibition, a deluge of death and sickness had descended upon 
America.  
 
Robert Goldstein and the United States v. The Spirit of ‘76 
Robert Goldstein was not the only person convicted of violating the Espionage Act 
during the Great War, but he was the only person convicted for producing a patriotic 
feature film. An American-born German-Jewish owner of a costume company from San 
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Francisco, Goldstein used money from the economic success of The Birth of a Nation to 
finance and produce a wartime movie, The Spirit of ‘76, that triggered a transformative 
indictment on movie propaganda and a political controversy that revealed strict 
limitations on speech. The rise and spectacular crash of Goldstein’s only movie is also 
the beginning of America’s trial on propaganda. The United States v. The Spirit of ’76 was 
the first criminal case against a movie—moving images that caused insubordination, 
disloyalty, and mutiny. This particular property was a feature-length film on the 
American revolution modeled after The Birth of a Nation and accused of being pro-
German propaganda. Did Goldstein intend to make such propaganda, or did the courts 
convict an innocent man? Was Goldstein the victim of a conspiracy?  
In August 1914, the production of D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation was in full 
swing. Griffith’s lot at the intersection of Hollywood and Sunset boulevards teemed with 
extras, carpenters, production personnel, and investors—the energy of a film of great 
importance, both economically and artistically, was undeniably in the air. But money was 
drying up at an alarming rate, and Griffith and his producers, the Aiken brothers, often 
had to scramble to meet payroll at the end of the day. Griffith had hired Robert 
Goldstein’s company to costume extras and regulars in the production—a monumental 
effort that required outfitting hundreds if not thousands of individuals in Civil War 
uniforms, period dress, and Klan regalia.47 An agreement between Griffith and Goldstein 
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was drafted on August 3, in which the filmmaker agreed to pay costumer $1,500.00, with 
an additional $3,000 to be paid on completion of the negative.48 But with funds 
chronically short, Goldstein later agreed to a percentage of the box office instead of the 
remainder of his fee. This was a fortuitous decision on Goldstein’s part, as the economic 
success of Epoch Producing Company’s racist epic instantly made a small fortune for 
Goldstein.49 Goldstein admired Griffith and considered him a friend. For Christmas in 
1915, Goldstein had presented Griffith with a silver statue of a clansman on horseback. 
Things quickly turned sour, however, once Goldstein made the decision to follow in the 
great director’s footsteps.50  
Griffith knew a competitor when he saw one, and Goldstein was a very ambitious 
man. By his own account, Goldstein began preparations in early 1916 for the production 
of a motion picture using the Birth template—an over two-hour-long historical feature 
on the American Revolution. Griffith, of course, had his own plans for a motion picture 
on the Revolutionary War, and so pursued ruthless tactics to slow Goldstein down—
spying, harassment, and sabotage—the same tactics Griffith used against Birth 
protesters. Goldstein’s account of these years, written in his own hand while exiled in 
Germany, is a remarkably frantic and paranoid third person narrative, a 93-page 
manuscript Goldstein sent to the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in 
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August, 1927, and first discovered in the early 1990s. In this manuscript, Goldstein 
depicts himself as a wandering, confused, and hopeless man beset by enemies on all 
sides, not least of which was D. W. Griffith. It’s impossible to prove the veracity of his 
claims, but there exists evidence that Griffith had engaged in such tactics before, against 
either his ex-wife, Birth protesters, or competitors in the movie business. Griffith 
certainly had a motive to ruin Goldstein and the means to do it.  
Two years later, with profits from Birth rolling in and Griffith’s next great 
masterwork, Intolerance, set to be released, the director drafted the following letter to 
Goldstein:  
For the sum of $1.00 paid in hand to me at this date [August 7, 1916] and 
other valuable consideration, I hereby agree that I will not produce, or any 
company that I am connected with will produce, or caused to have 
produced, or prepare for the production of, a motion picture on the 
subject of the American Revolutionary War, or period, for at least one year 
from date.51  
 
This letter appears to have been sent, but whether or not Griffith truly intended to keep 
this agreement or if this was another Griffith ruse cannot be known, but by August 1916, 
Goldstein’s production of The Spirit of 76 was well under way, and it seems conceivable 
that Griffith, who was preparing to sail for France and begin production on his Great War 
feature Hearts of the World, had conceded that Goldstein was first to the Revolution.  
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 Goldstein produced Spirit in Hollywood, with some of the same actors Griffith had 
used in Birth.52 Actors remembered Goldstein as spirited, affable, and always gentle on 
the set. Although funds were chronically short, Goldstein continued to pour his own 
money into the project. He struggled with editing in postproduction for months, and by 
April, 1917, just as America was entering World War I, Goldstein took out full page 
advertisements in Moving Picture World announcing the completion of his film.53 
Goldstein chose May 7 at Orchestra Hall in Chicago for the premiere of his film, with 
prices ranging from 50 cents to two dollars.54 
 But wartime America was not ready for Goldstein’s Revolutionary War epic. Major 
Funkhouser, head of the Chicago Censor Board, halted exhibition upon receiving word 
that the film “contains scenes that disparage England, now an American ally.” 
Funkhouser asked the Department of Justice for a recommendation, and the Bureau of 
Investigation chief of Chicago wired Washington for advice. Justice officials 
contemplated federal action under the Interstate Commerce law.55 Goldstein responded 
based off of the Birth template: he insisted that every element of his film was historically 
accurate and “founded on recognized authority.” The city would have to remove all 
textbooks from public schools, Goldstein argued, to have equal justice.56 
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 The scene at the center of the controversy depicted atrocities committed by 
English troops at the Cherry Valley massacre. Babies and old Quakers are stabbed with 
bayonets; a woman is dragged across the screen by her hair; and an English officer drags 
a young woman into his bedchamber. Based on photographic stills of some of these 
images (there is currently no known surviving print of The Spirit of ‘76), the construction 
of these scenes in terms of framing and mise-en-scène is notably similar to scenes from 
The Birth of a Nation, showing massacres committed by “irregular troops” in the Southern 
town of Piedmont. 
 
Fig. 9. Full-page advertisement for The Spirit of ’76 in MPW, April 7, 1917 
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 Goldstein sought an injunction against Funkhouser and the city, restraining them 
from halting the exhibition on the same grounds that Birth had argued for exhibition in 
Chicago only two years before. But racial paranoia in 1915 was no match for potential 
treason in wartime America. The injunction was refused on May 17, and Mandamus 
proceedings held concurrently by the Chicago Superior Court also refused to intervene. 
After finally reviewing the film, Funkhouser demanded about 2,000 feet of cuts from 
fourteen reels. Goldstein agreed to the cuts and on June 15, 1917, The Spirit of ‘76 finally 
had its premiere at Orchestra Hall without much controversy. Critics admired the 
costumes and detail of the period piece. Kitty Kelly in the Examiner called it a “costume 
triumph,” and a film that is “not anti-British, but anti-tyrannish: it breathes freedom, 
just as does the press of today, and one doesn’t cringe at a nationality in particular, but 
at the type of tyranny at present being Teutonically manifested.”57 A movie that breathes 
freedom, that exposes Teutonic tyranny, was about to land its creator in federal prison.  
With debts mounting, Goldstein was forced to return to Los Angeles for an 
opening at Clune’s Auditorium, the theater hall where Birth, still under the name The 
Clansman, had its world premiere. The exhibition at Clune’s was almost immediately a 
disaster for Goldstein. Tipped off that there was objectionable content in Spirit that could 
potentially damage relations between the United States and Great Britain, federal 
officials demanded to see the film in a private screening before the premiere. Assistant 
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District Attorney Gordon Lawson and a representative from the American Protective 
League viewed Goldstein’s film and insisted on several cuts, including the elimination of 
the entire Cherry Valley scene. Goldstein, by his own account, made the cuts two days 
before the public showing. But during the November 27 evening premiere, all of the cuts 
demanded by the Assistant District Attorney had been restored, including the Cherry 
Valley scene. The film played through the following day and a Thursday matinee. Press 
reactions were mixed on the movie, but several reviews noted there was little in the way 
of objectionable material. Spirit “contains nothing that would dampen the fervor of 
America at war now,” wrote the Exhibitor’s Trade Review, “instead, it inspires 
patriotism.”58 On charges that the film elicits “a feeling of resentment against England,” 
Motography determined that “there is not the slightest danger of its doing so.”59  
The Los Angeles District Attorney’s office and the Bureau of Investigation did not 
agree, however. They regarded the movie as a dangerous instrument of German 
propaganda with the power to turn the American public against its British allies by 
depicting British atrocities. The fact that the objectionable scenes were removed and 
then placed back in for the Clune’s engagement was evidence enough for state 
authorities that Goldstein had acted in bad faith.60 On November 29, 1917, two days after 
the premiere, federal agents seized the film and took Goldstein into custody. He was 
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charged on three counts of violating the Espionage Act and was indicted on December 4. 
Goldstein was out on bail the next day, but was soon back in jail as the preliminary court 
hearing doubled the amount of bail. Goldstein would remain incarcerated for over three 
years.61  
 Was Goldstein the victim of sabotage? Historical scholarship on Goldstein and his 
only movie is scant, but none seems to suggest the possibility, despite the fact that 
Goldstein accused Griffith of masterminding a plot against him. Although there was no 
discernable outrage from the public or the press, everything seemed to be unraveling for 
Goldstein in Los Angeles. “Everything had gone fairly smoothly,” wrote Goldstein, “until 
Griffith arrived in town.” Griffith had returned to Southern California from Europe by 
early November, and was in Los Angeles during the premiere, but not in attendance. 
Griffith was personally close to William H. Clune, owner of Clune’s Auditorium, and so 
had the means to infiltrate the theater and restore the cuts to Spirit. By Goldstein’s 
account, Clune was less a collaborator with Griffith than one of his many victims. 
Goldstein describes his account in third person: 
When he talked the matter over with Clune and told him his suspicions 
that Griffith had caused the opposition to the picture, Clune seemed to 
agree with him. Clune had also been one of the stockholders in The Birth, 
and after its success he also wanted to make a twelve-reel picture. So 
when Thomas Dixon, the author of The Birth, came out to Los Angeles and 
made The Fall of a Nation, which predicted the United States being 
conquered by the Germans, Griffith seemed to think that all the people 
connected with the production of The Birth were going to run him 
opposition in the twelve-reel film game.62 
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Goldstein’s trial became one of many wartime sensations of domestic treason. By George 
Creel’s count, over 1,500 American citizens were arrested under the Espionage Act, and 
some 908 were indicted. The movies were subject to a great deal of wartime suspicion, 
not only because of the social power of moving pictures, but because of the highly 
flammable nitrate film stock that was classified by the wartime government as an 
incendiary device capable of being used in domestic terrorism.63 Describing the climate 
of fear and paranoia in late 1917, George Creel wrote:  
Who does not remember the fears of ‘wholesale disloyalty’ that shook us 
daily? There were to be ‘revolutions’ in Milwaukee, St. Louis, Cincinnati; 
armed uprisings here, there, and everywhere; small armies herding 
thousands of rebellious enemy aliens into huge internment camps; 
incendiarism, sabotage, explosions, murder, domestic riot. No 
imagination was too meager to paint a picture of America’s adopted 
children turning faces of hatred to the motherland.64 
 
Creel provides this context in a defense of the CPI’s work and an attack on the notion of 
“wholesale disloyalty,” emphasizing German-American contributions to America’s war 
effort. Republicans assailed Creel and the CPI in the postwar years, but Creel consistently 
stressed the fact that American democratic ideals could create political bonds stronger 
than ethnic nationality. 
Robert Goldstein slipped through the cracks of this democratic ideal. He 
maintained throughout the trial that he was the victim of a conspiracy and that his 
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ethnicity was the real problem. “‘Fancy anyone getting sentimental over a man named 
Goldstein!’ ‘That is what is the matter,’” Goldstein told his third person self, “‘I should 
have taken a stage name like Reginald Scarborough and it might have been alright. The 
people who have made me all this trouble seem to think that The Spirit of ’76 by Robert 
Goldstein does not sound good. Even if I wanted to bow to this prejudice, it is too late 
now.’” The years of the Goldstein controversy marked the bridge from Birth and the 
southern-based Klan revival to a nationalized Klan movement infiltrating the northern 
states and the Republican Party. From 1917 to 1921, America moved toward a new era of 
reactionary nativism and paranoia over the political power of propaganda.  
The trial was held in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California, with Judge Benjamin Franklin Bledsoe presiding. The court labored over the 
details of the Cherry Valley massacre, both as historical reality and as movie 
reenactment. Judge Bledsoe consistently misidentified the actual historical event, 
however, referring to the Wyoming Massacre in northeastern Pennsylvania. Historical 
inaccuracies aside, the focus was on the “unspeakable atrocities” portrayed in the film, 
as when a British soldier is shown “impaling on a bayonet a baby lying in its cradle and 
then whirling it around his head so impaled.” Goldstein admitted in court that he had 
placed these scenes back into the film after its preview by the Assistant Attorney General. 
He claimed in court that restoring these sequences was necessary to “put ‘pep’ into the 
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show,” but in his memoir written years later, Goldstein claims that he was the victim of 
manipulation by his lawyers and that he did not understand the charges against him.65 
Judge Bledsoe found Goldstein guilty on 2 of the 3 counts against him, and weeks 
later he was sentenced to 10 years in the federal penitentiary at McNeil Island along with 
a $5,000 fine. Goldstein spent the next two years at McNeil in harrowing circumstances. 
He accused prison guards and outsider influences of inducing other prisoners into 
cocaine frenzies to attack him. He was isolated for long stretches, subject to hard physical 
labor, and received almost no visitors during this time. He considered himself not a 
political prisoner but a man imprisoned for being a Jew. His descriptions of incarceration 
on McNeil are a frightful premonition of the Holocaust era: “Was it possible to live here? 
He had seen a few of the trustees and they seemed to be well fed and clothed. But his 
own clothes were old and filthy, and three sizes too large for him. He felt his shaven 
head.”66 Goldstein described his conviction as a “legal murder,” not because “his fate or 
the fate of the picture is of so much importance, but because the case involves the 
principles on which the United States Government is founded.”67 
There were people interested in the Goldstein case, foremost among them was 
Zechariah Chafee Jr., a respected scholar on the First Amendment and Harvard law 
professor. Chafee was in the process of gathering articles into chapters for what would 
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be the seminal book on modern free speech liberties, Freedom of Speech, published in 
1920. Freedom of Speech criticized the government’s case against Goldstein and 
questioned whether there was any intention on the part of Goldstein to undermine 
America’s war effort. A defender of free speech and critic of the Espionage Act, Chafee 
agreed with Justice Louis Brandeis on the US Supreme Court that the Espionage Act was 
“the beginning of a series of encroachments on civil rights of every kind, whose full 
consequence we are dimly beginning to realize.”68 The political force of the Espionage 
Act was directed at the dangers of propaganda itself. In drafting the legislation for the 
Espionage Act, there was an attempt by Chafee and others to incorporate a provision that 
exempted “anti-war utterances if made with good motives and for justifiable ends.” This 
provision was attacked relentlessly by Attorney General Gregory, who argued to 
Congress that such a provision would “in effect destroy the value of the Espionage Act 
as a weapon against propaganda.”69 The trial on The Spirit of ’76 was a trial on propaganda 
in American political culture. 
Chaffee wrote a letter to D. W. Griffith on May 25, 1920, in which he asked for 
Griffith’s opinion on Goldstein motivations: “Is he the sort of person who would 
deliberately produce anti-British scenes in order to embarrass this country in the 
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prosecution of the war?”70 It took Griffith nearly a month to reply to this letter with a 
short response: 
My relations with Mr. Goldstein were impersonal and limited to business 
transactions with our organization. I have no reason to think he would 
willfully conceive a film plot to incite hostility toward a foreign country. 
I would be inclined to think his ambitions would be almost entirely 
commercial.71  
 
But from the Attorney General’s perspective, intentions were not the determining factor 
in espionage. In referencing the case against Goldstein and The Spirit of ’76, Gregory 
informed Congress that “some of the most dangerous types of propaganda were either 
made from good motives or either the traitorous motive was not provable.”72 No motive, 
profit or otherwise, was sufficient to justify movie propaganda and its threat to the health 
of American democracy.  
It is true that American movies were simply incompatible with constitutional 
protections of free speech in 1915, but legal understanding of limitations on free speech 
was itself in its infancy. Chafee’s defense of speech liberties was not well received in the 
anxious postwar years of America. With communist labor agitation and race riots 
gripping the country, Freedom of Speech received hostile reactions in many corners of the 
academic and legal establishment.73 It would take a generation for Chafee’s work to find 
broad acceptance and praise, and by the end of World War II, a revised and updated 
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edition of the work quickly became the pillar of the more-speech doctrine, the modern 
civil libertarianism of countering harmful speech with more speech. The development of 
film free speech followed a similar trajectory. Even Chafee seemed skeptical of speech 
protections for the cinema. Indeed, Freedom of Speech was in part a critique of the 
Blackstone interpretation of where censorship is applicable—that prior restraint be the 
dividing line in acceptable and unacceptable censorship. “The prohibition of previous 
restraint,” wrote Chafee, “would not allow the government to prevent … the censorship 
of moving pictures before exhibition.”74 In other words, restraining film product prior to 
exhibition, the most common censoring action, hardly conforms to the Blackstonian 
definition of constitutionally protected censorship. 
The legal limitation of prior restraint was a poor fit for film speech interpretation, 
but Chafee seemed hardly aware that the case he cited as evidence—Mutual v. Ohio—
could make no mention of prior restraint since the basis of the decision was that film was 
not entitled to speech at all. The movies were not speech ill-suited to the prohibition on 
prior restraint; they were economic products, subject to any form of interstate 
regulation. Why would Chafee overlook this basic legal reality? What now seems clear is 
that Freedom of Speech was built on a series of distorted truths. Chafee makes three 
influential claims in this work: that the founders talked often and broadly about the 
liberty of press and speech and banished seditious libel from the American republic; that 
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free speech jurisprudence was minimal in the long 19th century; and that Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes had fashioned his “clear and present danger” limitation not skeptical of 
speech rights but “with speech protective ends in mind.”75 By the 1970s, legal scholarship 
on the First Amendment began uncovering the limitations of Chafee’s free speech 
gospel, chief among them was the myth that free speech legal battles were minimal 
leading up to 1915.76 As more than one historian has since noted, Chafee was a great free 
speech activist but a poor free speech scholar and historian. It seems likely that Chafee 
overlooked the main point of Mutual—that the movies are not speech—in order to hold 
up the evidence of Goldstein’s prosecution as an example of the failures in Blackstonian 
adherence. Modern free speech was built on historical myths. Movies and their own 
visual mythmaking were at the center of these historical constructions. 
In another sense, Chafee’s misreading of Mutual may be some indication that even 
legal scholars at the time had understood this important decision in very different ways 
than subsequent film historians. What is certain is that the decision gave speech scholars 
little direction in understanding exactly why movies were to be so limited in their 
definition other than the fact that movies were seemingly limitless in their use and 
impact. Ironically, the social power of the cinema necessitated legal grounding in the 
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“pure and simple” definition of an economic product. Its power necessitated a delimited 
legal understanding of that power. The controversies surrounding The Birth of a Nation, 
and its defense on grounds of film speech, clearly indicate highly visible and complex 
legal battles over the liberty of speech prior to America’s entry in WWI. Speech conflicts 
associated with The Birth of a Nation and The Spirit of ’76 helped shaped this historical 
fiction by casting the pre-cinema past against a new and turbulent future. Motion 
pictures had become the vehicle through which constructions of American identity and 
American democracy found cultural meaning and political force. But they were, 
according to the finest judicial minds of the era, just economic products. 
President Wilson commuted Goldstein’s sentence to 3 years in 1919, and in 1922, 
Goldstein was a free man. He would not give up his movie dream, however, and recut 
Spirit into a film called Heart’s Aflame, which showed in limited venues in New York City. 
This time the picture was accused of being a pro-Irish attack on Britain. Goldstein was 
assailed in the press as an ex-convict and Sinn Feiner, and the Ku Klux Klan—just 
becoming a visible presence in New York, may have been involved in some street 
agitation against the film.77 Pro-German during the war and pro-Catholic in the anxious 
postwar years of nativist paranoia, Goldstein’s movie showed the trajectory of American 
political culture and its construction of national identity in the ruins of the progressive 
era. Goldstein and his movie were largely lost to the passage of time. Harassed by the 
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only country he knew, Goldstein left America for Holland and eventually Germany. He 
corresponded with the Motion Picture Academy of Arts and Sciences through the 1920s, 
imploring them to help give him a new opportunity in the American film industry, but to 
no avail. He disappeared sometime in the 1930s, either in Hitler’s Nazi Germany or in 
America.78 As an exiled Jew in Nazi Germany, his fate was likely tragic, but as an 
American citizen “publicly murdered” by the federal government for making a patriotic 
motion picture, Goldstein’s fate was already a tragic and deeply ironic one.  
 
The Postwar Years 
From prohibition cinema through The Birth of a Nation and The Yellow Dog, commercial 
film articulated the exuberant propagandistic spirit of the progressive era to such an 
extent that it overshadowed the propaganda of state authority. For the reluctant censors 
of Wilsonian liberalism, they too often looked upon the burgeoning social power of 
American commercial movies with guarded caution. The reflective social power of 
commercial cinema proved a double edged sword, easily turned on American 
government. When the war ended, the industry was quick to shape an argument that the 
propaganda services of commercial cinema were not money makers. “Whenever we run 
propaganda films,” stated one theater owner, “[i]t is a source of loss. […] However, we 
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have learned the value of the screen as a medium for propaganda, and are now using it 
in our own interests [to fight censorship].”79 Such efforts, ironically, entailed eliminating 
explicit propaganda from the commercial industry and reorienting the screens toward a 
seemingly depoliticized Hollywood dream factory of safe and clean entertainment. When 
the progressive reform sentiment had exhausted itself in the ruins of peace, the movies 
would come out clean and the progressive and liberal expressions of the American state 
would be left to the dust bin of history. America was to enter a period of reactionary 
nativism and social uncertainty as the citizen’s Councils of Defense were disbanded, 
replaced by a resurgent and national Klan and institutionalized prohibition. 
For American movies, the Great War was also the high watermark of exhibition 
power in an industry still struggling to consolidate. As economic and political power 
moved from the patent holders and industrial raw material suppliers to the site of movie 
consumption—the moving picture theater—exhibition took on a central place in the 
social and cultural changes of the 1910s. The theater site was the face of the industry and 
the center of cultural exchange, climaxing in the patriotic service of exhibition houses in 
recruiting and propagandizing during the war. The National Association of the Motion 
Picture Industry (NAMPI), the trade association that emerged out of the Patent Trust 
wars, was largely led by exhibitors. William A. Brady, the head of NAMPI, was a theater 
owner and firm believer in harnessing the power of propaganda in cinema. Brady was 
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also point man in the industry’s War Cooperating Committee, working directly with the 
CPI’s Film Division director, Charles S. Hunt, to coordinate wartime movie policies.80 
Brady’s position helped exhibitors carve out a crucial role in the war. But such a 
conception of the cinema—exhibition power as democratic and inherently political—was 
too wedded to progressive propaganda and the war to provide the foundation of 
American film industry development.  
If the struggles of the 1910s had taught the emerging movie moguls anything, it 
was that the moral anxieties of reform could only be checked by mastering the site of 
production. Moreover, this moral crisis surrounding film’s social power was a major 
barrier to vertical consolidation in the industry, even if it spurred on greater horizontal 
coordination. To achieve viable consolidation necessary for the growth of what was still 
an infant industry, the movie men had to clean up the images on the picture sheet. Power 
in the industry would necessarily shift in the furtherance of this goal, from the exhibitors 
to the producer-distributors. But to achieve this economic reform and hold the censors 
at bay, the movie men needed the right leader. They found him in a conservative 
Republican politician from Indiana, the man who would steer the industry through the 
choppy waters of political censorship and oversee the great economic consolidation that 
would give birth to the era known as classic Hollywood. That man was William Harrison 
Hays. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
HOLLYWOOD, PROHIBITION, AND THE KLAN: POLITICAL CLEARING GROUND FOR 
THE RISE OF HOLLYWOOD 
 
In wake of the Edison Trust’s implosion, the National Association of the Motion 
Picture Industry was formed to coordinate industry action against both economic 
regulation and moral censorship. But this too proved a failure, collapsing under a 
distribution of power weighed in the favor of exhibitors who were unable to control the 
moral concerns over screen content and unwilling to curb explicitly political functions 
of the screen. As a July 1, 1922 press release from the Federal Council of Churches put it, 
“[a] great commercial amusement calls for some measure of social control […] that places 
the responsibility squarely on those who produce pictures. And—since they produce for 
the whole nation—it ought to be national control.”1 By the beginning of the 1920s, 
members of NAMPI would dissolve their association and power in the industry would 
again shift, this time toward producer-distributors. The cause of this shift in power was 
a series of public scandals that struck an industry leader in the early 1920s. These 
scandals revolved principally around the production sector of the industry, in particular 
the newly empowered creative talent of the movies whose private lives had become 
symbols of a decadent and immoral Hollywood.  
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 As the liquor industry succumbed to prohibition and postwar America to an 
unpredictable reactionary nativism, the movies were threatened with the worst series of 
scandals to ever hit the industry, battering the highest echelons of Hollywood. The most 
prominent of these scandals—the early drug-related deaths of Olive Thomas and Wallace 
Reid, the William Desmond Taylor murder, and particularly the Fatty Arbuckle trials—
did not come from the lower and marginal reaches of the industry: these were established 
stars and respected names who were all associated with the industry’s leading studio, 
Paramount. The moral scandals emanating from Paramount had set off a chain reaction 
of coordinated and consolidated economic maneuvers that would forever change the 
structure and organization of the American film industry. From 1920 to 1922, Adolph 
Zukor’s company spearheaded the formation of the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America to respond to Hollywood’s scandals. The newly formed 
Association tapped William Harrison Hays, key Republican insider and former 
Postmaster General under the Harding administration, to be president of the 
Association.2 The agreement went public in January, 1922, and he began his tenure in 
March that year. 
 The coordinated practices of the major studios needed political cover to gain the 
moral control over the screen necessary for vertical integration of the industry, and Hays 
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was the kind of Washington insider who could provide this political cover. A conservative 
Hoosier and successful lawyer for oil and coal interests, Hays was a temperate, tiny 
mouse of a man who forged his political power through an affable and earnest conviction 
in organization and compromise. He earned praise from many of his Republican 
colleagues for rebuilding party unity by organizing opposition to President Wilson’s 
attempts to bring the United States into the newly created League of Nations. He was 
trusted adviser to many powerful individuals of the time, and he was a master at pulling 
the levers of traditional party and political patronage, assembling an impressive array of 
contacts across the nation, most of whom were more than happy to provide a favor or 
two for the likeable Hoosier. Humble, effusive, and almost childlike, Hays rarely 
brandished this political power publicly, which perhaps explains the historical 
perspective that has constructed him as a mere publicist.  
Publicity certainly was his great skill, but publicity requires political negotiation 
for advertising to be successful, and the movies—with all the moral and political 
anxieties it elicited—necessitated a supremely skilled politician. Consolidation, 
therefore, could not be pursued in strictly economic terms for the movie men in 
Hollywood and their financiers in New York—they needed political alliances that created 
enough breathing room to control the moral questions surrounding the industry. Hays 
provided this breathing room by aligning movie interests with the ascendant Republican 
Party who tended to dominate national politics throughout the 1920s. For Hays, this 
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work on behalf of Hollywood also meant smaller, more focused alliances with federal 
prohibition enforcement and the Ku Klux Klan.  
 
The Politics of Publicity 
There is some disagreement among American film historians as to the relative 
success and mission of the Hays office in the 1920s. In influencing a generation of 
American film scholarship, Robert Sklar referred to Hays as a “glorified public relations 
man” whose office was responsible for “[cutting] the movies off from many of the most 
important moral and social themes of the contemporary world.”3 The Hays office 
certainly looked the part of a publicity stunt hoodwinking blue nose moralists and 
government authorities with the ploy of better movies. With a closer analysis of MPPDA 
documents, Richard Maltby has shown that there was little possibility, or even 
expectation of, a non-commercial cinema, either educative or religious or politically 
propagandistic, that could prove to be a viable alternative to the commercial film 
product. For Maltby, there was little disagreement over the “consumable commodity” 
that was the movies’ “assigned location in American cultural topography.”4   
 Hays did oversee a depoliticization of the screen—a process by which the 
propagandistic powers of the cinema were to be denatured—but it is perhaps more 
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accurate to say that Hays shifted the function of politics and the movies away from the 
social function of cinema and toward the politics of publicity. The appointment of Hays 
elicited a great deal of concern over explicitly political influences on the movies, but 
nearly all of these concerns were expressed in terms of Hays influencing movies toward 
Republican Party bias. Republicans, for their part, sought to press political advantages 
in the movies through Hays. But operating below this public contestation over party 
politics in the movies, few seemed to consider the politics working from the industry on 
Washington: that Hays would provide important political cover for economic control of 
the industry by producers. Hays was no mere publicity man, but a shrewd political insider 
with the organizational skills to formalize and institutionalize the coordinated 
arrangements of the film industry. But there was no broad agreement on the function of 
cinema in American culture. Indeed, educative and non-commercial film interests—who 
showed a greater willingness to use the instruments of movie propaganda—pressured 
the industry for greater development and acceptance, sometimes holding out the threat 
of censorship as leverage. The MPPDA was constantly negotiating political conflict, 
tempering the propagandistic possibilities of the screen, and filtering the social and 
moral issues of the era into acceptable commercialism.  
 While Paramount and other majors were busy pursuing a robust consolidation of 
the industry by aggressively building theater chains and tightening the links between its 
production and distribution units, Hays publicly banned Arbuckle from the movies and 
began building a publicity campaign for the movie industry around a simple set of 
	  
196	  
principles: the movies must serve the public; the public does not call for censorship, but 
better and more moral movies; and so to defeat censorship, producers must eliminate 
the friction at its source and provide the public with wholesome, morally uplifting 
entertainment. These principles—embodied in the “better movie campaign,” “Saturday 
morning children’s movies,” and later in the “Do’s, Don’t, and Be Careful’s” moral movie 
formula—were constantly championed as the prominent work of the Association. But 
behind the cloak of “better movies” the Association’s work was messier and more 
explicitly political. It followed a two-pronged plan: to control any political action 
(censorship, taxation, Sunday blue laws, legislation against block booking, etc.) that 
public interests, politicians, or government regulators could direct against the industry; 
and, under this political cover, to oversee greater coordination and consolidation in the 
industry while preserving a certain idea of competition.    
 From 1922 to 1926, the MPPDA won nearly every major censorship battle for their 
producer-distributor members. It would begin in the fall of 1922 with an impressive 
landslide victory against a referendum to defeat the newly-established state censorship 
board in Massachusetts and would culminate in a successful defeat of a federal 
censorship bill in the first congressional session of 1926. It was by almost any measure a 
series of stunning successes for an infant industry developing in such anxious and 
turbulent times. Such successes relied on publicly visible strategies and campaigns to 
improve the image of the movie industry, but it also required political negotiation behind 
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the scenes by a skilled insider. The movie men had plenty of evidence that Hays was the 
right kind of insider.  
Hays’ political skills were put to good use by the so-called “Ohio Gang” of 
Republicans in healing the progressive-conservative fracture of the Republican Party 
(along conservative lines) and rebuilding party organization in the wake of Wilson’s 
Democratic Party successes. Wilson’s appropriation of progressive sentiment allowed for 
a conservative shift in Republican Party politics away from progressives like Robert La 
Follette and Hiram Johnson, both of whom were political opponents of Hays. Theodore 
Roosevelt had died in early 1919, removing the possibility of a revered national political 
figure solidifying the party platform in progressivism. In the place of party division, Hays 
and other conservative Republicans oversaw a solemn Republican Party memorialization 
of Roosevelt’s public life. The consolidation and revitalization of the Republican Party 
in the 1920s was characterized by a rejection of an outdated progressivism, a stronger 
alliance with economic elites, and a turn toward reactionary nativism in which millions 
of loyal “Lincoln Party” voters joined in the national rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan. The 
sedimentation of Republican ideology in American nativism, social conservatism, and 
unflinching support for the economically powerful provided the fertile ground on which 
the modern Republican Party was built.  
 Hays was at the center of this party transformation when he first took the post of 
MPPDA president. Critical elements of the press and Democratic Party sympathizers 
openly worried about the political effects of the Hays appointment—as they saw it, the 
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Republican Party now had the instruments of film propaganda at its disposal. Hays took 
the job, wrote the New York Evening World, “to use the motion picture industry in 
propaganda to further the election of a Republican Congress in the November [1922] 
election.”5 Hays did press Republican Party advantages when he could, but always 
through the strategy of eliminating propaganda from the screen. The Pathé/Tariff 
controversy was an early test of these newfound conceptions of propaganda and Hays’ 
political interest. Bert Green, a cartoonist employed by Pathé, had drawn a series of film 
animated shorts lambasting the Republican-sponsored Fordney-McCumber tariff bill 
pending in Congress, showing many Americans forced to pay higher prices for goods 
should the bill pass. In “Movies and Partisan Propaganda” the chairman of the 
Republican National Committee George Lockwood wrote that “Pathé films have gone 
into the party of propaganda business […] The readiness of a great film distributing house 
to lend itself to such propaganda strengthens the sentiment in behalf of declaring 
moving pictures public utilities and putting them within strict government control.”6  
 Hays recognized the threat of being pulled by his party allegiance on the one hand 
and the imperative of representing the interests of his employers on the other. Hays was 
able to negotiate this early test successfully by focusing on the evils of propaganda itself. 
Responding to Lockwood, Hays wrote emphatically that “the screen must not be used for 
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  Lockwood to Hays, July 7, 1922, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 6.	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propaganda. That is fundamental.”7 Lockwood chafed—as he saw it, the movies were 
awash in “anti-prohibition and anti-reform [sentiment] even of the most legitimate 
character.” He suggested Republicans could respond with their own movie arsenal, to 
“have the matter squared by getting some stuff put out by ourselves” despite the fact 
that “I am against propaganda in the movies from any source.” Lockwood continues: 
The saloon people of this country kept up this sort of thing until the 
people rose up and drove them out … they will do the same thing with the 
moving picture people unless they use more conservatively and sensibly 
their service … I believe when I attack the prostitution of the movies to 
personal and party ends that I am doing them a service in helping to stave 
off the interference they will have unless certain practices are voluntarily 
eliminated.8  
  
Lockwood’s warning was a fair summation of the work Hays was charged with doing, to 
steer the industry toward a voluntary elimination of “certain practices,” but such 
practices for Lockwood and Hays ironically turned the propagandistic power of movies 
on its head—the instruments of film propaganda were precisely the means through 
which national prohibition, and a measure of respect for the movie industry, were 
achieved. The insidious label of propagandists could be stuck on the vanquished liquor 
men, and the movies could come out clean. Hays maneuvered to put the industry 
“irrevocably on record” against propaganda by furthering Republican Party aims, but 
there were limitations to this course of action when the GOP went on the offensive. When 
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Senator Medill McCormick wrote to Hays asking for assistance in developing a movie on 
Republicanism that “could be used in a State campaign,” Hays responded that “[n]one of 
the Association members are engaged in propaganda production … I am wondering if 
you could not get a good patriotic picture of some kind which would do for county fairs.”9 
Hays deftly substitutes “patriotic” for “propaganda” in this instance, steering political 
conceptions of the cinema toward patriotism. 
 
Republicans to Hollywood: The Monroe Doctrine Exposition 
The Hays office in New York also managed an ever increasing flow of visitors to 
the Hollywood colony, much of it traditional 19th century party patronage of a strangely 
exhibitionist kind. It certainly was not the beginning of the tourist flood to Hollywood, 
but the formation of the Hays office in New York was perhaps the first 
institutionalization of Hollywood tourism for political leverage. Hays received 
innumerable requests from friends, wives, daughters, aunts and uncles of political and 
business elites “to see something of the studios.” Thomas G. Patten, a former 
congressman and Postmaster of New York City who had earned a law degree at Columbia 
in 1880, was the first MPPDA man in Hollywood. Patten proved ineffective and out of 
touch as a Hollywood point man—he was over 60 years old and found it difficult to keep 
up with the frenetic social pace of Hollywood. As Courtland Smith wrote confidentially 
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to Hays, “Tom [Patten] is a social success in a limited field. That field corresponds to the 
Player’s Club group in NY. In all other respects he is too old, too sick, and too slow. These 
are the kindest words I can use.”10  
 Throughout the busy summer of 1923, Patten escorted Washington power players 
and New York bankers around the movie colony. Secretary of War John W. Weeks and a 
party of 60 that included numerous senators and congressmen visited Hollywood in May, 
1923, where they toured the Lasky set to watch Cecile B. De Mille shoot some scenes and 
the Universal set of The Hunchback of Notre Dame. This visit was something of a dress 
rehearsal for the biggest event of the summer—the Monroe Doctrine Exposition, an expo 
in Los Angeles commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine. President 
Warren G. Harding’s arrival for the expo was scheduled for the last week of August, at 
which time he would become the first sitting president to tour a motion picture studio.11 
The impending arrival of President Harding threw the New York and Hollywood offices 
of the MPPDA into sheer pandemonium. Hollywood wanted a full day with Harding, but 
his Washington handlers insisted that the president’s visit to the movie colony be limited 
to just one hour, with a tour of one studio to be chosen by Hays himself. Hays pressured 
his contacts for more time, but his biggest problem was negotiating the notoriously 
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competitive and cutthroat executives in picking the lucky studio who was to receive the 
chief executive. Patten reported “considerable competition among the studios” and 
some executives privately expressed that it would be a “grave mistake” for Hays to pick 
the studio, a decision that would upset many to please a few.12  
 Hays had a lot riding on the Harding visit to Hollywood—it was to be the 
culmination of a publicity campaign that marked a new era in the American movie 
industry, an era in which Hollywood and the Republican Party forged an alliance that 
shaped as it limited the social functions of the screen. These social functions had served 
as a medium of political discourse in the 1910s, the screen as the exposition of 
propaganda and machinery of democracy. The LA Expo of 1923 was the expression of a 
different kind of politics—the outward appeal and publicity of going public. The Hays 
publicity operation was not a depoliticization of the movies, rather it was a shift in 
political function toward a “more manly and democratic process of self-control and self-
regulation” in commercialization.13  
 The LA Expo proved a monumental disaster. Lack of coordination among city 
officials left events poorly planned and money extremely short. President Harding had 
arrived in San Francisco via Alaska, British Columbia, and Seattle on July 29, 1923 with 
his health declining rapidly. He would die in San Francisco of a cerebral hemorrhage on 
August 2, just weeks before his studio visit. For Hays, it would be a major political 
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setback—he would never again have such a close political ally in the White House. But 
the vows between Hollywood and the Republican Party had been exchanged. Their 
relationship would flourish through the 1920s, crucial years for the development of the 
classic studio era of American film. Under such an alliance, the industry was able to 
undergo the economic and social development to consolidate the industry and ward off 
political censorship. These moral and economic questions were not isolated—a certain 
level of unique coordination served as a precondition to moral control; in turn, economic 
consolidation was a precondition to moral mastery. Strategies that limited the power and 
use of propagandistic cinema were also fostered through the industry’s alliance with the 
Republican Party—this alliance provided political cover for discursive shifts that 
empowered private commercial enterprise at the expense of alternative visions of 
cinema, be they overtly political, religious, or educative functions. This discursive drift 
in American political culture served to limit political influence over private power by 
controlling the social power of the screen for economic ends. “The saloon people of this 
country” had spread the cancer of propaganda that infected the social body; for Hays, it 
was up to the movies to articulate a commercialized cure for these social ills. 
 
The Friend of Your Enemies: Hollywood and Prohibition 
Newly installed Prohibition Commissioner Roy Asa Haynes, in a letter to Will 
Hays, makes a familiar argument about the social capacity of the cinema, that, properly 
directed, movies “will be one of the most helpful of all agencies” and improperly directed, 
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it could be “one of the most dangerous.”14 The movies had entered the age of prohibition 
with a powerful ally. Locked in an economic and social struggle throughout much of the 
progressive era, the movie and liquor industries collided over the social function of 
consumer capitalism and the state’s role in regulating those functions. The movie men 
in turn sought to align the industry with elements of the very reform sentiment that 
advocated political control over film morality. These alignments held throughout much 
of the 1920s, even as the movies gained in popularity and the ideals of prohibition 
crumbled in a wave of corruption, organized crime, and public disdain for the 18th 
Amendment and Volstead Act. Haynes, a political lackey of the Anti-Saloon League and 
their powerful Washington manipulator, Wayne Wheeler, had a keen personal interest 
in the movies. He pressed Hays to “do what he could” for his “very charming niece, aged 
about nineteen years, who for years has had an ambition for a try-out in the movies.” 
Margaret Faulconer, Haynes’ niece and daughter of a Presbyterian minister, did get a 
screen test with First National, and subsequently appeared in the Richard Barthelmess 
vehicle Sonny (1922).15  
 Less than a year later, in January, 1923, Haynes traveled to Hollywood to 
investigate rumors of a growing narcotics trade in the movie colony. Although he was in 
Hollywood for no more than 24 hours, and did not meet with Thomas Patten, Hays’ point 
man in Southern California, he nonetheless wrote glowingly of the movie colony’s 
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cleanliness, at least with regards to illicit drugs. “[O]ur investigation,” Haynes wrote to 
Hays, “revealed a situation no worse than in other sections of the United States, 
population considered, and that the number of persons addicted to the use of narcotic 
drugs found by our operatives was surprisingly low, and absolutely refuted the 
impression prevailing in many quarters that moving picture artists are quite generally 
addicted to the use of narcotic drugs.”16  
 Six months later, the prohibition czar called in a favor. His latest book, Prohibition 
Inside and Out, gave all the dope on federal agents tracking down illicit liquor—boat 
chases, thrilling highjacks, the “capture of moonshiners in mountain fastness,” all the 
elements of a terrific action movie. Though Adolph Zukor showed little interest in the 
prohibition exploits, Haynes doubted that the matter had been “presented to him in such 
light as to arouse requisite interest.”17 Hays had his men look into the matter. He had 
reason to tread lightly. Federal enforcement of prohibition was given to the Treasury 
Department under Andrew Mellon, whose final word presided over the wartime 
admissions tax on motion pictures. For its first seven years, prohibition enforcement 
duties were left to one unit in the bureau of internal revenue,18 a small corner in an 
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17 Haynes to Hays, August 7, 1923. WHHP, Vol. 1, Reel 11. 
18 That the IRS enforced prohibition underscores the state’s tendency to regulate cultural industries along 
traditional economic lines. Most federal film censorship legislation would have delegated enforcement 
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otherwise vastly different bureaucracy. Mellon had little interest in prohibition 
enforcement, frequently clashing with Haynes and his thoroughly corrupt, underfunded, 
and ineffective unit. The principal concern for the movie czar was whether fellow 
Republican Mellon had been portrayed fairly in the book. In a memo to Hays, K. L. Russell 
writes that the book makes mention of “hinderance through prejudice of some judges, 
but this is entirely impersonal.” Russell concludes that Haynes’ book—packed with 
righteous bravado and dangerous rum raids—would “make inviting material for films.”19 
Thomas Ince thought so as well, struck a verbal agreement to adapt the prohibition czar’s 
exploits, and quickly began production on December 14, 1923.20  
 Haynes’ conception of a “properly directed” film industry would “lend itself to a 
great production which will include many features that might by certain critics be termed 
propaganda.” For Haynes, Hollywood’s service to the prohibition cause would be “a great 
American picture with a strong patriotic appeal” that might show “the peaks of society, 
where our chief difficulties are, and which presented our best opportunities for portrayal 
along a dignified and constructive line.” The upward appeal of class on the screen—both 
dignified and constructive—had long been present in American movies, but rarely were 
they expressed by government officials. Haynes saw a film adaptation of Prohibition 
Inside Out as a historical epic on a grand scale, with a production budget to match. “The 
figure of Lincoln,” Haynes wrote to Hays, “with various quotations from him delineating 
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his attitude, might be worked through the scenario.”21 The tremendous success of the 
industry-changing blockbuster The Birth of a Nation seems not far from the picture 
Haynes had in mind—American cinema oriented firmly toward “100% Americanism” and 
the glorification of the past, only this time with direct oversight from Washington.  
 But the industry had shifted decisively from the instruments of propaganda that 
had been fashioned for the Great War.22 Ince’s writers had stripped Haynes’ book of 
anything remotely propagandistic or even political, reworking Prohibition Inside Out into 
a “straight dramatic feature” retitled Those Who Dance. The speed at which Hollywood 
worked overwhelmed the bureaucrat. Production of Those Who Dance starring Blanche 
Sweet was well underway by the time Haynes had caught word. Incensed that Ince had 
gone ahead with production without his approval, Haynes worked his contacts in 
Washington. Using Hays as an intermediary, Haynes insisted Ince had been enthusiastic 
over the picture and had indicated that “there would be no trouble to put in all of the 
propaganda feature [sic] in the film that we felt necessary.”23 Haynes demanded either 
changes to the story or a large cash settlement. Ince wrote to Hays in January, 1924, to 
explain his side of the issue, arguing that it would not be “practicable or safe” to produce 
and distribute “the production of a propaganda picture … that told the true story of liquor 
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and that carried the sanction and endorsement of the official Washington Government.” 
Distributors were wary of a movie on such a divisive political issue, and, as Ince put it, a 
movie that advertised the prohibition commissioner as co-author “would seriously injure 
its popular reception.”24 Moreover, the connection between a top government official 
and such a commercial venture “might precipitate Congressional action, not only to his 
serious embarrassment, but to my financial interest as well.”25  
 In the end, the movie adaptation of the prohibition czar’s thrilling exploits was 
reworked into a safer, fictionalized product of the Hollywood dream factory, not the 
instrument of propaganda Haynes had hoped for. Haynes continued to press for financial 
remuneration, threatening to bring the Ince interests to court after the unexpected death 
of the producer in November 1924. Liquor evil on the screen showed the limitations of a 
state-directed cinema in the early 1920s. First National released Those Who Dance, first 
in Des Moines, and then in New York, but the movie failed to return its investment.26 
Despite positive reviews, the public found it a little too propagandistic. 
 Haynes’ days as the top federal enforcer were numbered. Public outcry over the 
incompetence of prohibition enforcement led to a major shakeup of the Treasury 
Department unit in 1924 and 25. Enforcement was reorganized into its own bureau and 
a concerted effort was made to turn back the corruption and organized crime that swirled 
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around illegal liquor. The relationship Hays had cultivated with Haynes proved to be a 
waste of time—the personal patronage given to Haynes meant nothing to the new 
prohibition officials, who regarded the movies as an instigator of wet sentiment. The 
situation came to a head during the spring congressional session of 1926, when, for the 
first time in 10 years, Congress weighed two bills on the establishment of federal film 
censorship. The Upshaw bill, authored by dry champion and Georgia representative 
William David Upshaw, called for nearly total government control over the film industry, 
establishing a film board of six commissioners under the Bureau of Education to oversee 
film content and control distribution prices to exhibitors. It was as one observer 
commented “the apex of the blue-nose philosophy.”27  
 The MPPDA’s Washington men—Jack Connolly and Charles Pettijohn—went to 
work, lobbying individual members of the House Education committee. Washington was 
at the same time overrun by prohibitionists and anti-prohibitionists in the spring of 
1926, as Congress debated numerous bills over the fate of legal liquor. After testifying in 
favor of film censorship in front of the House Education Committee, Reverend Canon 
Chase and Maude Aldrich of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union made personal 
visits to the wet and dry hearings in the Senate, arguing that movie culture was just as 
responsible for the erosion of morality and rise in crime that afflicted America. 
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Pettijohn—who personally had no patience for the dry cause—insisted Hays do 
something to reign in his “dry friends” in Washington. Pettijohn did not mince words: 
In view of the splendid treatment the Dry forces have received from the 
motion picture industry, it is about time they “stop kicking our dog 
around.” If anybody wants to make this country wet just turn the news 
reels loose for sixty days and let them reach fifty to sixty million people 
each week with wet propaganda. These Drys ought to thank god you are 
sitting where you are.28  
 
The Association could still wield the threat of propaganda, though it was no more than a 
bluff. Public opinion had begun to turn against the dry crusade, but the industry could 
not yet afford to take on the still powerful prohibitionists. Hays contacted Wheeler and 
Nicholson of the ASL for some assistance. Nicholson replied that the ASL cannot “take 
up any matter that is not directly concerned with the prohibition issue” but nonetheless 
requested that Hays send him “more direct information … as to just what has been done 
in getting the motion picture concerns to eliminate anti-prohibition propaganda from 
the screens.” This no doubt frustrated Hays, an abstemious conservative, who firmly 
believed that the Association’s leadership had a tremendous effect on cleaning up the 
screens and incentivizing producers to make better movies.  
 Wet and dry forces were confronted with serious limitations in their conceptions 
of movie propaganda. How Prohibition Inside Out became Those Who Dance is a powerful 
indication that federal prohibition enforcement found it impossible to refashion the 
machinery of commercial cinema toward dry propaganda—state limitations of influence 
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that would have been hard to imagine in the progressive era or World War I. Dry 
crusaders outside government regarded commercial cinema as soaked in wet 
propaganda, despite a lack of evidence—the regulatory impulse of social reform was still 
working to link together liquor and the movies as sources of social ill. It was up to Hays 
and the Association to articulate an anti-propaganda position that could protect 
commercial interests but do so in way that signaled the industry was morally responsible.  
 On July 12, 1926, the MPPDA released the statement that “no picture be allowed 
to enter any shot of drinking scenes, manufacture or sale of liquor, or undue effects of 
liquor … which can be construed as being brought in unnecessarily as a type of 
propaganda.”29 The sympathetic movie press jumped on the news. “Goodbye, 
Bootleggers! The motion picture of the future is to be as dry as the Sahara,” wrote Louella 
Parsons for the Baltimore American.30 “Film Act to Respect Dry Law Religiously,” wrote 
the New York World.31 These gentlemen’s agreements between producers were never 
ironclad but they did serve to keep the reformers at arm’s length while the industry 
developed economically. Again, the essential component here was articulating a social 
function for the film industry that cut against any “type of propaganda” in screen 
content. The dry attacks of 1926 and 27 emphasized the antagonisms that remained 
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30 Clipping from Baltimore American, July 4, 1926, in: WHHP, vol. 1, reel 27. 
31 Clipping from Ibid. 
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between the reform sentiment and the American film industry. In some sense, the liquor 
and movie wars of the 1910s carried over into the 1920s through the politics of publicity.  
 The MPPDA pursued the familiar tactic of publicizing the movies as a substitute 
for the saloon, but headlines like “Motion Pictures fight the Saloon” from the Cotton and 
Cotton Oil News of Dallas, Texas, were not exactly earth shattering exposes from major 
sources32 Hays also reassessed his political leverage in Washington, insinuating privately 
that Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon had financial interests in illegal distillery 
operations, leverage that could be used both with regards to prohibition and to Treasury 
tax policies for the film industry.33 Hays was also interested in stealing away rising legal 
star Mabel Walker Willebrandt from the federal prohibition enforcement office. 
Willebrandt, a Stanford trained lawyer who did eventually provide counsel for the film 
industry in the 1950s, would be a “distinct addition to any organization,” wrote Hays to 
interested parties, “[w]e have no opening now and if we had I would consider it very 
fortunate, indeed, if we could get her.”34  
 The real political work was, of course, done in Washington, where the House 
Education Committee debated the fate of the Upshaw bill. Pettijohn provided testimony 
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give the film industry further tax relief, opting to give the auto industry relief instead: Jack Connolly to 
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to the committee while Connolly worked the back channels, moving from office to office 
shoring up allies, horse trading, and reminded friends of old favors. The Upshaw bill 
didn’t stand a chance—it was defeated in committee by fourteen votes to one.35 The dry 
attacks on the movies faded for the time being, only to reemerge in the last years of 
prohibition when liquor’s presence was increasingly noticeable on American movie 
screens. But the movies were responding to a changing culture in America—the dry 
crusade had exhausted itself and proved a monumental failure. The American public, 
suffering in the economic free fall of the Great Depression, responded to the reform 
sentiment and state regulatory authority over liquor with “we want beer.” By then, the 
movies were listening.   
 
The Enemy of Your Friends: Hollywood and the KKK 
In 1923, Julius Rosenwald, the Chicago millionaire and owner of Sears and 
Roebuck Company, wrote to Will Hays with a proposal to improve the image of American 
Jewish identity. Rosenwald described the increasingly intolerant political environment 
in America: 
Five years ago, we were greeted with a friendly tolerance, and a spirit of 
equality. Today we find ourselves discriminated against, maligned in the 
public press … Day by day we see this Anti-Semitic spirit grow … Since 
Henry Ford kindled the flame, the conflagration had spread. The Ku Klux 
Klan is a natural corollary and we expect further and more vicious 
manifestations of this spirit of the insidious propaganda against us is 
permitted to gain force … We must meet anti-Jewish propaganda with 
pro-Jewish propaganda—and here are the means. 
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Rosenwald suggested coordinated efforts on the part of Jewish producers could ensure 
“a certain proportion of the productions … will contain a likable Jewish character … [in] 
otherwise American or Christian environs.” The plan called for producers to designate 
“one man best fitted for the purpose” of developing stories that included likable Jewish 
characters. Rosenwald believed that racial and ethnic appearances should not be 
eliminated but rather turned toward tolerance. “Racial types,” wrote Rosenwald, “as 
shown in the drama or photoplay, have always impressed upon the audiences certain 
characteristic features. Before the war, for instance, a German character was never, to 
the writer’s knowledge, shown upon the stage or screen in an uncomplimentary way. The 
German might have been hard-headed, stubborn, but always kindly and beneficent, so 
that one almost, through force of habit, would refer to a German as ‘a good-natured old 
German.’ Why can’t we do this much for the Jew?”36  
 Hays believed, however, that such a proposal could do great damage to the 
industry, as it would “inevitably be received as organized propaganda.” Hays responded 
to Rosenwald with telling words on the limitations of propaganda in the commercial film 
industry, writing that “I have no reason to think that, in the motion pictures, a Jewish 
character is handled on any prescribed basis, good or bad. […] The motion picture must 
avoid all propaganda: benevolent or malevolent. To assist in seeing that it achieves that 
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… is my task.”37 Eliminating racial and ethnic prescriptions in American movies was not 
only impossible, but a task that underscored a fundamental tension in screen 
representation: the inherent conflict between representation and production of racial 
and ethnic identities. How could the movies simply reflect such identities without “any 
prescribed basis”? What was the relationship between these unadulterated reflections of 
life and the productive reinforcement of cultural self-perception? For Hays, these 
questions were treated as merely academic—the screen’s racial and ethnic identities 
could be faithfully guided by an associational approach to market competition, the same 
economic strategies guiding screen morality. Bound together in this economic 
development are propaganda, race, and shifting definitions of moral code. Tolerance 
would emerge from trade industry agreements designed to white wash the screens of 
racial and ethnic identity, an overtly political function to cinema, and threats to the 
moral center. The movie industry’s attempts to delimit the political function of the 
screen must in itself be understood as a political strategy. In this white washing of 
American screens, conservative Republicans made the movies liberal. 
 Prohibition was the Frankenstein of the reform sentiment left to a 1920s American 
political culture ill-equipped to force America dry, something only a national spirit of 
progressivism could attain. That spirit seemed suddenly an anachronism, but effects of 
public mobilization—both from the war on the saloon and the war in Europe—remained 
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in rural, small town, and urban America. A guiding principle of the ASL’s crusade against 
liquor was a willingness to work with anyone—wet or dry, Republican or Democrat—who 
could line up the votes. This ruthless approach to political power was carried over as the 
guiding spirit behind Klan recruitment—white protestant men across both parties and 
both sides of the liquor question joined the hooded fraternity. As we will see in the Klan 
deals cut with Hollywood, the Klan was willing to compromise other principles for 
political gain.  
 The Indiana Anti-Saloon League was a highly active and visible organization 
through the 1910s, but members drifted even as early as 1916 when the dry crusade went 
national. By 1920, they were still a well-organized political force by the time the Klan 
started recruiting in the state in the early 1920s. Journalist R. L. Duffus, in writing of the 
Indiana’s Klan emergence, notes that the IASL mobilized by “drilling their followers to 
take orders and to apply the single test of wetness or dryness to candidates for public 
office.” This “large group of voters” had become “accustomed to act en masse and to 
disregard incidental questions of right and wrong.”38 Duffus was one of the few non-Klan 
outsiders to observe meetings, rallies, and marches, witnessing firsthand the ways in 
which dry mobilization could be reoriented toward the fraternal order of white 
supremacy’s invisible empire that claimed unrivaled fidelity to the nation and flag.39 
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Nationally and in Indiana, prohibition and the Klan were left to a fractured Republican 
Party that nonetheless dominated politics for much of the 1920s. Despite continued 
electoral threats from La Follette, the progressive wing of the party had effectively been 
contained, but party in-fighting over the Klan had only just begun.  
 From 1915 to 1920, the Ku Klux Klan was not a powerful or national organization. 
Under its founder, William Simmons, the Klan was a small, Southern based fraternal 
organization that lacked a modern public relations office or a hierarchical and 
modernized bureaucracy. In 1920, Simmons hired two professional publicity agents—
Edward Young Clark and Elizabeth Tyler—who set about reorganizing the Klan toward 
open recruitment and national exposure.40 Crucial to this reorganization was a change in 
initiation fees, in which recruiters were awarded a portion of the money paid by each 
newly initiated member they brought into the order.41 This Ponzi scheme of reactionary 
nativism was a phenomenal success, filling the Klan’s coffers and encouraging Klan 
proselytizers to comb far and wide for sympathetic white protestants. Klan elites built 
small fortunes and armed fiefdoms; their excess became legendary. By the middle of the 
1920s, millions of Americans had joined the movement, and two thirds of all Klan 
members came from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.42  
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Klan Recruitment and Movie Propaganda 
William Simmons had been using his favorite movie, The Birth of a Nation, to 
recruit members to the hooded order as early as its Atlanta opening in December 1915. 
Though Birth did not yet make its Atlanta premiere when Simmons christened the new 
Klan at Stone Mountain in the fall of 1915, it had already played in Knoxville and 
Chattanooga, Tennessee; Spartanburg, South Carolina; Asheville, North Carolina and a 
dozen other cities of the South.43 Simmons, moreover, was well aware of Dixon’s play and 
the phenomenal run Birth was enjoying across the country. The spirit of Klan revival was 
in the air and Simmons, an unassuming ex-preacher and insurance salesman who lacked 
both charisma and organizing skill, sensed an opportunity. The Atlanta Constitution first 
published the arrival of Birth on December 4, 1915, and in the same edition Simmons 
placed an ad announcing the rebirth of the Klan as a “high class order for men of 
intelligence and character.”44 The December 6 premiere at the Atlanta Theater was a 
rousing success. Simmons’ newly formed hooded order paraded down Peachtree Street, 
stopping in front of the theater and firing off rifle salutes in front of the large lines 
forming at the box office. Birth screenings continued to aid southern recruitment to the 
Klan for the next five years. Simmons himself returned again and again to watch the film 
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in Atlanta, coaxing free admission out of the theater manager and often bringing along 
potential Klan recruits.45  
 Simmons considered Griffith’s blockbuster an important tool of propaganda in 
Georgia and the rest of the Deep South, but it was only after Edward Young Clarke and 
Elizabeth Tyler signed on as publicists that the Klan pushed movie propaganda in the 
north, sometimes through private screening engagements and at other times through 
revival screenings at commercial movie theaters. Special return engagements of Birth to 
two New York City theaters aided recruiting efforts there in February 1922.46 In December 
of 1922, Birth again returned, this time to the Selwyn Theater. New York censors, 
concerned about the relationship between the film and the growing Klan movement, 
reconsidered the film. Griffith, for his part, offered further modifications: 
The two-day controversy between Griffith and the state picture 
commission, settled by the producer saying a title would be inserted to 
the effect that the management disavowed any connection with the 
present Klan, or an announcement would be made, concluded in the title 
being flashed. It was not a slide, but incorporated into the film. It stated 
that after the reconstruction of the South, following the Civil War, the 
originators of the Klan put away their uniforms and disbanded the 
organization forever.47 
 
 
Exhibitors, however, had begun to worry about the Klan’s connections to the film and 
the ongoing, increasingly successful, protests against its showing. “Aroused over the 
rumor” that Birth was rereleased through Klan pressure, exhibitors asked Griffith to 
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“withdraw the picture from general release.”48 United Artists, who by this time had taken 
over the rights to the film from the Aitken Brothers and Epoch Producing, balked at such 
a suggestion. Birth was a masterpiece and blockbuster, not a Klan recruitment movie, 
they insisted. The idea that Birth aided the new Klan was unavoidable for the film 
industry press, who nonetheless suggested that Simmons’ Klan was merely “a little 
crowd of coin-getters in the south” who seized on the images of “spectacular and 
thrilling white masked costumed riding Klansmen” for their own personal gain.49  
As film historian Melvyn Stokes as pointed out, from 1915 to 1920 the Klan was 
still a southern regional organization with moderate to slow growth during the peak 
earning years and availability of Birth.50 This chronology tempers the notion that Birth 
was a crucial factor in the nationalization of the Klan after 1920. By the 1921, Klan 
incursions in almost every state in the north and west of the country used several 
propaganda films, including Birth, in their recruitment drives. In some cases these 
exhibitions were free, as when the Tillamook County Fair in Oregon provided free 
showings of Birth in September 1922.51 Simmons would be ousted in November 1922 by 
Texan dentist Hiram Wesley Evans, spending the rest of his life in relative seclusion, 
obsessively watching and rewatching The Birth of a Nation in his private exhibition room. 
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Movie producers, vaudeville comedians, and the legitimate theater crowd all used 
the Klan as timely material for cultural commentary, often with biting, critical effect. 
Louis B. Mayer capitalized on the Klan with his picture One Clear Call, released in the 
summer of 1922, a “sure fire money getter at the box office” with “a touch of the Ku-Klux 
Klan that serves as a thrill.”52  
 
 Fig. 10. Advertisement for Louis B. Mayer’s One Clear Call in MPW, Aug. 26, 1922 
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But “lukewarm reviews, plus a lack of drawing names” sunk One Clear Call, 
“despite the accentuation of the Ku Klux Klan episodes in the Stanley Co.’s ads.”53 Some 
vaudeville performers complained that competitors were stealing their new Klan angles 
and jokes.54 One escape artist performed his usual routine of breaking out of a suspended 
metal cage with a new twist: he did it dressed in the white robes of a Kluxer. Several anti-
Klan plays were produced, but most failed miserably. One play, Behind the Mask, based 
off of the Klan exposé written by Major C. Anderson Wright, hoped to both capitalize on 
and expose the Klan phenomenon. The play broke records for the lowest box offices in 
Syracuse (total gate on opening night: $14) and Montreal before shutting down.55 Wright 
tried again in late 1922 with a new play called Masked Men, but this too proved a dismal 
failure in Wilmington, Delaware and Baltimore showings.56 
In Atlanta, Clarke had his own plans for an epic Klan movie. Working with Clifford 
Slater Wheeler, a Klansman and president of Wheeler Productions, Inc., Clarke planned 
a $400,000 “propaganda picture” called Yesterday, To-day and Forever, a pro-Klan 
spectacle “designed to rival The Birth of a Nation in splendor.”57 But exhibitors again 
chafed at the prospect of more censorship and agitation such a movie would undoubtedly 
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bring. Queried on the prospects of showing the movie, exhibitors replied with “a 
surprising number of refusals to handle the subject.” Producer Mark Dintenfass was later 
attached to the project, but with distributors wary and exhibitors giving unequivocal 
signs they would not screen it, Yesterday was shelved.58  
 Perhaps an even more important film to the nationalization of the Klan was The 
Face at Your Window (1920), an anti-Bolshevik sensationalist movie produced by Fox. 
This currently-lost feature film told the story of two factory owners, one a ruthless 
capitalist who oppresses his workers and the other fair and labor-friendly. The son of the 
friendly owner falls in love with a factory worker and Russian immigrant who eventually 
decides to spy on her fellow Russian laborers. When “Comrade Kelvin” arrives in town to 
agitate the laborers for revolution, members of the American Legion ride horseback 
through town clad in bed sheets to quell the Bolshevik uprising.59 The movie was released 
on November 14, 1920, and played in small cities and towns through the spring of 1921.60 
In Indiana, just as the Klan began a major campaign in the Hoosier state, The Face at Your 
Window was exhibited in towns such as Greencastle and South Bend.61 For some 
observers, the film managed to be anti-capitalist and anti-labor at once, and ultimately 
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proved a failure at the box office, losing in excess of $100,000 for Fox.62 The pro-labor 
Machinists’ Monthly Journal described the film as an “insidious viper … void of reason.”63 
The poet Carl Sandburg wrote sardonically that the movie provides about as much 
enlightenment as “the physical results that follow the imbibing of wood alcohol. […] As 
propaganda it fails as hysterics always fail. ‘Keep your shirt on,’ was not the slogan in 
making this picture.”64 Two years after its release, The Face at Your Window returned to 
theaters with a new marketing campaign. The Regent of Kansas City, a 10 cent house, 
may have been one of the first to rerelease Face as a Klan film: 
The management of the Regent, a ten-cent 12th-street house, put one over 
for a few days. An old thriller, “The Face at Your Window,” was dug up 
and advertised as “All About the Ku Klux Klan,” “The Invisible Empire.” 
The quoted titles were heavily displayed and created a sensation, as all 
films dealing with the Klan are under a ban. City Censor Larkin compelled 
all references to the Klan and the name on the electric sign to be taken 
out.65 
 
Klan movies were the site of a minor controversy in Kansas City that summer. A pro-Klan 
three-reeler called The Mysterious Eyes of the Ku Klux Klan, which appeared to be nothing 
more than documentary footage of a Klan rally in Oklahoma, was banned by the city 
censor. The ban only incited Kansas City moviegoers to seek out treatments on the 
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controversial subject, as the surprising success of the “old thriller” Face suggests. Such 
bans, coupled with the inability of the Klan leadership to produce their own film, opened 
up the possibility of rebranding the anti-Bolshevik Face as a pro-Klan picture.  
But it was the non-commercial Klan recruitment exhibitions of The Face at Your 
Window that gave the movie greater exposure and new political purpose. Luther Ivan 
Powell, a powerful Klan leader in the Pacific Northwest, had a copy of the film and 
exhibited it numerous times for would-be Klansmen at his Seattle headquarters. The 
Reverend Rueben H. Sawyer likely borrowed Powell’s copy for free exhibition at the 
municipal auditorium in Portland Oregon on December 22, 1921. Sawyer’s public speech 
“The Truth About the Ku Klux Klan” was attended by 6,000 Portlanders, creating a 
sensation. More lectures and exhibitions followed in Portland in the following months, 
proving so popular that “overflow crowds posed a serious civic problem.”66 Sawyer’s Klan 
campaign headed south to Eugene on January 7, 1922, when hooded Kluxers paraded 
down Willamette Street before lighting a massive flaming cross on Skinner’s Butte, 
overlooking the city. The following day, crowds formed at the Eugene Theatre to pay 50 
cents admission for Sawyer’s lecture and a double feature—“Eight Reels of Thrilling 
Pictures with a Message of Warning to American Manhood and Womanhood”—of The 
Face at Your Window and an obscure short titled The Ku Klux Klan Rides Again.67 Powell’s 
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print of The Face at Your Window was also projected in Roseburg, Oregon, on April 1, 
1922. After the screening, a white mob formed outside the theater circulating the rumor 
that a local black man, Sam Jackson, had insulted white women while drunk. The mob 
marched through Roseburg looking for Jackson but could not locate him. The following 
day local law enforcement instructed him to leave town and never return.68 The film was 
also used in recruitment drives in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan by Klan organizer 
Robert Lyons.69  
 As prints of The Face at Your Window began to wear down with repeated use, Fox 
distribution started refusing rentals. Klan recruiters requested a copy of the film from 
distribution exchanges in Chicago, Memphis, Rochester, and Minneapolis, only to be 
denied every time.70 In January 1926, just as the Klan was completing its spectacular 
implosion, Klan organizer Paul J. Heedwohl sent a letter to Fox and Hays asking for 
assistance in securing a print. The movie, Heedwohl wrote, “is very good propaganda to 
rebuild the Klan organization, and which will ultimately benefit the Republican Party.” 
Heedwohl had led the Terre Haute Klavern and had spent the last year combining 
“stalwart Republicans with our organization” in a campaign against progressive Robert 
La Follette: “[H]ad it been possible to have had this film in the State of Wisconsin at that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Eugenians in early 1916, was later renamed the Heilig Theater. With the central roof beam sagging, the 
structure was deemed unsafe by city officials and torn down in the early 1970s. 
68 Toy, KKK in Oregon, 70; The Oregonian, April 3, 1922. 
69 Lutholtz, Grand Dragon, 322-24. 
70 Paul Heedwohl to Noble Johnson, December 7, 1925, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 24.  
	  
227	  
particular time I am sure we would have cut down his plurality vote more than we did.” 
Such a film, wrote Heedwohl, could be part of an Indiana campaign to rebuild the fissures 
in the Republican Party since “the Klan came to the rescue of the Republican Party in the 
last National election.” According to Heedwohl, the Fox Film Corporation “is aware of 
the possibilities that there are with this film” and it would be “no doubt hard to induce 
[Fox] to release this film, for the fact that they are not in harmony with the Klan 
organization.”71 Though Heedwohl didn’t ask directly, the letter clearly indicates his 
hope that Hays could pressure Fox into releasing a print to the Invisible Empire. Noble 
Johnson, U. S. congressman from Terre Haute, also wrote to Hays regarding the 
Heedwohl matter, urging the movie czar to help out his hometown friend.72 Hays, 
unsurprisingly, rebuffed this request by positioning the movies against any form of 
propaganda. In a curt reply to Heedwohl drafted while he was bound for Hollywood by 
train, Hays wrote that “I am very sure … that none of our companies would be interested 
in making a film for any definite propaganda or political purpose. They are very 
conscientious about this.”73  
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Riding the Fence: Hays and the Klan in Indiana 
In the solid south, the Klan was a creature of the Democratic Party, but in the 
north, particularly in states like Indiana and Oregon, the Klan tended to be dominated 
by Republicans. In Indiana, Governor Ed Jackson and Senators James Watson and Arthur 
Robinson were Republicans and Klansmen. The state assemblies of 1922 and 1924 were 
dominated by the Republican Klan. Republicans accounted for 84 of the 100 members of 
the Indiana House and 32 of the 50 members of the Senate. L. W. “Jack” Henley, Hays’ 
former secretary, wrote to Hays that “[m]ore than 50 per cent of the Republicans who 
will be in that Assembly are either active members of the KKK or in full sympathy with 
its aims.”74 By 1924, the Klan was nearing almost total control of the party in Indiana. 
“There is a real danger that the Republican Party in Indiana will be swallowed up by the 
Ku Klux Klan in the coming primary,” wrote Henley to his former boss Hays, “[i]f a 
Klansman is nominated for governor there will be 10,000 negroes in the state who will 
not vote for him.”75 Historian William Giffin has shown how black voter realignments in 
1920s Indiana presaged national realignments after 1932. The historical understanding 
of a sudden shift in black voters away from the GOP in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
first term belies an earlier and more complex shift in voting patterns influenced by the 
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rise of the KKK.76 The Republican principle of equality before the law had all but 
disappeared from the party platform by the 1920s, replaced with a more robust and 
corporate pro-business platform combined with low key social policy alignments in 
women’s suffrage and prohibition. The Klan was by this time no regional, populist, 
vigilante organization, but an upwardly aspiring fraternal order for white protestant 
professionals and community leaders. The GOP–Klan union was both a marriage of kind 
and of convenience.  
 Will Hays was a conservative joiner: a leader in the Presbyterian church, he was a 
Mason, Shriner, Rotarian, and member of the Indiana Anti-Saloon League. These 
politically active and conservative upper middle class professionals were precisely the 
type of individuals who found the Klan appealing in the 1920s. As the organization grew, 
much of its populist flavor was submerged under a more conservative and economically 
privileged membership body and leadership. Was Will Hays a Klansman? It was certainly 
a question Zukor and other movie men thought about with the Klan at its peak. In January 
1925, letters accusing Hays of encouraging “the growth and spread of this anti-Jewish 
organization throughout the northern states” were sent to Paramount and other studios 
from a man calling himself Joseph Zimmerman of Toledo Ohio. The letters were sent 
with an enclosed copy of a 1919 telegram from Edward Young Clark to Elizabeth Tyler 
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stating that the former had a “very satisfactory meeting” with Hays, who was in Atlanta 
developing Klan ties that could break the “Solid South” Democratic Party monopoly.77  
 The historical record provides no certainty either way, but despite a close private 
and public relationship with Walter Bossert—a prominent Indiana Klansman who 
deposed the notorious D. C. Stephenson as the state’s Grand Dragon—most of Hays’ 
important political contacts were men like Harry S. New, former governor James 
Goodrich, and the “Ohio Gang,” part of a dwindling Old Guard of conservative 
Republicans who tended to look upon the Klan with some measure of disdain. Moreover, 
Hays does not appear among the names of Indiana Klansman in previously undiscovered 
Klan documents that emerged in the mid-1960s.78 Although the Klan gained many 
members from the professional Republican middle class, there were a number of men in 
the elite Republican establishment, particularly those connected to national politics, 
who saw the Klan as a threat to the existing order of patronage and privilege. It seems 
likely that the affable Hays, always loathe to find himself embroiled in party conflicts, 
negotiated a middle ground, aiding Bossert where he could, using Klan power when it 
aided the film industry, and otherwise quietly building up conservative Republicanism 
amidst America’s nativist reawakening. 
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 Bossert did most of his work for Hays in moving the Klan-dominated state 
legislatures of Indiana and Oregon away from Sunday blue laws and movie censorship. 
In Indiana, Hays successfully scuttled Sunday closing and film censorship bills in the 
House committees with the help of Bossert, who had a legal practice in Indianapolis. 
There is some indication that Hays in turn aided Bossert in his inter-Klan conflict with 
David Curtis Stephenson. Stephenson was a Texan-born self-promoter, who fashioned 
himself a socialist agitator, printer, or salesman in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Iowa before 
rising from obscurity to dominate the Indiana Klan. His main preoccupation—and 
ultimate downfall—was womanizing and liquor. An unauthored file on Stephenson sent 
to Hays, likely by Bossert, described Stephenson as a “dangerous element” who had two 
failed marriages, allegations of fraud, and several failed business ventures that left locals 
holding the bag while the charismatic Texan moved on to another town and life.79 After 
a brief stint in wartime service, the twenty-nine-year-old Stephenson managed to marry 
for a third time and settle in Evansville, Indiana in 1920.  
 Oregon and Indiana follow a pattern in which the Klan “seemed to grow most 
rapidly in areas with the least cause for civic alarm and where opposition to its principles 
was slightest.”80 This indicates an important spatial dimension to the rise of the 20s Klan, 
that the movement was most intense in places farthest removed from diversity shows a 
collapsing effect of social responses brought about by technological change, particularly 
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motion pictures and automobiles. Hamlets of “100% Americanism” were not threatened 
by an invasion of others, despite the hysteria—that invasion only appeared real because 
America’s previously more isolated networks of rural, small town, and urban 
communities were becoming more interconnected. Labor migration within the country 
had increased after World War I, but such patterns actually aided Klan recruitment in 
several instances, making it easier for Klan recruiters to infiltrate small towns and cities. 
 Within a chaotic social milieu still reeling from wartime mobilization and 
substantial labor migration, Stephenson was able to impress himself on community 
leaders almost immediately. The war and increasing automobile ridership had 
profoundly effected small town life in America, only a few generations removed from a 
time when the settlement of outsiders in a place like Evansville would have been more 
noticeable and unusual. Stephenson’s ability to remake himself and start anew was 
greatly aided by this social change. When Klan recruiter Joseph Huffington arrived in 
Evansville, Stephenson was quickly singled out for his charisma and political energy. 
Within a year, he was able to work his way into the inner circle of the rapidly growing 
Indiana Klan. His populist message was infused with a political paranoia that set 
disaffected white nativism against the “establishment.” From his palatial Indianapolis 
office on the third floor of the S.S. Kresge building, Stephenson claimed to have a direct 
line to the president of the United States, that snipers were stationed on the rooftops of 
nearby buildings hoping for a chance to assassinate him, and that with Indiana politics 
	  
233	  
in his firm grasp, the next stop would be the White House itself.81 While Mussolini was 
rising to power in Italy and Hitler was writing Mein Kampf in a Landsberg prison cell, 
Stephenson was strategizing on his own All-American brand of fascism.  
 Stephenson had a powerful ally in Senator Watson and was a fierce rival of Hays’ 
confidante Walter Bossert. These divisions fractured the Indiana GOP in the 1920s, with 
Governor Jackson, Watson, and Robinson in varying degrees of alliance against old guard 
Republicans like Hays, Goodrich, and New, more closely aligned with the national party 
and Coolidge.82 Indiana was not the only state in which the Klan infiltrated the 
Republican Party. The 1924 electoral season was dominated by the Klan question. In 
October Hays sent out a telegram to 20 close Republican friends asking for updates on 
races and the political environment locally, particularly in relation to the Klan. Most of 
the responses show varying degrees of anti-Klan sentiment, giving some indication of 
the wider Republican circles Hays traveled in. Fred Miller of South Bend responded that 
“Indiana probably will have more split tickets than in any other election in its history 
due to the intense feeling against the Klan … it looks as if the Klan influence is sufficient 
to elect the Republican gubernatorial nominee but his plurality will be greatly below the 
Republican national ticket.”83 “We have a bad Klan fight here,” wrote Charles Rawson of 
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Iowa, who noted that local papers were lining up Coolidge with the Klan, and that 
“consequently, some of our big merchants who had promised to contribute to the 
campaign are refusing.”84 In Caspar, Wyoming, Patrick Sullivan wrote to Hays that 
“[t]here is an intensely bitter Ku Klux feeling in Denver. Notwithstanding that, it looks 
to me like the Republican Senators would be elected.”85 In Indiana, Robert Tucker of 
Indianapolis wrote that “[p]olls taken in every city of the state indicate a loss to Jackson 
among the better class of people. This is due to the anti-Klan movement which is growing 
every day.” Tucker described the scene at the Indianapolis Republican Party 
headquarters: 
The third floor is given over largely to the Jackson campaign. The 
Coolidge Campaign is conducted from the ninth floor. There is a strong 
Klan element on the third floor which is doing everything within its power 
to elect Jackson.86  
 
Bert Morgan, Prohibition Commissioner of Indiana, cast the divisions in the GOP in 
socio-economic terms: “the business men as a class and a number of regular Republicans 
are against Jackson but when you go out into the factories and mills they are all for him. 
I was out in West Indianapolis recently, the Democratic stronghold, and it looked as 
though there was a Jackson picture in nearly every window.” Although recent scholarship 
on the KKK in the 20th century has convincingly troubled the traditional view that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Rawson to Hays, October 20, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 18. 
85 Sullivan to Hays, October 22, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 18. 
86 Tucker to Hays, October 24, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 18. 
	  
235	  
Klan’s rise was rooted in the rural-urban tensions of 1920s America, the relationship 
between the Invisible Empire and grassroots populism is still murky.87 The Klan did have 
a populist element to its early recruiting successes, but it was without a doubt an 
upwardly aspiring fraternal order that attempted to cobble together an alliance between 
professionals, tradesmen, civil employees, and some workers. Stephenson was likely 
more politically connected than Bossert, at least with Indiana’s presently serving 
politicians, but Bossert’s Klan faction, aided in his alliance with Hays, Goodrich, and 
New, was more nationally connected and better aligned with the Old Guard of the GOP.  
 
The Klan in Detroit 
Bossert worked Republican connections in Michigan with the help of Hays, who 
was asked to “quietly tip off” his connections to get in touch with a Klan recruiter living 
at the Statler Hotel in Detroit. Bossert’s associates in Michigan were “quietly building 
the same kind of machine that we built in Indiana,” but one that could be geared toward 
anti-labor agitation in the increasingly unionized auto industry.88 Detroit, awash in 
bootleg liquor from Ontario and teeming with newly arrived blacks and foreign-born 
Catholics looking for work in the auto industry, was ripe for the Klan’s racial hysteria and 
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moral nativism. Membership grew to about 32,000 by 1924, but resistance to the hooded 
order was strong. The local press was almost entirely anti-Klan and Detroit police made 
a habit out of confiscating the Klan’s own publication, The Fiery Cross, from street 
vendors.89 Additionally, the Burns Law, passed in the summer of 1923, outlawed public 
meetings by masked men.90  
 But the Klan was to make their biggest move in the city by nearly seeing through 
a write-in candidate, Charles Bowles, for city mayor. Bossert was one of the financiers 
and organizers behind Bowles, who he regarded as a “good friend … I would very much 
like to see put across.”91 Bossert asked Hays to send out letters to Republican contacts in 
Michigan urging support for Bowles despite the fact that he had failed to secure the 
Republican nomination. Bowles finished an impressive second in what was intended to 
be a runoff election between John W. Smith and Joseph Martin, garnering over 20,000 
votes ahead of Martin and less than 10,000 shy of the Democratic winner, Smith. The 
Klan whipped up a frenzy with accusations of voting fraud as the official canvass of the 
votes determined that some 17,000 write-in votes were discounted for numerous 
mistakes. Votes could be ruled invalid with the placement of a period after the name or 
an abbreviation of Charles. The Detroit News soon published a list of 120 ways to write 
Charles Bowles that had been discounted.  
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 But Klan anger could not be translated into broader public outcry and 
mobilization, and the Bowles campaign proved the high water mark of the Detroit KKK. 
By 1927, harassed by the press and increasingly unable to keep members connected to 
their local Klaverns, the Klan in Detroit withered to a small band of loyalists. 
Nonetheless, national observers were shocked and dismayed by the relative success of 
the Klan in municipal politics. “In Detroit,” wrote Christian Century, “a Klan write-in 
candidate, almost totally unknown in the city, whose name was not even on the printed 
ballot … came within a few thousand votes of being elected mayor of the fourth city in 
the United States.”92 
 
The Klan in Oregon 
In the U.S. House, Republican gains in Indiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Colorado 
were aided by Klan mobilization within the Republican Party. Oregon’s history of white 
nativist exclusion stretches back to the first settlement of the state. Anti-Catholic 
sentiment was deeply engrained and reflected in Oregon’s Know Nothing and American 
Protective Association movements in the 19th century. The issues of slavery and free 
blacks were especially difficult for Oregon Territory, and in drafting the original 
constitution in 1857, it was decided that these issues would be referred directly to the 
voters. A surviving abstract of the votes in Polk County gives some indication of the 
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sentiment at the time—voters decided overwhelmingly against both slavery (484 to 231) 
and the settlement of free blacks (584 to 53). Oregon’s anti-slavery position was thus 
articulated through racial exclusion: “Most Oregonians equated the presence of blacks 
with the institution of slavery, and wanted no part of either.”93 The final draft and 
approved constitution of the territory banned free blacks, affirmed equal rights of “white 
foreigners,” and granted power to the Oregon legislative assembly to “restrain and 
regulate the immigration to this State.”94 The regulation and maintenance of whiteness 
was thus explicitly codified into Oregon state law.  
 The Oregon Klan grew rapidly following its introduction in Medford sometime in 
1921, and by the 1922 gubernatorial election, the Klan had grown to be the dominant 
mobilizing force within the Republican Party. Klan infiltration in the north was often 
spearheaded through associations with Masonic and Scottish Rite bodies, but this is 
particularly prevalent in Oregon. The notorious public school bill, which sought to 
prohibit private elementary and secondary education, was originally drafted by a 
Portland Scottish Rite lodge. The incumbent governor, Benjamin W. Olcott, was 
vehemently and publicly anti-Klan, issuing an Executive Proclamation against the Klan 
in May, 1922, in which he wrote that “[t]he true spirit of Americanism resents bigotry, 
abhors secret machinations and terrorism and demands that those who speak for and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 “Abstract of Votes, 1857,” Oregon State Archives at Oregon Secretary of State Offices, 
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/echoes/link20.html (accessed on 8/3/2015).  
94 “Original 1857 Constitution of Oregon,” Oregon Blue Book of the Oregon Secretary of State, 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/const.htm (accessed on 8/3/2015). 
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her cause speak openly, with their faces to the sun.”95 His call for public action against 
“masked riders or cloaked and disguised figures” was not well received. He barely 
survived the Republican primary against Klan-backed state senator Charles Hall, and 
when the Klan threw their support to the Democratic nominee Walter M. Pierce, the 
incumbent lost in a landslide. The new Democratic governor proved to be a major 
disappointment for the Republican-leaning Oregon Klan—by 1924, the Klan initiated an 
unsuccessful recall effort against Pierce, who subsequently lost re-election in 1926.  
 Walter Bossert worked his Klan connections in Oregon for the movie czar. The 
Hays office had initially encountered significant troubles in influencing the Oregon 
legislature against Sunday closing laws and state film censorship. Fred Beetson, Hays’ 
new point man in Hollywood, made a special trip up to Portland in early 1925 and 
employed a lobbyist aptly named Kaspar K. Kubli. Kubli was a former state legislator and 
speaker of the House who was recruited into the Klan by Oregon Grand Dragon Fred L. 
Gifford. He was, however, a “drunken low down type of politician” who, after being paid 
for his services, demanded 4 cases of liquor and more money from the Hollywood man. 
Kubli then attended a night session of the Oregon assembly and “was so drunk they had 
to remove him.” The pay offs threatened to be exposed by the incompetent Kubli, who 
proved loose lipped with regards to his Hollywood bag man.  
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 The region’s most powerful exhibitors—Claude C. Jensen and John G. von 
Herberg—were little help to the Association as well. They were men who, according to 
Beetson, enjoyed “the filthiest, foulest possible reputation. They are ex-saloon men of 
the lowest order … They kill their bills, as did the saloon people, with wine, women, and 
money.” The dirty politics of nativist Oregon was threatening to spiral out of control, 
and Bossert was called in by Hays for damage control. Bossert quickly contacted Gifford, 
Oregon’s Grand Dragon, who personally killed the Sunday closing bill in the committee 
and instructed his Klansmen to lay off the movies.96 Gifford wanted the movie czar to 
know just who was responsible for killing the anti-movie bills in Oregon and who really 
controlled the state. “[T]he machine [here in Oregon] is entirely mine and [the bills] could 
have gone either way. I received no word of thanks nor anything else for my efforts there 
and expect in the future to be advised previous to the session of just what my status will 
be in this respect.”97 While Bossert believed that Gifford could be a “very valuable 
contact” for Hays in the future, the movie czar coldly brushed off the Oregon Grand 
Dragon, writing to Bossert that “I never retain anyone anywhere and I cannot in this 
instance.” Hays likely was unaware of the fact that Klan power in Oregon was quickly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Gifford to Bossert, telegram, February 25, 1925, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 20. The telegram could not have put 
it more succinctly: “Bill killed today”; Bossert to Hays, February 26, 1925, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 20; Bossert 
acknowledges receipt of check for work in the “Oregon situation,” Bossert to Hays, March 17, 1925, WHHP, 
vol. 1, reel 21.  
97 Gifford to Bossert, quoted in Bossert to Hays, September 25, 1925, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 23. There is a subtle 
hostility present in Gifford’s messages to Hays through Bossert—Gifford also wanted it known that the 
movie men in Portland “are not our kind of people” and that the work done for Hays would not be 
considered “past history.” Gifford to Bossert, undated copy of letter, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 20.  
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waning, and Gifford was largely powerless. He resigned as Grand Dragon of the Oregon 
Realm sometime in 1925. He briefly returned to the public light in a failed attempt to 
revitalize the Klan in the late 1930s, but largely faded into obscurity.  
 
The Downfall of the Klan in Indiana 
Back in Indiana, Republicans increased their majority in the House (by 22 seats) 
and Senate (by 4 seats) following the 1924 elections. Black Indianans shifted heavily 
toward the Democratic Party—in some black Indianapolis precincts Democrats gained a 
majority for the first time in the history of the city. Ed Jackson, enjoying support from 
both factions of the Klan, was elected Indiana governor with a bigger margin in 
Indianapolis than the state as a whole.98 He presided over a Klan-dominated legislature 
with a veto-proof Republican majority. But Klan glory would be short lived, even in 
Indiana. A significant factor was the inability to approve and sign into law Klan-backed 
legislation—efforts to close Sunday amusements, to prohibit private schooling, and to 
outlaw the wearing of religious garb by schoolteachers all failed. Hays made sure that 
allies such as Jackson, Bossert, and others knew where they should stand on the question 
of Sunday amusements. Hays wanted Bossert especially to have no doubts as to what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The Klan’s greatest presence in Indiana, Colorado, and Oregon was in its largest cities—Indianapolis, 
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should be done with any anti-movie legislation, indicating he would bank roll any 
necessary expenses in such an endeavor.99 
 While Hays was busy with Klan-dominated state legislatures in early 1925, the 
Klan itself was beginning its quick and sudden implosion. Stephenson’s brutal 
kidnapping, forced intoxication, rape, and murder of Madge Oberholtzer in March, 1925, 
set off a public outcry against the Klan and a highly publicized trial in which Stephenson 
was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.100 By 1926, 
Klan membership had plummeted, particularly in northern states like Indiana. The 
prominence of the Stephenson trial was a direct cause of a decisive shift in public 
opinion.101 By 1926, the Klan had ceased to be a national organization with any political 
presence or power.  
 Hays and his Indiana Republican allies had a front row seat to the Klan’s 
implosion: Hays knew Madge Oberholtzer personally; she was employed in the office of 
Bert Morgan along with Martha Hays, Hays’ sister. In the summer of 1924, Morgan wrote 
to Hays informing him that Oberholtzer and her best friend Ermina Moore were making 
a cross country trip to Hollywood, intending to stay at the Hollywood Studio Club, a 
YWCA-sponsored boarding facility intended to provide safe lodging for the many young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Hays to Bossert, February 26, 1925, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 20. 
100 For details on the Stephenson trial, Oberholtzer, and their effect on the downfall of the Klan, see: 
Lutholtz, Grand Dragon. 
101 Lutholtz, Grand Dragon, 211–13. 
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women relocating to Hollywood with hopes of working in the movies.102 Hays took an 
active interest in the Studio Club, which he regarded as a useful instrument in the clean 
up of (or the appearance of cleaning up) Hollywood and the publicity fight against 
reformers. Despite a ban on visitors to the studios, Hays asked Beetson to “have an 
exception made in this case.”103 Six months after her trip to Hollywood, Oberholtzer met 
Stephenson for the first time at a Republican Party fundraiser, and three months after 
that, she would be dead. The forgotten Oberholtzer-Hollywood connection marks a 
tragic irony in America’s 1920s nativism: here was a single young woman driving across 
America to Sin City Hollywood, enjoying the freedom of travel and high society through 
Republican Party contacts, only to be raped and murdered back in small town Indiana by 
the leader of an organization that staked its virtue on the protection of white 
womanhood. But was there more to the story than an ironic coincidence? 
 Lutholtz’s account of the Stephenson trial raises some doubts about his guilt. 
Stephenson, by his own account, accused the Bossert faction of framing him to destroy 
his reputation. He later testified that another woman had been offered $50,000 in the 
summer of 1925 by Bossert ally Robert Lyons to tell a similar story of a violent rape at 
the hands of Stephenson. Stephenson claimed that the woman refused the offer and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Morgan to Hays, July 23, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 17. 
103 Hays office to Morgan, July 25, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 17. By coincidence Hays happened to be in 
Hollywood at this time, and Julia Kelly (Hays’ secretary in New York) informed Morgan that the young 
women could meet Hays in person if they got to Hollywood in time. This seems unlikely, however, as Hays 
left Los Angeles by train on the morning of July 28.  
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contacted him and his lawyers with the story, visiting Stephenson in jail on July 3, 1925. 
That night, the woman, Edith Irene Dean, was found badly beaten and mutilated just off 
a rural road outside her hometown of Noblesville, Indiana. She died from her injuries the 
following morning and no arrests were ever made in her case, though Stephenson 
claimed that she had been followed after her visit to his cell and forced off the road by 
three men, Klan officials Robert McNay, Ray Huffington, and Lyons himself. Lutholtz 
writes that “nearly all of Stephenson’s story [on the murder of Dean] checks out” and 
that the story “goes a good distance toward explaining why Stephenson then, in August, 
was capable of being threatened out of testifying in his own defense.”104 Did Bossert 
frame Stephenson, and if so, was Hays aware of this? Further, did Hays give some help to 
Bossert and Lyons in destroying Stephenson? Hays was in possession of a confidential 
report on Stephenson that focused on his womanizing, propensity for violence, and 
failed marriages. This report was sent to Hays exactly one week after Oberholtzer first 
met Stephenson. That Hays—Bossert’s most powerful political ally—knew Oberholtzer 
before she became a prominent figure in the downfall of Stephenson certainly compels 
one toward speculation, but it is almost certain that any clarity to these mysterious 
connections have been lost to the passage of time.  
 Historian Leonard Moore writes that the disgrace of Stephenson and increasing 
unpopularity of Governor Jackson “provided perfect openings for Indiana’s Republican 
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establishment.” Conservative Republicans, in this view, repudiated Klan infiltration in 
the party just as they had the progressives. Moore continues:  
Once the scandals erupted, Old Guard leaders began a two-year campaign 
to distance the party from the Klan movement and to explain the order’s 
political influence as a particularly insidious episode of political 
corruption. In 1926, an unidentified group of wealthy Republican 
businessmen financed a “secret investigation to find out on whose front 
door the crookedness could be hung.”105  
 
There is no indication, however, that Hays—certainly a leader in Indiana’s GOP Old 
Guard—was actively involved in this campaign, a fact that troubles the historical view of 
a clean repudiation of the Klan by the traditional GOP. It seems very unlikely that Hays, 
now working in private industry, was simply not involved enough in politics back home 
to be a part of the GOP establishment’s reassertion of dominance—his personal papers 
give a clear indication of continued interest and active involvement in Indiana’s political 
affairs. Indeed, Hays continued a close personal relationship with Bossert well after the 
Klan’s demise.  
 Although Stephenson’s political power was destroyed and the Klan widely 
discredited, many prominent Klansmen, particularly those high up in the Bossert faction, 
simply buried their Klan affiliations and carried on with their professional careers. 
Robert Lyons earned a law degree at Indiana University in 1927 and worked as a lobbyist 
for national grocery chain stores in Washington. He lived a life of opulence in 
Indianapolis and kept a suite of offices at the Columbia Club where the most important 
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Indiana Republicans, including Hays, did business. By the 1940s, Lyons was regarded as 
a “kingmaker in Indiana politics” whose secretive dealings became legendary: “What he 
did, whom he talked with on those return trips was known to few—only those whom he 
contacted—although at times word ran like a prairie fire that ‘Bob’ Lyons was in town.”106 
Bossert downplayed his Klan connections after resigning as Grand Dragon in 1926. He 
returned to his legal practice in Indianapolis and remained active in Republican Party 
politics until his death in 1946.  
 The Hays office used its Republican contacts to steer America’s nativism away 
from movie regulation, attaining some measure of social control through political power 
that arose from the coordinated efforts of movie producers and distributors. This 
relationship in turn shaped the development of the Republican Party itself, particularly 
the sedimentation of a pro-business platform with a post-progressive social 
conservatism that emerged from the inter-party conflicts with the Klan. As early as 1927, 
there was talk in the press of a “revival of New-Hays-Beveridge Republicanism” that 
would “fight Klan rule.”107 Hays played both sides of the Klan issue to great effect, using 
their mobilization where helpful and otherwise shaping a post-Klan GOP conservatism 
that remained durable if dormant for much of the 1930s and 40s. Hollywood’s negotiated 
relationship with the Klan helped clear the moral ground for the movie men to gain 
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leverage against blue nose reformers, refashioning the means of their nativist sentiment 
toward antithetical ends. Hays’ strategies helped producers and distributors build the 
capacity for moral control necessary for greater vertical consolidation in the industry. 
Non-commercial educative cinema—both necessary and undesirable for the movie 
men—proved to be another negotiated political field that would give the industry the 
means of social control to achieve the ends economic consolidation.  
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CHAPTER VI  
 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION TO MORAL MASTERY 
 
The movies had emerged victorious in the liquor war and the Great War. Producers 
wrested power in the industry and under the MPPDA, forged complicated alliances with 
federal prohibition and the Klan. It was now time for producers to achieve lasting 
economic consolidation. The film industry had aligned itself with temperance agitation, 
progressive moralism, and the patriotic fight of war, both to make the industry more 
respectable as middle class leisure entertainment and to decouple the ready link between 
film censorship and the reform sentiment. These alignments were a necessary 
precondition for broader industry consolidation but they could not achieve lasting 
economic development and reform without greater moral control over screen content. 
This chapter takes a more detailed look at the entangled economic and moral issues 
surrounding the film industry after World War I, arguing that the concerns over the social 
power of movies spurred greater horizontal coordination among producers, which in turn 
gave the industry greater moral control over production to consolidate the industry 
vertically and ultimately achieve moral mastery of the screen with the 
institutionalization of the Production Code Administration. 
 Raw material suppliers, producers, distributors, and exhibitors had been 
struggling to find the right legal formula for vertical consolidation since the beginnings 
of commercial American film—to form the disparate branches of an infant industry into 
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an integrated and smoothly functioning machine. Some companies, such as the Fox Film 
Corporation, were vertically integrated at an early stage, but these consolidated 
enterprises tended to be on a limited scale and lacked industrywide coordination. Firms 
like Fox were also regarded as the worst offenders of American morality by industry 
insiders.1 From roughly 1909 to 1915, the Motion Picture Patents Company had failed in 
structuring the industry along traditional lines of property and patent protection. State 
regulatory action looked upon the burgeoning movie industry with an unusually high 
level of scrutiny. The moral anxieties associated with the industry greatly hindered 
economic consolidation. Independent producers played a crucial role in bringing down 
the Edison Trust, but it was an industry war largely fought and won by exhibitors who 
had gained newfound power in the shifting sands of American capitalism in the 1910s. 
The consumer-orientated transformation of capitalism allowed movie men who 
controlled the point of purchase and site of consumption—the motion picture theater—
to be at the center of the industry’s development in the 1910s. The essential services of 
the exhibition houses in the Great War further strengthened exhibitor power in the 
industry.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Fox made his money on pictures of [a suggestive] type.” Bob Cochrane to Will Hays, December 13, 1923, 
WHHP, vol. 1, reel 13. In this letter, Cochrane expresses concern that William Fox has been largely absent 
from MPPDA functions, and thinks regarding it as a sign he may be slipping back into making immoral 
pictures. These concerns were an indication that some members regarded the Association as a morally 
binding institution. See also: MPPDA minutes of members’ meeting, June 16, 1924, WHHP, vol. 1, reel 16, 
in which Fox admits he made a lot of salacious pictures: “I made them by a bird by the name of Theda Bara. 
I made them as rotten and vile as you can … I changed my course and now we are trying to do what Zukor 
did several years ago.”   
2 For an account of this, see Chapter 4. 
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Exhibitors were powerless, however, in dealing with the tension between 
economic consolidation and the moral character of screen content. Although the history 
of consolidation in the American film industry has been well documented, too little 
attention has been paid to the relationship between economic consolidation and the 
moral questions of censorship and social regulation. Economic consolidation was 
consistently hampered by what reformers regarded as the moral threats of the screen, 
threats that were amplified, from their perspective, by the Hollywood monopoly or 
“movie trust.” The cinema’s social capacity for public influence created a high level of 
distrust from both reformers and state authorities over the goals and consequences of 
consolidation—would the “movie trust” threaten the moral fabric of America just as the 
“liquor trust” had? 
 
Moral Clean Up and its Discontents: Educative and Religious Cinema 
Canon William Sheafe Chase, pastor of Christ Episcopal Church in Brooklyn from 
1905 to 1932, was perhaps the most visible and fervent campaigner for the regulation 
and censorship of the movies. Beginning in 1907, Chase advocated for the city of New 
York to regulate the motion picture industry and censor harmful film content. He was 
the primary author of New York state law for regulating motion pictures in 1921 and in 
1925 became General Secretary of the Federal Motion Picture Council in America, Inc. 
He founded a series of reform organizations throughout the early years of American 
movies and consistently attacked the “lawless conduct of the motion picture industry.” 
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Canon Chase had always been a strong advocate of film censorship, but by the 1920s and 
with the rise of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Chase 
reoriented his reform proposals away from censorship of film content and toward 
economic regulation of the industry. The call for censorship was replaced with the call 
for trust busting. With Will Hays and the MPPDA as his targets, Chase consistently tied 
together the notion of consolidation in the industry and the moral threat of movies, 
arguing in effect that control of motion pictures by a consolidated motion picture 
industry would degrade and imperil the moral fabric of America and the world. For Chase, 
censorship itself, particularly censorship that adhered to limitations of prior restraint, 
could not attend to the structural immorality of the industry as a whole, and so he and 
other reformers turned their attention to the economic control of the industry by 
producers in Southern California. 
For Chase, the American movie industry’s “school of crime” was created by the 
consolidating efforts of the MPPDA and its member producers and distributors. He 
sought a “restoration of competition in this industry as one of the means by which they 
can reasonably hope to obtain pictures which are better in a moral, educational, and 
cultural sense.”3 Canon Chase had a personal interest in motion pictures—he was one of 
the early advocates for the use of motion pictures as religious instruction in churches 
and schools. He exhibited movies in his church on Sunday, and led a fervent campaign 
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to stop Sunday amusements and commercial movie theaters open on the Sabbath. Chase 
celebrated the power of moving pictures to inform and influence the public, but was 
deeply distrustful of commercial cinema. Among reformers, this put Chase in a unique 
position as a public figure who believed in the righteous power of movies while 
incessantly attacking its commercial control. There was also an implicit belief in the 
power of competition to uphold moral values in Canon Chase’ reform activism. Chase 
attended numerous Congressional anti-trust hearings on the movie industry, advocating 
that anti-trust laws be enforced so that, through the “restoration of free competition” in 
the industry, “better pictures may be obtained from those ready, willing and able to make 
them as soon as market conditions permit their exhibition.”4 It is not hard to see how 
these arguments worked at cross-purposes for Chase—he envisioned a non-commercial 
arm of American cinema, both religious and educational, that would supplant 
commercial power in movies; but he saw this reorientation through the traditional 
market and commercial dynamic of competition. Through competition, base 
commercialism could be checked by the desire to make better and more moral movies.  
Hays and the MPPDA responded to these challenges by situating themselves in a 
tenuous middle ground between moral uplift and a defense of private commercial 
enterprise. They kept regulators and reformers at bay by emphasizing the need for 
“better films” and the moral clean up of the industry by producers themselves. They 
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routinely articulated the social power of the cinema for shaping the moral capacity of the 
American public and argued that the commercial industry was the only force capable of 
doing this. Hays used his powerful connections in the Presbyterian church community to 
win over religious objections to motion pictures and the movie industry, situating 
himself as both reformer and defender of the movies. It was, to be sure, a very different 
era than the progressive years of the 1910s. The reform sentiment had taken a decidedly 
aggressive shift toward external coercive measures through state action rather than 
internal conditioning of reform. Two years into the prohibition era, and amidst an 
increasingly nativist and reactionary American sentiment, convincing the public and the 
state that the movie industry could reform internally was far from easy. 
Educative cinema is as old as the movies themselves, but early attempts to align 
commercial interests with film as education were first pursued in the United States by 
French film companies— Pathé, Éclair, and Eclipse—who produced travel shorts and 
botanical and scientific films for American distribution and exhibition in 1912. The 
Motion Picture Patents Company (also known as the Edison Trust) used their massive 
distribution arm, the General Film Company, to organize a separate library of 
educational films called the Educational Department. Edison envisioned a commercially 
successful production and distribution of classroom instructional movies, and sought to 
develop a film series of 7 reelers called Conquest Pictures. These efforts, predictably, 
failed to make any money, and Conquest Pictures went out of business in May 1917, one 
month after America entered the war. During the war, the entire library of the 
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Educational Department of the General Film Company was subsequently bought by The 
Community Motion Picture Bureau, an organization started in Boston in 1912 for the 
purposes of selecting and arranging programs for non-theatrical groups. The CMPB 
performed “a stupendous piece of work” during the war, exhibiting educational films in 
the dugouts of the frontlines in France and on the battleships and transports of the U.S. 
Navy. Edison’s commercial endeavor into educative cinema had failed, but non-
commercial uses of the same materials flourished during the war.5  
After the war, the potential of educative cinema seemed limitless, and the CMPB 
“were prepared, as no company had ever been, to organize the non-theatrical field and 
to supply the demand for pictures for any kind of community need.” But such potential 
quickly dissipated in America’s postwar environment and the CMPB faded into obscurity. 
Hays believed these efforts had failed because of “unbusinesslike methods,” a clear sign 
that educational film needed to be channeled through the commercial circuit and driven 
by profit motivation. The major stumbling block in this regard were the exhibitors, who 
protested any attempts to develop an educational film arm of the movie industry. Even 
a commercially oriented educative cinema was unacceptable to most organized 
exhibitors as they felt rightly that educational movies are not profitable. When Famous 
Players organized an educational motion picture department in early 1919, exhibitor’s 
organizations went on the war path, accusing producers of controlling and ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Elizabeth Richey Dessez, “History of Educational Films,” Nov. 8, 1922, unpaginated. Prepared at the 
request of the Hays office. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 7. 
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decimating the cherished motion picture theater, that cathedral of democracy.6 When 
Hays took charge of the MPPDA, he found in himself in the thick of a difficult political 
challenge with regards to educational cinema. William Jennings Bryan wrote to Hays in 
March 1922, pressing him to foster and develop the educational and religious picture 
trade, a field “that has been scarcely touched upon to the present time … I can see in 
moving pictures a vehicle for the education of the young more potent than all the text 
books ever written.”7  
The American Development Foundation also pressed Hays to develop educational 
cinema, framing the issue as one of industry survival for the movie men. While the ADF 
acknowledged that “almost all attempts to [develop educational films] have been met 
with financial disaster … news weeklies, scenic, travelogues, animated drawings, 
industrials, and biological subjects … have shown the possibilities for educational and 
propagandic purposes.” The educational field of the cinema, the ADF warned, “will 
continue to grow—whether or not the idea is sound from a commercial point of view.” In 
invoking the long tension between liquor and the movies, the ADF further warned that: 
The present opposition within the industry to non-theatrical showings 
may be compared with the opposition on the part of saloon keepers and 
brewers to prohibition. Prohibition seemed too far off, or too impossible, 
to worry about; it was slow in starting, but it gathered speed and made a 
whirlwind finish almost before its opponents realized it was coming. If 
saloon keepers and brewers had made concessions to conciliate the less 
radical prohibition advocates they might have continued to operate with 
profit under temperance instead of bringing absolute prohibition down 
upon themselves. 
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The ADF warnings became even more dire when discussing religious pictures and the 
tension between churches and the movie industry: “The possibilities for political activity 
spreading from [churches] are unlimited. The motion picture industry often boasts of its 
15,000 theatres but it is not hard to calculate what the answer would be if 150,000 
churches were lined up against 15,000 theatres … We must remember that these are 
Christian churches; that there is a certain amount of radicalism and intolerance among 
them; and that a great many of the ministers and members are convinced that the motion 
picture industry is dominated by Jews who have no regard for the Christian religion, if 
indeed they are not actively hostile to it.” 
 The solution for the ADF seemed obvious: the industry as a whole should produce 
religious and educational pictures for churches and schools, “taking whatever loss might 
be entailed,” and acknowledging that if the church or school comes into competition 
with commercial exhibition, “it will only be in the very small town or community where 
the theatre is unattractive and probably unprofitable.” Small town exhibitors could 
threaten the entire industry with opposition to non-theatrical showings: “Is the tail end 
of the industry going to wag the whole dog?” But this, for Hays, was an untenable 
proposition that threatened to undo the power shifts that had given producers and 
distributors control over the industry—in allowing small exhibitors to wither in the face 
of non-theatrical development of the cinema, the MPPDA would bring upon the industry 
open warfare between producers and organized exhibition interests, who praised and 
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celebrated the small town theatre as a cherished instrument of American democracy. 
War between producers and exhibitors would come soon enough, but the time was not 
ripe. Hays needed other tools and strategies for beating back non-commercial interests 
and keeping exhibitors from defining the fate of the motion picture industry.  
Hays needed to turn a challenge into an opportunity, and the first step required 
sending signals to the nation’s educational and religious leaders that he was on their 
page. In a speech to the National Educational Association in July 1922, Hays assured 
educators that the movie industry would “cooperate fully” with the NEA and other 
organizations in developing educational pictures. “I propose that we jointly study that 
demand and that we jointly find ways and means of supplying it,” and in a familiar 
refrain, Hays reiterated that the movie industry had developed from the picture pioneers 
on the movie frontier into “an orderly business thoroughfare” run by the “sober business 
man. Of its own weight the industry has settled down commercially into a sanity and 
conservatism like that of the banking world.”8 But the more Hays looked into the issue, 
the more obvious it became that non-theatrical cinema was simply incompatible with 
the commercial aims of the industry. In a memo to the Hays office authored by May Ayres 
Burgess, the insurmountable problems were explicitly stated: the industry is too volatile 
to project future educative and religious content; production is too expensive to simply 
subsidize; the fire risk in schools and churches would be significant; and “the exchange 
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people do not know what the non-theatrical users wish … [t]hey do not talk the non-
theatrical language and they are not interested in the non-theatrical needs.” Analyzing 
the production problems, the memo highlighted the tension between movie 
entertainment and instructive film: “the classroom film does not need to be funny; it 
does not need to be cute; [and] it does not need to tell a story.” An example was made of 
Edison’s attempts to create lesson plans that taught schoolchildren multiplication tables 
using brownies, strategies that “actually diverts attention [and] is unpedogogical.”9 
Clearly, hopeful words and joint studies would not be enough to resolve these 
insurmountable problems, but one of these problems—fire risk—could be turned into 
opportunity for Hays and the movie men. 
Non-commercial cinema, particularly educative and religious film, could not be 
cleanly severed from the elements of propaganda that had so afflicted the industry in the 
1910s, and so these projects were severely limited in their development despite the fact 
that a non-commercial arm of the industry, subsidized by the movie men in Hollywood, 
could do much to appease the anxious moralists. Exhibitors were the most vocal 
opponents of non-commercial cinema for obvious reasons—their business at the motion 
picture theater could be greatly curtailed if every school and church had motion picture 
projection and distribution arrangements. As we will see below, the key to controlling 
this situation for producers and distributors was their decision to continue using 
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flammable nitrate-celluloid film stock, which kept exhibitors in line and limited the 
distribution channels available for non-commercial interests. 
 
Putting Out the Fires: Commercial Imperative in Nitrate Celluloid 
 Film stock requires a chemical base to support the photosensitive emulsion 
necessary for motion picture photography. In the early years of motion picture film, this 
film base or transparent substrate was made of nitrate celluloid, a highly flammable and 
explosive chemical composition that doesn’t need oxygen to burn since the reaction 
itself produces oxygen. Nitrate celluloid was the first film stock and base of the American 
movie industry, developed by George Eastman in 1889. By 1909, Edison’s Motion Picture 
Patents Company standardized 35mm nitrate celluloid film stock with a 1.33 aspect 
ratio10 (standards that held through most of the classical Hollywood era), but the Edison 
combine also began developing a safer alternative—acetate celluloid that was slow 
burning when in reaction, causing it to melt as opposed to burn or explode. The French 
film company Pathé had already been producing 28mm acetate celluloid film stock for 
non-commercial use in schools, churches, homes, and community centers, and by 1912, 
safety acetate became the standard stock for film gauges less than 35mm.11 The 
expectation was that non-theatrical film use would be limited to safety film stock in 
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11 Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won’t Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United States. Jefferson NC: 
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these narrower gauges, but the non-theatrical circuit, haphazard and multifaceted, could 
not enforce any standard for all schools, churches, YMCAs and YWCAs throughout the 
country.  
 Commercial film was almost entirely processed using nitrate celluloid. Fire hazards, 
particularly in film exchanges where release prints were stored and rented out to 
exhibitors, were a constant source of worry for the movie industry. Nitrate film fires 
totally destroyed exchanges in Toronto and Atlanta in 1915 and in Dallas in 1921. A 
Pittsburgh film fire killed 10 people in 1919 and numerous fires occurred in schools while 
projecting educational movies.12 Installation of concrete projection booths and other 
safety devices were costly. Local regulations were haphazard and not standardized. In 
addition, commercial use of nitrate celluloid required higher insurance premiums. 
During World War I, much anxiety surrounded the numerous film exchanges scattered 
throughout the country as a potential site of terrorist acts. By the 1920s, the Hays office 
was faced with a potentially explosive political problem, as the National Fire Protection 
Association released a report recommending that the movie industry switch to acetate 
celluloid film stock. The National Fire Protection Association, founded in 1896 by a group 
of insurance underwriters, also began lobbying the federal government and state 
legislatures for legislation that would ban nitrate celluloid. In 1923, the New York State 
Assembly introduced the Sanders Bill, which would force all exchanges and theaters in 
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the state to use the off-standard, narrow gauge stock with acetate celluloid film base. 
Some in the industry welcomed a change. A Hays office memo conceded that with “a 
rapid development of the manufacture and distribution of acetate stock … will probably, 
in comparatively few years, result in placing the entire industry on an acetate basis, and 
thus permanently remove the fire hazard.”13  
 If the fire hazard of nitrate celluloid threatened the industry and its reputation, if 
it required costly protections and insurance, and if the technology of slow-burning film 
stock was already in place, why did the industry resist political pressure from the 
National Fire Protection Association and policymakers? It was widely acknowledged in 
the industry at the time that nitrate celluloid “wears longer, is easier to handle, and gives 
slightly better illumination.”14 Tests showed acetate celluloid to have about an 85% 
efficiency rate compared to nitrocellulose. It was also claimed that acetate celluloid was 
costlier to produce, but this was likely due to company decision-making at Eastman 
Kodak, the company who had an almost complete monopoly on film stock production in 
the United States. By switching to acetate, Eastman Kodak might have opened up the 
market to other film stock manufacturers such as Pathé. 
 The most insurmountable problem transitioning to acetate celluloid, however, was 
as much an opportunity as a genuine problem. The paramount concern of the 
commercial film industry was a standardized film stock that could be used in both the 
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theatrical and non-theatrical fields. With all motion picture film processed on the same 
film stock and base, little could be done to stop schools, churches, and community 
centers from installing projectors and showing commercial movies, undercutting the 
motion picture theatre as the site of mass entertainment. By sticking with nitrate 
celluloid and aggressively pushing back against any potential regulation, the Hays office 
could solidify the divide between the theatrical and non-theatrical fields in a way that 
could resolve the other problems educative and religious cinema presented to the 
commercial industry.15  
 The plan involved working closely with the National Fire Protection Association to 
implement standards of fire safety and prevention, such as building fall traps in 
projection rooms that would cut off potential fires from the rest of the theater, lining 
concrete walls with asbestos, mandating fire extinguishers in all motion picture theatres, 
and instituting regular fire safety drills at all exchanges. By keeping the divide between 
theatrical and non-theatrical fields, Hays and the moguls in Hollywood could also placate 
the exhibitors, whose animosity toward the producers and distributors seemed to 
increase with each passing week.16 An internal memo to Hays stated that “exhibitors will 
approve our plan because it will then be impossible for any distributor to send nitrate 
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16 This favor to exhibitors could also be productively taken away if exhibitors continued to attack the 
MPPDA and the movie trust. Although no evidence exists that the Hays office contemplated such a “carrot 
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celluloid stock for non-theatrical exhibitions. This will remove from the exhibitors that 
source of unfair competition,” further stating that “even the White House … will have to 
get a booth and a permit.”17  
 Hays was the principle architect of this grand strategy. He aggressively 
institutionalized this “conservation campaign” and directed legal counsel for the 
MPPDA to draft the Model Film Bill, which sought to legally codify the separation of the 
non-theatrical and theatrical use of film. The bill would “relieve churches, schools, clubs, 
lodges, and business houses of unnecessary expense, red tape, and other burdensome 
restrictions in the use of safety film” while giving the commercial industry the right to 
use “motion pictures for educational and general cultural purposes.” Kansas was the first 
state to pass the bill, followed by Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Connecticut, Oklahoma, 
and South Carolina. The MPPDA began regular inspections of the exchanges in 35 U.S. 
cities and helped the Film Boards of Trade institute fire protection committees. Fire 
chiefs and marshals who were “more or less unfriendly” to exchanges before the MPPDA 
took up work, were by 1924 working directly with the industry. The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce also started working with the film industry in implementing and publicizing 
the conservation campaign for fire protection. All of this resulted in a resounding 
political victory for Hays and the movie men, and it also brought about “big savings in 
new methods of routing film.” Hays had turned the film distribution sector of the 
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industry into “one solid, smoothly working unit,” and it begged the question: how far 
could the industry go in developing distribution? Could the physical distribution of film 
be fully consolidated and centralized by the movie men of Hollywood?  
 
Turnkey Cinema: The Distribution Connection 
 Distribution in the film industry—sales transactions from producers, rental 
transactions to exhibitors, and the physical storage and transportation of film—is the 
crucial nexus in which images of film production become an economic product in the 
marketplace. There were early attempts to control the American movie industry from the 
site of distribution, most notably the Triangle Film Corporation, an integrated 
production and distribution firm founded by the Harry and Roy Aiken, producers of The 
Birth of a Nation (1915). Triangle was known as a prestige studio contracting high quality 
film productions from such early film giants as Thomas Ince, D. W. Griffith, and Mack 
Sennett, but the Aiken brothers developed Triangle’s powerful position in the industry 
through an impressive film library and extensive distribution network. They envisioned 
the Triangle exchange as a combine that purchased finished productions outright and 
assembled a massive film library that could undercut competitors and control the market 
for film rentals to theaters. The industry had settled into this particular practice—
distributors buying film content from producers and renting to exhibitors—by the 1910s, 
but Triangle aimed to control the industry by mastering these exchanges. These prestige 
productions were very expensive, however, and assembling an impressive film library as 
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the source of industry power required significant financial overlays. The Aitken brothers 
quickly collapsed under the weight of enormous debt, finished off by the financial 
failures of D. W. Griffith’s hugely ambitious Intolerance (1917). By the 1920s, with the 
decline of the state’s rights model of booking and the withering of independent 
producers, distribution increasingly became a consolidated arm of big producers.  
 By 1922, Will Hays’ first full year as head of the MPPDA, the industry was 
threatened by a series of scandals in Hollywood and poor box office numbers. There 
appeared to be multiple problems afflicting the industry, and for some observers, the 
biggest problem was mass production in an infant industry: “It isn’t Hollywood scandals, 
it isn’t the reformers bellowing, it isn’t stupid censors, it’s just poor average 
entertainment and too much money for it, that’s the problem with the moving picture 
business.”18 Could the problem of “average entertainment” be solved through 
improvements and reforms in mass production, or was mass production itself the 
problem? No one could appreciate these problems, and their relationship to film 
distribution, better than William Wadsworth Hodkinson. Hodkinson had founded 
Paramount Pictures in 1914 by merging together several film rental bureaus. His 
innovative restructuring of distribution into centralized exchanges created enormous 
efficiencies and helped push the industry away from the old state’s rights model, in which 
independents worked with regional buyers and sellers for securing exhibition rights in 
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individual states or geographic regions. He also revolutionized the industry by creating 
block-booking—bundling several film products together and selling these bundles to 
exhibitors (a process that severely limited theater owners in choosing movies with the 
greatest economic potential). Hodkinson’s Paramount had an exclusive arrangement 
with Adolph Zukor’s Famous Players Company and Jesse Lasky’s Feature Play Company, 
but when these firms merged in 1916 and bought Paramount outright as the distribution 
arm of their new parent company, Famous Players-Lasky, Hodkinson was pushed out of 
Paramount.  
 By 1922, Hodkinson—who had made his fortune and standing in the industry by 
building up the distribution sector through efficiencies of mass production—was 
disillusioned with both the commercial potential of distribution and mass production 
itself. In a long and revealing letter to Will Hays, Hodkinson laid into the industry, 
arguing for an “abolition of the present system and the establishment of neutral 
distribution.” “Poor pictures,” wrote Hodkinson, “are … the product of the present 
system and that it is only when the Producer is relieved of the burden of supporting 
distribution machinery with his own product and is limited to the production of only 
such pictures as he can do well … that the effect in the way of higher average grade of 
pictures can be secured.” For Hodkinson, mass production was not “an effect of deep-
seated abuses” but the “cause of bad business” itself: “It is of course obvious that the 
large percentage of failures results from the factory system … the present condition is 
the result of mass production.” In a striking bit of irony, the creator of industry block-
	  
267	  
booking had become frustrated with the consequences of his innovation:  
These Producers-Distributors who have the theatre market by the throat 
through insisting on loading up the exhibitor with poor pictures so that 
he may get their good ones, effectively block the efforts of competing and 
worthy independents to find a market for the better pictures.19   
 
The solution, for Hodkinson, was a simple one, and one that only Hays could force upon 
the big producers: “Take out of the hands of all producers the distribution and other 
machinery whereby they can force the mass product on the market and the industry will 
correct itself automatically.”20 But for Hays, there were great dangers in neutral 
distribution, namely in creating opportunities for non-commercial cinema—with neutral 
distributing machinery, educative and religious cinema could potentially compete more 
effectively with the commercial dream factory of Hollywood. Neutral distribution would 
also, inevitably, open up greater possibilities to independent producers, thereby 
threatening the big producers’ control over both the economic resources of the industry 
and the social and moral power of the screen. For Hays, any reorganization of the 
distribution sector would have to remain controlled by big producers in Hollywood. The 
answer was greater consolidation, not neutral disassociation.  
 Again, Hays located opportunity in what appeared to be a series of regulatory 
challenges from the federal government. Exhibitors had been pushing officials in the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue to revise or abolish the war-time admissions tax on movie 
theaters. One alternative entailed “sending up” (or “sending down,” depending on where 
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one stood in the industry)21 tax liabilities to the transactions between producers and 
distributors. If taxes could be imposed on transactions between producers and 
distributors, as well as between distributors and exhibitors, the burden to movie theaters 
could be lessened by spreading liability more equitably through the industry. Hays 
worked closely with movie industry lawyer Siegfried F. Hartman to craft a policy that 
could push back against this tax revision by using industry consolidation as leverage. 
Could it hardly be fair if certain firms, in which “all of the operations … are carried on by 
the same company,” were subject to requirements that forced “a double, triple, or 
quadruple tax, as the case may be”?22  
 Hays had to tread carefully here, lest he rouse the fears of a consolidated movie 
trust forcing the weight of monopoly on independent producers and exhibitors alike. As 
Hartman advised Hays, any communication with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
should be carefully considered “in that they afford less possibility of being construed as 
if we intended to present merely a case where the producing company was one hundred 
percent owner of the exchange companies.” They had to speak for the industry at large 
but do so in a way that furthered big producer interests without “putting [our heads] out 
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“from below,” where the movie theater experience signified the heights and ultimate aims of the industry. 
Exhibitors consistently talked in this language through the 1920s. For producers, however, the hierarchy 
was precisely the opposite. The Hollywood site of production was the peak of the industry, and film product 
was ultimately distributed “down” to individual movie theaters, be they big picture palaces in downtown 
cities or small neighborhood and community theaters.   
22 Siegfried F. Hartman to Commissioner of Internal Revenue, September 9, 1922. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 6. 
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over the trench.”23 Hartman’s letter to Internal Revenue stressed that, regardless of 
whether a distributor was owned by producers or not, “[e]very company … distributes its 
pictures through distributors consisting of exchanges so-called … None of the companies 
attempts to book its pictures from its home office.” All producing firms are “compelled 
by the exigencies and nature of the business to employ exchanges for the distribution of 
their pictures, whether these exchanges be owned by and embraced within the producing 
company or are separate corporations bound to and allied with the producing company.” 
Hartman concluded his carefully worded letter by arguing for a more simplified tax code, 
an argument that also smoothed out justification for greater industry consolidation: 
I have already called attention to the fact that the plain language of the 
statute indicates an intention of the framers of this tax to cause it to be 
passed on to the public and included in the admission fees charged. 
Certainly Congress could not have intended a double, triple, or quadruple 
tax with respect to the same identical film, if the public was expected to 
bear the tax; surely the ultimate consumer would be required to pay only 
once.24   
 
Hays was effectively able to use tax policy challenges to shape consolidation in the movie 
industry—the “ultimate consumer,” who should not be overly burdened with onerous tax 
liability, created a crucial point of leverage for the movie men to consolidate the industry 
and, more broadly, shape the currents of consumer capitalism’s development in the 
1920s. With some political ground cleared, Hays and the MPPDA could consider unique 
forms of consolidation that might bring about even greater efficiencies in mass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Siegfried F. Hartman to Hays, September 9, 1922. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 6. 
24 Hartman to Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2. 
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production and, thus, greater profits for the movie men of Hollywood. This unique 
consolidative arrangement was centralized physical distribution, a plan that would have 
forever changed the character of the American movie industry. 
 
The Limits of Consolidation: Centralized Physical Distribution 
 Hays and the MPPDA turned their attention to various alternatives to reorganizing 
distribution. On the one hand, coordinating the bidding and selling practices to 
exhibitors created opportunities for presenting a united producer-distributor front 
against exhibitor interests, but on the other hand such practices appeared in direct 
conflict with Sherman Anti-Trust laws, stretching Hays’ notion of a “certain idea of 
competition” too far. Industry insiders nonetheless pressed the issue to Hays. Bob 
Cochrane at Universal put the matter bluntly: the MPPDA could “get us all together to 
put a stop to the frightful manner in which we are bidding against each other for 
legitimate theaters … [exhibitors] are reaping a harvest out of us.” This unprofitable 
situation “could be stopped by collective bargaining or whatever we choose to call it,” in 
which “some method could be devised where all the bidding … could be done by one man 
representing the Association.”25  
 But “collective bargaining” by producer-distributors threatened federal scrutiny 
and anti-trust regulation. Hays would have to come out publicly against such proposals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cochrane to Hays, September 6, 1923. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 12. 
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to placate anxious exhibitors, and in a letter to the Exhibitor’s Trade Review, Hays stated 
the matter in unequivocal terms: “I desire to make it perfectly clear that MPPDA, Inc., of 
which I am president, is not interested directly or indirectly, in the question of film 
rentals.” True, the MPPDA was formed “for the promotion of certain common interests 
… but the fixing of prices, or even collective bargaining with exhibitors in relation to film 
rentals … has never been … among the purposes of this organization.” Coordinated 
bidding practices by producer-distributors “is inconsistent with the fundamental 
economic law that prices of commodities in a free market, must be determined by the 
rule of supply and demand.”26  
 With greater coordination among producers through the MPPDA, however, the way 
was paved for centralizing physical distribution of film to exhibitors, a process by which 
studios could create greater profits through efficiency while maintaining consistency 
with “fundamental economic law” by distinguishing selling from the logistics of storage 
and transportation of film. Universal mogul Carl Laemmle advocated for merging the 
physical handling of films. “Sixty exchanges, properly located,” wrote Laemmle to Hays, 
“could do the work now done by several hundred … Universal has its own complete set 
of exchanges, yet I would be perfectly willing to enter into an arrangement whereby the 
present overhead for physical distribution could be cut down. Pride of ownership would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Hays letter to Exhibitor’s Trade Review, drafted by Siegfried F. Hartman, July 16, 1923. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 
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not stand in my way of handling pictures through central shipping offices.”27 The appeal 
of greater efficiency interested others, such as Rufus Cole, founder of R-C Pictures and a 
corporate manager in film distribution, who urged the MPPDA to coordinate “the 
physical distribution of all films,” freeing up exchanges so that they may “simply be a 
selling organization.” “When the contracts with theatres are signed,” explained Cole, 
“the work of the selling organization ended; the contracts being turned over to the 
combined physical distributing Company and they handle everything from then on.” 
Such a scheme could even consolidate these selling organizations into the same building 
while keeping company interests distinct.28   
 Centralizing physical distribution required management and operations distinct 
from any of the producing companies, as well as a transportation firm to actual carry out 
distribution to movie theaters. At Paramount, Zukor and Lasky were developing such a 
scheme with Lewis J. Selznick, onetime film producer and one of the innovators in the 
distribution sector. Selznick would form the Film Service Corporation, and with a capital 
investment of at least $250,000 would acquire exchange facilities in 22 cities. A 20-year 
contract would be made with the American Railway Express Company for the physical 
distribution of all film, including independent producers, for a flat rate of 7 ½% of gross 
rental. Zukor estimated that physical distribution costs were currently from 12 to 15% of 
gross rentals, so a centralized and coordination distribution scheme could save half the 
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28 Rufus Cole, in memo to Hays, December 28, 1923. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 14.  
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cost of a significant expense.29 Paramount’s competitors balked at such a plan, however, 
as they pointed out it would be impossible for Selznick to keep his own film interests 
distinct from a disinterested plan of distribution for all producers. As Edward Bowes of 
Metro Goldwyn put it, any viable centralized distribution plan “can only succeed if there 
is a unanimous agreement among all producers and it is handled through the Hays 
office.”30 The MPPDA would have to be in charge. 
 Hays began working directly with E. M. Cowie, Vice President of the American 
Railway Express Company. Cowie assured Hays that little actual management and 
operations would have to be done by the MPPDA. With support of producers, Hays would 
provide oversight but leave the work of booking, bookkeeping, billing, shipping, and 
inspection of prints and advertising accessories to Cowie’s firm. The cost would then be 
divided among producers by ratio of their respective number of prints out of the total.31 
These arrangements would provide a measure of economic stability in tumultuous times, 
such as the influenza outbreaks of World War One, giving the industry associational 
power to “shoulder the burden of any one of its members in times of stress.” The 
“primary premise” of centralized physical distribution assumed: 
… that the Producers, particularly the large ones, like all other business 
men, are willing to save money in operating details through their own 
cooperation, so long as such cooperation leaves them absolutely free and 
unrestricted in production and in initiative and resourcefulness in the 
presentation and sale of their products, so as to be able to win over their 
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30 Edward Bowes to E. M. Cowie, Chairman of Railway Express Film Transport Company, January 21, 1925. 
WHHP, vol. 1, reel 12. 
31 Memo to Hays from Gabriel Hess, January 21, 1925. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 12. 
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competitors in legal competition, or at least gain their fair share of the 
business. 
 
 
The message, to some, was clear: big producers in Hollywood would gain the most from 
such consolidation, putting a definitive end to any alternative center of power in the 
American film industry. 
 Meanwhile, concerns were expressed by other producers. United Artists—led by 
Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks, and D. W. Griffith—were deeply 
critical of the consolidated power of the big producers and regarded a joint distributive 
system as “only a further step in consolidating the position of the ‘Trust.’”32 First 
National—an amalgamation of first run theater interests who had struck out in film 
production and provided a counterweight to Paramount’s power in the early 1920s—also 
expressed concern: booking would be done by Railway Express, but booking—“the hub 
of the entire exchange system”—necessitated close contact with the principal sales 
manager in distribution.33 How could film bookings to theaters not be influenced by the 
point of sale, in which theater owners agreed to financial terms with the producer? 
Wouldn’t more lucrative sales, or bigger producers, inevitably receive favored booking 
and better releases? Cowie replied to Harry O. Schwalbe at First National through Hays:  
commercial waste in the present joint system of selling and physical 
distribution, is the conduct of the salesmen and branch managers in 
shifting from their shoulders to the booker the responsibility of obtaining 
play dates from exhibitors. The average salesman or branch manager feels 
that when he has negotiated the sales terms, (except the play dates) that 
his job is finished, and that it is encumbent [sic] on the booking 
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department to do the rest.34  
 
In other words, for Cowie, the booking department was merely a clerical department 
charged with impersonally scheduling play dates, not the hub of distribution operations. 
Cowie had a point, but in the cut throat and suspicious world of the early American movie 
industry, distrust ran high, and producers were suspicious of any industry arrangement 
that could potentially give bigger competitors an advantage. Cowie assured Hays that his 
company would “operate without favor … and shall adhere to a straight line in the 
carrying out of its uniform contract with the Producers.”35  
 Producers met in the spring of 1925 at the MPPDA’s boardroom in New York. 
Preliminary plans were presented, and members agreed to hear a formal proposal by 
Cowie a week later. Experiments were already being conducted at Detroit exchanges, 
where distributors were working together to integrate “cartage, shipping, inspection and 
storage of film, paper and accessories.”36 Proponents of the plan argued that centralized 
physical distribution was not “Utopian,” but rather a constructive and pragmatic strategy 
of consolidation that aligned directly with Herbert Hoover’s new economic ideas on 
associationalism as an instrument for the consolidation of distribution across 
industries.37 Members voted on the deal in principle, and all but one agreed. The lone 
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35 Cowie to Hays, January 20, 1925. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 19. 
36 President’s Annual Report, MPPDA, March 30, 1925. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 21. 
37 W. W. Irwin to Bob Cochrane, February 16, 1925. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 20.  
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holdout, curiously, was George M. Spidell of Paramount, the biggest producer in 
Hollywood and one seeming to gain the most from consolidation in distribution. It’s 
possible that Paramount objected to taking management of centralized physical 
distribution out of the hands of Lewis Selznick, whose owns plans for consolidation 
would have kept the controlling firm a private, for-profit company and one allied with 
Paramount. But there were bigger, more threatening concerns on the horizon—federal 
government investigation into the industry. 
 While plans for centralizing distribution advanced to a critical stage, the US Justice 
Department was investigating exchanges in Cincinnati and the Cincinnati Film Board of 
Trade. The investigation arose from complaints by exhibitors in Kentucky that these 
exchanges had engaged in numerous violations—collusion in refusing to work with 
certain theater chains, fixing prices, and violating terms of the uniform contract. In 
writing to Will Hays, Assistant Attorney General William Donovan requested that a 
special agent named Martin be given total and unfettered access to distribution files, 
proceedings of the board of trade, and any other relevant documents. Hays informed 
Donovan that the film boards of trade, located in major cities across the country, were 
not part of the Association nor controlled by producers, but that he would communicate 
with them the importance of giving Martin anything he needed.  
 Film boards of trade were established as early as 1912, and by 1921, there were 20 
in operation. These boards were intended to settle disputes in film rentals, and were 
made up of an even number of distributors and exhibitors who would hear and rule on 
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cases. In practice, the boards operated in “a more or less haphazard manner,” and some 
were used “more as a club against exhibitors.” Before the establishment of the MPPDA, 
the boards generally suffered from distrust and unfair business practices between 
distributors and exhibitors. C. D. Hill, president of the St. Louis Film Board of Trade, 
wrote to Hays that his board has been an “abject failure” for the past 5 years, blaming 
exhibitor interests such as the Exhibitor’s League of actively working “to make the 
Board’s work ineffective.” Distributors complained most about past due accounts and 
damaged prints. Exhibitors complained vociferously over block booking and other 
practices that made it difficult to choose and turn over product, in addition to non-
theatrical films supplied by exchanges.38 Hays and the MPPDA worked hard to institute 
fair and uniform practices across the boards. A uniform contract between distributors 
and exhibitors was in place by June, 1922, although exhibitors continued to fight for 
more agreeable terms.39  
 The Justice Department spent several weeks in Cincinnati investigating, and in late 
April of 1925 informed Hays that they would expand the investigation to film boards in 
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Indianapolis, and St. Louis. Producers and distributors 
were extremely nervous, and Hays sought to reassure them that “the formula for the 
operation of the Film Boards of Trade and Arbitration Boards is legal and proper.” “There 
is, therefore, nothing to conceal,” concluded Hays, “and we do not want anybody to get 
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an impression to the contrary.”40 By June, Special Agent Martin’s complaints that he was 
being restricted access to board files were passed on to Attorney General John G. Sargent, 
who requested information from Hays. Exchange managers pushed back, insisting that 
“we have refused Martin absolutely nothing.” Charles C. Pettijohn, General Counsel to 
Hays and the MPPDA, suggested Martin was biased toward, and possibly corrupted by, 
exhibitor organizations, who seized on the investigation as proof of unfair practices by 
distributors and producers. Hays applied his usual political pressure on Attorney General 
Sargent, a Republican and close confidant of President Coolidge. Hays also pulled some 
publicity strings with reliable media—the Weekly Film Review, for example, published a 
series of articles on the film boards and the growing rancor between exhibitors and 
producer-distributors. After weeks of their own “disinterested” investigation, Weekly 
wrote that the film boards were functioning remarkably well and placed the bulk of 
criticism on the Motion Picture Theater Owners of America, the largest and most 
powerful exhibitor’s trade organization. The MPTOA was 
nothing more than a seething mass of disorganization. And what a pity! 
What a chance it had! Consider the fact that the MPPDA and the MPTOA 
were started at approximately the same time. And now, one is functioning 
perfectly, like a well-oiled machine, and the other is enveloped in a maze 
of accusations and back-biting among its leaders … [the MPPDA] has done 
more in legislative fights for the general betterment of conditions for 
exhibitors [than any exhibitor’s organization].41 
  
While the MPPDA was far from a well-oiled machine, Weekly had a point—consolidation 
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and coordination spurred on by the Association was in direct response to disorganization 
in the industry, and did much to standardize industry practices. These practices, 
however, were largely determined by big producers, who sought to formalize an 
arrangement of power that found them at the top of the movie industry. Consolidation 
in the movie industry rankled some of the Association’s own members, particularly 
smaller producers. Carl Laemmle at Universal, who had led the fight against the Edison 
Trust a decade earlier and who remained independently-minded despite cooperating 
with big producers, was deeply frustrated with emerging monopolistic practices, as he 
saw them. “I do not know of any business or any art that could suffer more from 
monopoly than this business,” Laemmle wrote to Hays, “and yet, as sure as Fate, 
monopoly is coming to this business with giant strides.” In a scathing rebuke of the 
Association’s coordinated work in developing the industry, Laemmle minced no words: 
A limited group of companies is trying to dominate the whole field … I do 
not like publicly disagreeing with you but … the public should know that 
its cheapest form of entertainment is rapidly falling into the hands of a 
monopoly … Of what importance is it to me that censorship has been 
defeated by the Association in many states when my fellow members in 
the Association are rapidly crushing me in every state? What do I care 
about continuing to support film clubs when I can see but little business 
left to arbitrate?42 
 
Laemmle was concerned over an industry willing to destroy smaller firms for the sake of 
consolidation in the hands of fewer and more powerful interests so that “the bigger 
companies survive and the others must perish.” Laemmle then touched upon block-
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booking and producer-owned theater chains: “I have a feeling that you were pleased 
when Universal starting selling in block because it served as justification for the actions 
of other companies. I think you were glad when Universal bought some theaters because 
that, too, tended to justify what the other companies had done.” Laemmle threatened to 
fight these forces of monopoly with every means at his disposal, including “broadcasting 
the whole inside of this rotten story to the public.”43 Hays had a serious problem—even 
some of the Association’s own members opposed producer-centered consolidation of the 
movie trust.  
 It is unclear what specific concessions, if any, Hays gave Laemmle, but he assured 
him that he has “a deep interest in Universal’s success and I would go to great lengths, 
indeed, to do everything that the Association could or should do or that I can do to help.” 
Hays referred to block booking and producer-owned theaters as “competitive practices 
that have existed for years,” and that the “legality of it was actually being considered by 
the Federal Trade Commission.” Hays further insinuated that he had seen some financial 
numbers from Universal, and that Laemmle had deliberately painted a gloomier outlook 
than was reality.44 Laemmle never broadcasted the “rotten story” to the press, and stayed 
an Association member. Although a smaller studio, Universal was well integrated 
vertically and operated successfully through the 1920s. The company weathered the 
Great Depression better than others (including the most powerful studio of the silent 
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era—Paramount—who nearly fell into receivership in 1932–33) and emerged in the 1930s 
with several successes in profitable genres such as westerns and horror. 
 Meanwhile, in August 1926, the Justice Department concluded its investigation into 
the movie’s industry’s distribution practices. The investigation had lasted 18 months and 
covered a half a dozen cities in the Midwest. Federal officials in the Justice Department 
found no violations of Antitrust law by distributors. Hays assured the feds that minor 
infractions—particularly an uneven application of block-booking that eased such 
practices on big theater chains but were strictly applied on smaller houses—could be 
solved by pressure from the Association. But the investigations by the Justice department 
had been instrumental in discouraging the MPDDA from pursuing centralized physical 
distribution, consolidation that would have drawn serious scrutiny from Justice officials. 
The Association had already ruled on the fate of centralized distribution, well before the 
Justice Department reached its conclusions. At a member meeting in the New York City 
boardroom, the producers voted down the American Railway Express plan, but approved 
of a plan to centralized shipping rooms only, along the lines of the Detroit experiment.45 
Detroit’s experiment proved a profitable success, allowing 9 distributors in the city to 
save a total 2.3 million dollars just in shipping. Distributors could realize savings without 
sticking their heads out above the trench. 
 In a memo to Hays, Carl E. Milliken—former Maine Governor and Executive 
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Secretary of the MPPDA—wrote that centralized physical distribution “would greatly 
simplify the problem which the Religious Motion Picture Foundation and the producers 
of new pedagogic films will have in arranging their distribution.”46 Unwittingly, it seems, 
Milliken had brought the issue full circle. Milliken was a progressive and believer in 
educational and religious cinema, and Hays gave him free reign to be the public 
spokesman and mediator between the Association and religious and educational 
interests. But Milliken was mere publicity—he did not set Association policy. There 
would be no centralization of physical distribution beyond basic coordinated practices in 
the shipping room. Nor would there be any transition to the safer acetate celluloid film 
stock. These political limitations were crucial building blocks for the development of the 
mogul system in the movie industry. Hays had soothed unhappy Association members 
such as Laemmle at Universal, had located policy leverage in nitrate celluloid and 
centralized physical distribution to limit non-commercial cinema, and attended to 
federal government scrutiny over industry practices by working Republican Party 
contacts. Exhibitor power in the industry—waning since the close of World War I—was 
now ready to be dealt a lasting blow by the big producers.     
 
Open War: The Exhibitor’s Last Stand 
 On March 16, 1922, Will Hays attended a dinner at the Hotel Astor organized by the 
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new exhibitor’s association, the Motion Picture Theatre Owners of America. Their 
president, Sydney S. Cohen, delivered the keynote speech, in which he extolled the 
“unlimited potential strength and importance” of exhibitor’s across the country. Movie 
exhibitors are “governed by a certain ethics, by a high consideration of the rights of the 
people of all American communities, and their duty to their country and their 
neighbors.” Cohen then took on the emerging Movie Trust—the consolidated forces of 
big producers in reshaping the power center of the American movie industry:  
The Theatre Owner could not understand the alleged logic which lay back 
of this so-called trustification idea and permitting elements which had no 
direct contact with the people whatever to control the Motion Picture 
business … we brought this feature of our work to the personal attention 
of President Harding at a meeting between [the MPTOA and the 
president] … He commended our purposes very highly, declared he would 
bring it officially to the attention of the members of his cabinet so as to 
enable every department of National Government to take advantage of 
the Motion Picture Theatre in promoting all progressive official programs 
… As Theatre Owners … we are ready to serve … The American people 
cannot and will not tolerate any centralized control of this wonderful 
medium of expression.47  
 
Cohen’s explicitly political role for the motion picture theatre—as servant of 
government, as promoter of “progressive official programs,” and as powerful check on 
“centralized control” of a cultural medium—appeared remarkably anachronistic in 1922. 
Cohen did have powerful allies, and some producers, notably United Artists, chaffed at 
centralized power by the big producers. Free expression of the screen and theater was at 
risk in consolidation: “centralized control of the Motion Picture business … menaces its 
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future … Art and genius must be guaranteed expression and certain processes now in 
vogue tend to curtail these necessary privileges.”48 
 Despite Cohen’s sharp words, Hays had reason to be content as he made his way to 
the podium that night. Producers in Hollywood had a key Republican insider at the helm 
of their competing producers and distributor’s association, a man close to Harding and 
the Ohio Gang of Five. The future lay with associational consolidation of the industry, 
not the localism of Wilsonian progressive economic thought. Crucial to this process was 
the depoliticization of American movies, not a continuation of a “National Government” 
that could “take advantage” of the screen and the industry. For Hays, a cinema denatured 
of politics was one that “is essentially, of course, a source of amusement.” The 
importance of such an industry, nationally and politically, “is measured only by the 
imperative necessity of entertainment for our people.” Hays touched on the non-
commercial possibilities of the screen—long a source of friction with commercial theater 
owners—in ways that masked a warning but offered possible terms of reconciliation: 
We have had competition of the fiercest kind. There has been no time for 
adequate reflection. The mere physical and mechanical expansion has 
been so great and so rapid that there has not been time … to consider 
adequately the moral and educational responsibilities inherent in this 
great new thing, which is primarily a source of entertainment [emphasis 
added] … the theatre owners of the country should be organized, and I am 
very hopeful that there will be the strongest possible organization of 
exhibitors. This organization should be entirely separate from the 
organization of producers and distributors, and in its management the 
producers’ and distributors’ organization can not in any way whatever 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Sydney S. Cohen to William S. Hart, February 25, 1923. WHHP, vol. 1, reel 9. Hart—the silent western 
star and close confidant of Hays—surreptitiously passed this letter, marked confidential sender and 
private, to the MPPDA office. Hays, and Hays’ beloved son, were great admirers of Hart’s movies.  
	  
285	  
take any part.49  
 
Hays tried to sell the notion of an industry centered on depoliticized amusement, an 
argument that cut to the heart of a conflict between commercial imperatives of the 
moving picture theater and its indelible link to the cultural formation of American 
democracy. Closing off non-commercial alternatives to American cinema necessitated 
movie exhibitors abandon their conception of the theater as site of democratic 
deliberation—rather, envisioned Hays, the theater and screen would serve the interests 
of entertainment, of commercial amusement pure and simple. Allies wrote to Hays that 
his speech had “[t]ook all the sting out” of the hostile reception Hays elicited from 
exhibitors.50 Commercialism offered its heady rebuke to politicized American cinema.  
 Hays and exhibitor allies were already busy sidelining Cohen and aggressively 
developed contacts with more amenable power players in exhibition. One was Martin 
Quigley, devout Catholic and publisher of the Exhibitor’s Herald. “Mr. Hays—Friend or 
Enemy?” wrote the headline of a Quigley editorial weeks after Cohen and Hays’ dueling 
speeches. “[W]e feel warranted in assuming the integrity of his declarations,” wrote 
Quigley, “and that he is not permitting himself to be used as a catspaw by predatory 
interests which are opposed to the advancement of the exhibitor’s welfare.” Over the 
years, Hays won over Quigley, as he had countless others, with a friendly and persistent 
effort to incorporate Quigley’s concerns and proposals into a framework of industry 
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consolidation and coordination along terms most agreeable to the big producers. By the 
late 1920s, Quigley was a trusted adviser to Hays, and along with Daniel Lord, drafted 
some of the first iterations of what became the Production Code.  
 With a uniform contract in place by June 1922, Hays continued to press the MPTOA 
for an agreement of terms throughout the fall and winter of 1922. Several theater owners 
expressed their satisfaction with the uniform contract, but a few items proved to be 
sticking points, and Cohen’s organization stalled. By February, 1923, the MPTOA had 
drafted a response to the MPPDA, claiming that “certain Producers and Distributors, and 
even a few theatre owners” regarded the uniform contract as “a finished proposition.” 
The MPTOA accused the Hays of unscrupulous publicity, claiming there had been a broad 
agreement when in reality “you had no power other than to carry out [producers and 
distributors’] instructions.” Cohen was particularly incensed that Hays championed the 
contract as a cost-saving measure that would bring about efficiencies to lower 
admissions charges. The cost of film to the theater owner, argued Cohen, was increasing, 
and exhibitors were in no shape to publicize lower admissions prices in a national trade 
magazine.51 Hays was apoplectic—Cohen’s letter had “made no impression on the 
industry” and Cohen himself was merely “the head of a paper national organization.” 
Both New York state and New York City’s exhibitor associations agreed to all the clauses 
of the uniform contract, wrote Hays, and “Cohen’s own group agreed to 17 out of 20 
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causes.”52    
 A significant worry for Hays was keeping a unified front, and that meant 
concessions to certain smaller and more independent producers, most of which did not 
own theater chains. Warner Brothers, for example, at that time a small outfit without a 
distribution arm, let alone theater chains, was pressured by exhibitor interests to fight 
against the Hays combine. “[I]s it your intention of remaining independent,” the Rialto 
Theatre interests put it bluntly to Warners, “or are you expecting the Hays organization 
to run your pictures?” Warners tried to ride the fence, asserting that “it is no secret that 
we are members of the Hays organization and friends of the motion picture theatre 
owners in fact of all exhibitors.” “[W]e are not a national organization and don’t operate 
our own exchanges therefore [we] do not see why the burden should fall on us.” Joe 
Philips, secretary of the Motion Picture Theatre Owners of Texas, pressed Warners 
further: “the film men are past masters at passing the buck, beginning at the film peddler 
and not even ending at the producer … who is responsible for the millions of wasted 
money in production and the cost is all charged up to the exhibitor.” Smalltime Warners 
had a choice—side with their well-financed competitors—or strike out with exhibitors to 
fight against the movie trust. 
 Warners stuck with Hays and the Association, while another smaller production 
outfit—Vitagraph—distanced themselves from Hays and the MPPDA. Vitagraph’s origins 
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stretched back to the 19th century, whose founders—Albert Edward Smith and James 
Stuart Blackton—were Englishmen who had both immigrated to America as children. 
Vitagraph was one of the 10 company members of Edison’s Motion Picture Patents 
Company, and so had a history of benefitting from monopolistic control in the industry. 
The company suffered in World War I as foreign distributors dried up, and by 1922, was 
in serious financial trouble.53 Vitagraph sought to withdraw from the Association on 
October 11, 1922, but paid member dues all the way up to January 10, 1925. Exhibitor’s 
and the press seized on Vitagraph’s withdrawal from the MPPDA. “We congratulate 
President Smith and the Vitagraph Company of America on the position taken,” wrote 
an MPTOA release. The MPTOA went further, emphasizing the link between vertical 
integration in the industry and the preponderance of salacious and immoral pictures:  
The Motion Picture Theatre is a community institution and the Theatre 
Owner a leader in thought and action in his or her own locality … the 
complete coordination of the public mind is thus brought about and 
directed along constructive and progressive lines. This is one of the 
highest purposes of the Theatre Owner everywhere and can only be 
realized fully where the Exhibitor has some interest in the locality … 
Large blocks of Theatres are now owned by Producing and Distributing 
companies. It is such a manufacturer’ monopoly of what may be termed 
the retail division of the business which encourages the presentation of 
objectionable pictures.54  
  
This idea of independent production as a better source of “clean and wholesome” 
pictures may appear antithetical to our understanding of the film industry today, but in 
the mid-1920s, there were still alternatives to the big producer studio system, namely 
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educational, religious, and industrial pictures, most of which were classified as 
independent films. But for many industry insiders, political observers, and even some 
reformers, consolidation along big producer lines gave the industry coordinated capacity 
to control the site of production, institutionalize a regulatory body, and solve the moral 
problem of American cinema. 
 Hays began studying the the anti-trust case against the Motion Picture Patents 
Company in the 1910s. As Courtland Smith wrote confidentially to Hays, “in the old days 
there was a film trust. A real film trust.” “Now Albert Smith claims to be champion of 
independents and clean pictures and of the small exhibitor,” but, Smith continued, “he 
was an important part of the cruelest, the most abusive, the most indecent trust that this 
industry has ever known or could ever know.” Wrote J. D. Williams of Paramount to Hays, 
“they [Vitagraph] are bolshevists at heart so don’t get discouraged … they are too old to 
learn new ideas.” Henry Ford and other nativists also seized on the trust issue: 
“Independents Expose Corrupt Jew Movie Trust – Hays Organization charged with 
strangling competition—Oriental Jewish Immorality in Films, as analyzed by Henry 
Ford.” The article, from The American Standard, played on the old fear of organized 
liquor: “As soon as the Jew gained control of American liquor, we had a liquor problem 
with drastic consequences. As soon as the Jew gained control of the ‘movies,’ we had a 
movie problem.”55 “What is there about the movie industry which requires a monopoly,” 
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wondered the Worcester Telegram, “[t]heir chief function is to entertain. Would not 
unlimited competition among the producers give us better entertainment?”56 Amid the 
furor, which had turned noticeably political in its attacks on the “Jewish Movie Trust,” 
Vitagraph released a statement that it refused to believe that “justice to the distributors 
and to the public and to those independent producers who are not theater owning 
exhibitors can be obtained thru the labors of the MPPDA.”57 To make matters worse, 
exhibitors Charles J. O’Reilly and Nathan Burkan threatened a suit under the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act if their negotiations with the legal team of the MPPDA should fail, and 
during the January to March legislative sessions of 1925, 3 bills to prohibit block-booking 
were introduced in 3 different states.58 
 For Hays and his big producer members in Hollywood, everything seemed to be 
unraveling, exacerbated by a climate of nativism that saw the Ku Klux Klan at the peak 
of its state and local political power. The financial situation at Vitagraph, however, was 
worse than anyone realized. It lost credit at its bank, the Guaranty Trust, and failed to 
secure a $200,000 loan to continue operations. With financial pressure mounting and the 
company in the middle of the war between the Association and exhibitors, Vitagraph was 
bought about by Warner Brothers in March 1925. It was a stunning move in the movie 
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world—one of the oldest studios had been swallowed up by smalltime producers from 
Youngstown, Ohio. For Warners, who would capitalize on Vitagraph’s seldom-used 
sound synchronization technology, it was the beginning of a spectacular ascent into the 
highest levels of the industry. With the successful release of The Jazz Singer, Warners 
bought out First National, adding a first-class set of theater chains to its impressive 
distribution and sound- synchronized production outfits.  
 Meanwhile, exhibitors were organizing into combinations for block buying in an 
effort to break the stranglehold by big producers. Theater combines were formed in 
Oklahoma, two in Atlanta, in Portland under the name Multnomah Theatres, Inc., by 
Charles Kline in South Dakota and Wyoming, and by Sol Lesser on the West Coast.59 
Pittsburgh’s Moving Picture Bulletin wrote that, since the uniform contract was not 
equitable, “make it a business principle to have an understanding with your competitor 
and work together.” Gabriel Hess at Goldwyn Pictures passed this article off to Hays, who 
attributed the article to Fred Herrington of the Motion Picture Theatre Owners of 
Western Pennsylvania. Hess advised Hays to hold on to the article, as it “may be valuable 
at some future time for prosecution under the United States statutes.” If exhibitors 
wanted to attack the producer trust, Hays and the Association could take on the 
combines in exhibition.  
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 Hays attempted to leverage the Association’s publicity of developing the non-
theatrical field against organized exhibitors. The Association developed an agreement 
that would give the non-theatrical circuit access to films after a one year exclusive 
“protection” for commercial exhibitors. This agreement was passed off to exhibitor’s 
organizations, likely as both a warning and a signal that the Association will handle non-
commercial interests without exhibitors input. “I think it is a mistake,” wrote an 
unauthored Association memo, “to ask exhibitors for their opinion about the non-
theatrical field. They will offer many wild suggestions and we will merely encourage 
them to go out, each with his own plan …”60 Big producers and organized exhibitors were 
heading for open warfare. “The showdown would be coming on the question of non-
theatrical films,” wrote Courtland Smith, after his meeting with William “Al” Steffes, a 
powerful Midwestern exhibitor. Hays had been “kidding the exhibitors all along,” 
promising unity over the non-theatrical issue, but in reality encouraging non-
commercial exhibitions such as a Famous Players movie shown at a baseball park in 
South Dakota, and free movies shown in Dallas, Texas area parks.61 
 Although the situation appeared bad for the big producers, censorship agitation, 
Klan mobilization, exhibitor power, anti-trust investigations, and non-theatrical 
interests were all at their peak, and all would begin to wane by 1926. With a strong 
financial position, effective publicity gained through industry coordination, and a 
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powerful Republican insider at the helm of their Association, Hollywood’s big producers 
could weather the storm. Publicly, Hays stressed the good work of the arbitration boards 
to defuse the situation with exhibitors. Arbitration through boards had been in place by 
October, 1923, and out of 11,197 cases, only 15 went to the seventh, impartial arbitrator 
for a tie break.62 The system was working, argued Hays, and the Association had brought 
about much needed organization to the movie industry. Quietly, however, Hays and the 
Association knew that using non-commercial cinema to leverage cooperation with 
exhibitors (while using nitrate celluloid to leverage against non-commercial interests) 
were the necessary preconditions for industry development. Consolidation with big 
producers at the center of power was the ultimate goal. In a confidential memo, 
Courtland Smith suggested a far-sighted solution to the “serious fight … breaking forth 
in this industry”—coordinated consolidation among the major producers: 
Pot 1: Famous Players, First National, and MGM; Pot 2: Pathé Universal, 
Fox; Pot 3: Producers Dist., Educational, UA; Pot 4: Warner Bros., F. B. O., 
and Vitagraph. I list the three great companies, around which the industry 
should be built, in the first classification. In the second classification are 
the three companies that should be bought in the order named by the 
group. 1. Pathé should be bought by Famous because it would give them 
a great newsreel and the control of the short subject field which they may 
go into. Universal should be bought by First National because it would 
give them the great production plant they need. Fox should be bought by 
Metro Goldwyn because it would give them a newsreel and production for 
the smaller field, thus rounding out their product. The third classification 
should make distributing arrangements with the combination of classes 
one and two: Producers Distributing with Famous; Educational with First 
National; UA with Metro-Goldwyn. The fourth classification could be 
purchased reasonably or could be allowed to eliminate itself or could be 
allowed to head the independent movement that will certainly 
materialize, even if composed only of the rag-tag and bob-tail of the 
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industry. 
 If this plan were put through quietly and effectively it would clean up 
the entire situation and make it impossible to upset the industry by 
internal fights.63  
 
Many of these mergers did not happen, but the memo shows how far-reaching the 
Association was in their attempts to coordinate the consolidation of the industry. Hays 
sent signals to favored producers just where and what was available for aggressive 
buyouts. Warner Brothers, for example, were able to buy up Vitagraph and First National 
while supporting Hays and the MPPDA against exhibitor-coordinated action, positioning 
themselves as a major studio in the 1930s and 40s. 
 Further opportunities arose over a new Connecticut state tax on motion picture 
exhibition in the late summer of 1925. Hays threatened to pull all movies out of 
Connecticut, using coordinated distribution to dry up the movie theaters in a political 
maneuver aimed both at defeating the tax and weakening exhibitors. “The motion 
picture industry does not propose to be longer the plaything of politics and professional 
reformers,” Hays stated emphatically, “we will withdraw entirely from the state.”64 Hays 
met with Connecticut exhibitors at the MPPDA office in a testy and revealing exchange. 
“If we want to keep our theaters open,” stated Mr. Walsh, an exhibitor’s representative, 
“we have got to assume this tax … [l]ots of the small fellows cannot afford to close up.” 
Hays spoke up: “The authority you have—whom do you represent?” Mr. Walsh stated 
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that he represented 168 theaters in Connecticut, and that closing these theaters over a 
tax was simply not feasible. Walsh implied that theater owners would have to obtain 
films from somewhere. In the transcript of the meeting, someone identified only as “A 
VOICE” pressed Walsh: “If this Association cut off your pictures, would you solicit 
pictures from other sources?” MPPDA secretary Charles Pettijohn answered no first, 
immediately followed by Walsh, who also said no.65 The Connecticut tax controversy 
revealed that, when push came to shove, exhibitors were largely powerless and the 
MPPDA could dictate terms.  
 Hays was clearly running the show. He instructed exhibitors on what to say and 
whom to say it to, and each successive victory over censorship, regulation, or taxation 
gave him a stronger hand in the industry to coordinate action and keep exhibitors in line. 
Hays ultimately agreed to let the contracts with distributors run their course in 
Connecticut, but instructed exchanges to make no new contracts. By winter, 1925, 
Connecticut’s movie theaters were gradually losing first run movie content. The state’s 
governor, John H. Trumbull, convened several conferences as a political fury erupted 
over the closing of some 160 movie theaters. Trumbull, a Republican, was also quietly 
worked on by Hays. The boycott would loom for several months, and with each passing 
day the Association seemed in a stronger bargaining position. “It seems to be the 
consensus of opinion generally,” stated Governor Trumbull in a long-awaited statement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Minutes of meeting between Connecticut theatre owners and the MPPDA, August, 1925. WHHP, vol. 1, 
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to the press, “that this law works hardships on the Connecticut theatre owners not 
anticipated and that it should be amended or modified.”66 By December, 1925, 
distribution to Connecticut theatres was restored. A standard contract between 
distributors and exhibitors was agreed to on February 5, 1926. Although anti-trust action 
was to remain in some capacity through the 1920s and 30s, the war with exhibitors was 
effectively over and big producer power, facilitated by the MPPDA, would reign for the 
next 22 years. It was not until the 1948 Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Paramount that studio moguls agreed to sell off their theater chains and end block-
booking.  
 
Coda 
 The political fights of the 1910s and 20s laid the cornerstones of the classic studio 
system, and in so doing shaped much of the features of consumptive capitalism, 
orienting economic power toward consolidated forces of production and away from the 
more localized conceptions of retail and consumer power. Consumer purchasing power 
would drive economic growth, but not determine industry arrangements or regulatory 
concerns. In the movie industry, this shift necessitated a depoliticization of the screen 
that disarmed the democratic potential of propagandistic cinema. This process of 
depoliticization was necessarily political, however, and was threaded through anxieties 
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of progressivism, prohibition, the Ku Klux Klan, and contestations over the development 
of the modern Republican Party.   
 Early American exhibitors were motivated by their economic interests, of course, 
but saw much of this interest in its social binds to the community. Exhibitors had a public 
interest in democracy that furthered economic ends, a role amplified to remarkable 
degrees in the first World War. The motion picture theater was for many a social 
institution, an arena of democracy. Theatre owners sought various combinations, and 
often articulated film exhibition through discourse of localized, progressive, and 
political ideals. By the 1920s, this proved no match for big producer organization, which 
managed to shape the American film industry away from non-commercial cinema, 
exhibitor-centered interests, and federal/state regulation, all while battering and 
exploiting both nativist insurgencies and prohibition. In shifting the politics of 
propaganda to the politics of publicity, Hays was able to shape the trajectory of the movie 
industry in ways that opened cultural paths toward the development of modern 
liberalism—a depoliticized and commercial field of expression.  
 The liquor interests’ use in personal liberty—binding the liberty of consumption to 
the liberty of free expression—was not a transformative moment for liberalism but a 
failure, a possibility closed off by the moral politics of progressivism. The controversies 
surrounding The Birth of a Nation deepened the cleavage between social justice and free 
expression, further limiting the development of modern liberalism in ways that cast the 
politics of speech to the realm of civil libertarianism and defined the path toward 20th 
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century liberalism along the lines of equal justice. These cleavages along moral, speech, 
and economic lines were movie-made social formations, but the social power of the 
cinema—its power to shape public thought through images on the screen—required a 
thick negotiation of politics. Propagandistic cinema was tested in America’s war effort, 
only to be tied to the fading progressive state.  
 These cultural and ideational conditions of the movie’s social power shift in the 
1920s to more instrumental and operational work of depoliticization and economic 
consolidation. Producers installed Will Hays as president of their trade association, who 
set about clearing difficult political ground—negotiating Republican patronage, the 
ascendant Ku Klux Klan, federal prohibition, and the waning political activism of 
progressive reformers and pro-censorship figures in and out of government. Certain 
cultural and ideational conflicts are resolved, others simply absconded away, and a kind 
of political amnesia is explicitly constructed by Hays and the big producers (the movie 
industry has never done propaganda). Much of this political negotiation was furthered 
for economic ends, namely to provide breathing room for the coordinated activities of 
the big producers and the consolidation of the industry in ways that directly benefitted 
these emerging moguls of Hollywood. 
 From a policy stand point, the distrust of consolidation in the movie industry 
worked to antithetical ends of the progressive moralists, who consistently attacked the 
“movie trust” as the source of immoral and dangerous influence. But a trust—more 
specifically a big producer trust—was precisely what was needed to control and master 
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the social capacity of the screen. We see in the subsequent development of the 
production code a capacity for moral regulation, remarkably cautious, if not 
conservative, that could have only happened through vertical integration and 
coordinated practices of big producers. Moralists assailed big producer control as the 
source of movies “capable of evil” without much consideration of the way in which 
organizational and scientific management in industry development could effectively 
manage these moral anxieties. An industry dominated by Jewish immigrant 
entrepreneurs exacerbated the dissonance between consolidation and moral control. It 
might have been easier for the blue nose moralists to see consolidation as the solution 
to the moral problem of cinema had the industry remained in control of non-Jewish 
industrialists.  
 Consolidation and scientific management actually fit with late progressive-
economic thinking, particularly in the Common Law restoration in anti-trust law, and a 
paradox emerges in the progressive-moralist concern over the big producer trust in the 
1920s. but the movies were an infant industry quickly dominated by ethnic immigrants, 
and this is what limited its path toward consolidated regulation. Why did the MPPDA 
succeed in consolidation whereas the Edison Trust had failed a decade previous? Edison’s 
combine had a bottom-up hold on the manufacturing output of raw materials and the 
patents that protected those inventions. Controlling the materials of production was 19th 
century industrial thinking. It could not attend to the ideology and social power of 
moving images. But the masters of cinema—the moguls—could not embrace and foster 
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this social power. It had to be scuttled and buried, tamped into an industrial process of 
movie-making, of entertainment pure and simple. The social power of the cinema, in 
short, had to be controlled and institutionalized.  
 The dream factory was, in its ideal, an aesthetic attack on ideology itself—the 
triumph of style, spectacle, story, intrigue, and emotion over the raw power of ideas in 
their social form. The story of the depoliticization of American movies is, in one sense, 
the withering of a particular conception of ideology (cinematic, democratic, and overtly 
political) and the triumph of commercial entertainment in the American movie industry, 
a triumph that subsequently shaped some of the contours of modern liberalism and 
consumer capitalism. The MPPDA and the emerging movie moguls succeeded where 
Edison failed because they had negotiated the necessary path of economic coordination 
to moral control, and subsequently, economic consolidation to moral mastery.  
 The masters of cinema, Richard Schickel has suggested, were not those concerned 
with the hardware of the movie industry, but those concerned with the software of the 
movies themselves—the images and ideas reflected off the picture sheet. The moguls 
mastered the industry by controlling the ideational power of moving pictures, not by 
fostering an ideational medium of democratic expression. Control of this social power in 
movies emanated from the perception of moral authority and the institutionalization of 
moral self-regulation. Without such moral authority, the movies may have never risen 
to such a powerful position in American culture and economy. The consequences were 
not only felt by the movie industry—the moral authority necessary for the development 
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of American cinema also created the conditions for the triumph of consumer capitalism 
in the American economy.  
 Consumer spending today accounts for approximately 70% of the total U.S. 
economic output.67 The rise of consumer spending as the economic engine of American 
capitalism has been traced to corporate decision-making in the 1920s and 30s, both as a 
strategy of economic survival and as an attempt to counter government policies of 
planning and managing the economy.68 This history of consumerism necessarily touches 
on motion pictures as a powerful instrument of persuasion, one of the many mediums 
through which “image managers, spin doctors, and legions of ideological cosmeticians 
routinely package truth for public consumption.”69 But little attention has been paid to 
the development of this industry and its relationship to the rise of retail and consumer 
capitalism. More than a medium of persuasion, the growth and consolidation of the 
motion picture industry, and the political contests that emerged from its development, 
shaped the contours of modern consumer capitalism.  
 Politics has been effectively denatured from today’s American consumer culture, a 
culture that traffics in ideals but often fails to provide a medium of ideas. But a system 
of denatured dreams is itself an ideology. Commercialism has reached its apotheosis in 
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American visual culture. The cinematic production value of entertainment is the 
currency of consumer capitalism. From the dream factory of classic Hollywood to the 
Super Bowl commercials of today, the optics of American culture have developed a 
profound celebration of commercialism that is cinematic, triumphant, and irrepressibly 
entertaining. Political meaning can be gleaned, but only through the recesses of identity. 
Gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality are constructed from the screens of contemporary 
culture. It is not the realm of ideas or deliberation, but the realm of feeling and the story 
of personhood. Today’s visual culture may have been radically different had the movie 
men of Hollywood not denatured the American movie screen. In the final account, the 
ideology that most visibly emerges from the political conflicts in the early twentieth 
century movie industry is the ideology that rests at the fault line between modern 
liberalism and civil libertarianism, between government as an instrument and the people 
as harbingers of expression, between a persuasive state and the will of consumers and 
culture-makers, between propaganda and free speech.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
303	  
REFERENCES CITED 
 
American Brewers’ Review, vol. 24–30, 1910–1916. Chicago. 
 
Anderson, Alexis J. “The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870–1915.” 
American Journal of Legal History 24 (1980): 56. 
 
Anti-Prohibition Manual, 1915–18. Cincinnati, OH: Publicity Department of the 
National Association of Distillers and Wholesale Dealers.  
 
Baker, Newton D. “Law, Police and Social Problems.” Atlantic Monthly 116, no. 1 (July 
1915). 
 
Butters, Gerald. Banned in Kansas: Motion Picture Censorship, 1915–1966. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2007. 
 
California Beer Wholesalers Assn., Ince v. Alcoholic Bev. Etc. Appeals Bd. (1971), 5 Cal. 3d 
402, 407–408. 
 
Calkins, Raymond. Substitutes for the Saloon: An Investigation Made for the Committee of 
Fifty. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1901. 
 
Campbell, Craig W. Reel America and World War I. Jefferson NC: McFarland & 
Company, 1985. 
 
Chafee Jr., Zechariah. Freedom of Speech. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1920. 
 
Chamberlin, Bill F., and Charlene J. Brown, eds. The First Amendment Reconsidered. 
London: Longman, 1982. 
 
Chandler Jr., Alfred D. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business, 1895–1904. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. 
 
Chicago City Manual. Chicago: Bureau of Statistics and Municipal Library, May 17, 1915. 
 
Chicago Municipal Code of 1922. Chicago, 1923. 
 
City of Portland Archives and Records. Office of the City Auditor, Portland, Oregon. 
 
	  
304	  
Cooper Jr., John Milton. Woodrow Wilson, A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2009. 
 
Couvares, Francis G. Movie Censorship and American Culture. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1996. 
 
Creel, George. How We Advertised America. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1920. 
 
———. The War, The World, and Wilson. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1920. 
 
Dalton, Curt. “Dayton’s Forgotten ‘Silent Movie’ Theaters.” Dayton History Books 
Online, 2013, http://www.daytonhistorybooks.com/page/page/1475782.htm 
(accessed on 4/27/2015).  
 
Davis, Marni. Jews and Booze: Becoming American in the Age of Prohibition. New York: 
NYU Press, 2014. 
 
Deland, Margaret. “The Change in the Feminine Ideal.” Atlantic Monthly 105 (March 
1910): 290–302. 
 
Duffus, R. L. “Behind the Strange Spectacle.” New York Times, October 2, 1927. 
 
Duis, Perry. The Saloon: Public Drinking in Chicago and Boston, 1880 to 1920. Urbana-
Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 
 
Editorial. “A Few Thoughts and a Superfluity of Words,” Interstate Medical Journal (June 
1916). 
 
Engelman, Peter C. A History of the Birth Control Movement. ABC-CLIO, 2011. 
 
Everson, William K. American Silent Film. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2009. 
 
Ewen, Stuart. Captains of Consciousness: Advertising & the Social Roots of the Consumer 
Culture. New York: Basic Books, 2001. 
 
———. PR!: A Social History of Spin. New York: Basic Books, 1998. 
 
Exhibitor’s Trade Review, volumes 5 to 19, 1919 to 1926. New York: Exhibitor’s Trade 
Review, Inc. 
	  
305	  
 
Fields, Armond. Tony Pastor: Father of Vaudeville. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007.  
 
Forest Lawn Memorial Park Association. Los Angeles, California. 
 
Freeman, James E. If Not the Saloon—What? New York: The Baker & Taylor Company, 
1908. 
 
Frohlich, Louis D. and Charles Schwartz. The Law of Motion Pictures. Ann Arbor: Baker, 
Voorhis, 1918. 
 
Gaines, Jane. Fire and Desire: Mixed Race Movies in the Silent Era. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000. 
 
Giffin, William W. “The Political Realignment of Black Voters in Indianapolis, 1924.” 
Indiana Magazine of History 79, no. 2, (1983): 133–66. 
 
Gilbert, Douglas. American Vaudeville, Its Life and Times. New York: Whittlesey House, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940. 
 
Gleason, Arthur Huntington. “The New York Saloon,” Collier’s 41, no. 5 (1908). 
 
Gomery, Douglas, ed. The Will Hays Papers, vol. 1 (reels 1–43) and 2 (reels 1–35). 
Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986. 
 
Grieveson, Lee. Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early Twentieth Century 
America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 
 
Griffith, D. W., papers, 1897–1954. 36 reels. Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1982. 
 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 96 (1915). 
 
Hammerling, Louis N. “How a Minority May Rule,” The American Leader (Dec. 28, 1916). 
 
Hawley, Ellis. The New Deal and the Problem with Monopoly. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966. 
 
Hays, Will H. The Memoirs of Will H. Hays. New York: Doubleday, 1955. 
 
	  
306	  
Hofstader, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1955. 
 
Horowitz, David A. Inside the Klavern: The Secret History of the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999. 
 
Irwin, Will. “Who Killed Margaret Lear?” Collier’s 41 (May 1908): 10. 
 
Jackson, Kenneth. The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915–1930. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967.  
 
Keller, Morton. Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in 
America, 1900–1933. Cambridge, Mass.: 1990. 
 
Kemp, Jennie M. “Foes of Sunday Rest: The Liquor Saloon,” in Sunday the World’s Rest 
Day: An Illustrated Story of the Fourteenth International Lord’s Day Congress Held 
in Oakland, California, July 27th to August 1st, 1915, During the Panama-Pacific 
International Exposition. New York Sabbath Committee, 1916. 
 
Kerr, K. Austin. Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-Saloon League. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 76–82. 
 
Ku Klux Klan, “Ku Klux Klan Officers, Indiana Records, 1925.” Indiana Historical 
Society Library Manuscript Collection. Indianapolis, Indiana, 1965. 
 
Lamoureaux, Naomi R. The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. 
 
Lay, Shawn, ed. The Invisible Empire in the West: Toward a New Historical Appraisal of 
the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992. 
 
Lehr, Dick. The Birth of a Nation: How a Legendary Filmmaker and a Crusading Editor 
Reignited America’s Civil War. New York: PublicAffairs, 2014. 
 
Lindsay, Vachel. The Art of the Moving Picture. New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1915. 
 
Link, Arthur S. Wilson: The New Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 
 
———, ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 69 vols. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966–94. 
	  
307	  
 
Lutholtz, M. William. Grand Dragon: D. C. Stephenson and the Ku Klux Klan of Indiana. 
West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1991.  
 
Machinists’ Monthly Journal. International Association of Machinists, 1920. 
 
McDonagh, Eileen. “The ‘Welfare Rights State’ and the ‘Civil Rights State’: Policy 
Paradox and State Building in the Progressive Era,” Studies in American Political 
Development 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 225–74. 
 
Michael Aronson. Nickelodeon City: Pittsburgh at the Movies, 1905–1929. Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 2008.  
 
Moore, Leonard J. Citizen Klansmen: The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1991. 
 
Motion Picture Magazine, vols. 18–24. Jamaica, New York: Brewster Publications, Inc. 
 
Motography, vols. XVII–XVIII, 1917–1918. New York and Chicago: Electricity Magazine 
Corporation. 
 
Moving Picture World, volumes 1 to 41, 1907 to 1919. New York: Chalmers Publishing 
Company. 
 
National Board of Review of Motion Pictures records. Manuscripts and Archives 
Division, New York Public Library. 
 
Nemec, David. The Beer and Whiskey League: The Illustrated History of the American 
Association—Baseball’s Renegade Major League. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 
2004. 
 
Okrent, Daniel. Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition. New York: Scribner, 2010, 48. 
 
Oregon State Archives. Oregon Secretary of State Offices. Salem, Oregon. 
 
Pearson, Daniel Merle. Baseball in 1889: Players vs. Owners. Bowling Green: Bowling 
Green State University Press, 1993. 
 
Rabban, David. Free Speech in its Forgotten Years, 1870–1920. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.  
 
	  
308	  
Regier, Cornelius. The Era of the Muckrakers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1932.  
 
Reiss, Steven. Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture in the 
Progressive Era. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 
 
Rogin, Michael. Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 87.  
 
San Francisco Board of Supervisors. San Francisco Municipal Reports for the Fiscal Year. 
Cosmopolitan Printing Company, 1905–1914. 
 
Sandburg, Carl and Arnie Bernstein. The Movies Are … Carl Sandburg’s Movie Reviews 
and Essays, 1920–1928. Chicago: Lake Claremont Press, 2000. 
 
Schickel, Richard. D. W. Griffith: An American Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1984. 
 
Sklar, Robert. Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies. 2nd edition. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
 
Skowronek, Stephen. “The Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, 
and the American Political Tradition.” American Political Science Review 100, no. 
3 (August 2006): 385–401. 
 
Slide, Anthony, ed. Robert Goldstein and the Spirit of ’76. Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow 
Press, 1993. 
 
———. Nitrate Won’t Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United States. Jefferson 
NC: McFarland & Company, 2000. 
 
Smith, Alfred E and Phil A. Koury. Two Reels and a Crank. Garden City, NY: Doubleday 
& Company, 1952. 
 
Solomon, Aubrey. The Fox Film Corporation, 1915–1935: A History and Filmography. 
Jefferson, NC: McFarland Press, 2011. 
 
South Bend News-Times. South Bend, Indiana, 1921. 
 
Stelzle, Charles. “Instead of John Barleycorn.” World Outlook 5 (1919). 
 
	  
309	  
Stokes, Melvyn. D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007.  
 
Szymanski, Anne-Marie E. Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social 
Movement Outcomes. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. 
 
Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World 
to the Present Day. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. 
 
The Brewers’ Journal, vols. 40–45, 1910–1915. New York and Chicago: Gibson 
Publishing Company. 
 
Toy, Eckard Vance. “Ku Klux Klan in Oregon.” Master’s Thesis, University of Oregon, 
1959.  
 
Tucker, Robert K. The Dragon and the Cross: The Rise and Fall of the Ku Klux Klan in 
Middle America. Hamden: Archon Books, 1992. 
 
Unauthored. “The New ‘Poor Man’s Club.’” Collier’s 53, no. 1 (Dec. 1915). 
 
United States Brewers’ Association. Yearbook, 1907–1920. New York: J. J. Little & Ives 
Co.  
 
Variety, vols. 64–69. New York: Variety, Inc. 
 
Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the 
Committee on Public Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1980. 
 
Vaught, Steve. “The President Comes to Hollywood.” Feb. 21, 2011, 
https://paradiseleased.wordpress.com/2011/02/21/the-president-comes-to-
hollywood-for-a-minute/ (accessed on 7/27/2015).  
 
Verbeek, Ann Gilliom. “The League and the Law: Arthur L. Gilliom and the Problem of 
Due Process in Prohibition-Era Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History 104, no. 4, 
289–326. 
 
Waller, Gregory. “Another Audience: Black Moviegoing from 1907 to 1916,” in Hark, 
Ina Rae, ed. Exhibition: The Film Reader. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Weekly Film Review, vols. 10–12. Atlanta, Georgia. 
	  
310	  
 
Weistblatt v. Bingham. NY Supreme Court, 58 Misc. 328, 1908. 
 
Wertheimer, John. “Freedom of Speech: Zechariah Chafee and Free-Speech History.” 
Reviews in American History 22, no. 2 (June 1994): 365–77. 
 
Young, Donald Ramsey. Motion Pictures: A Study in Social Legislation. Westbrook, ME: 
Westbrook Publishing Company, 1922. 
 
